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I. WHY Do WE HAVE THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY WE HAVE?
A.

Unnoticed NationalJudiciary Puzzles

If one pauses for a moment of thoughtful critique, the origins of our
national court system and its jurisdiction seem to be a great puzzle with
many unanswered questions, indeed an enigma. Why did the national
government need its own separate system of courts, when in the 1780s
The original spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and grammar of letters or documents have
been reproduced in the quotes therefrom used in this essay to the extent possible. Sometimes it has
proved impossible to reproduce precisely the various diacritical marks, punctuation, and abbreviation practices then in common usage.
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there were thirteen completely unctioning state court systems? The Articles of Confederation-the first Constitution of the United States-provided for no national courts. What was so deficient about the state
courts that the Framers felt a need to list the establishment of justice as
the second item in the preamble to the new Constitution? The goal was
not to augment justice or to perfect justice, but rather "to establish justice"-as though justice could not be found in the state courts. Why are
the provisions for that court system in article III of the new fundamental
law embodied in the Constitution so maddeningly terse, vague, and openended? Why do they include the puzzling category of jurisdiction over
suits involving citizens or subjects of foreign nations (hereinafter called
"alienage jurisdiction")? Why did the opponents of the Constitution
level their heavy guns at this vague new judiciary, claiming that it would
be the very engine of the subversion of the states and of the kind of democracy the Revolution had been fought to obtain? Why did the Judiciary Act of 1789 establish such a highly-articulated, three-tiered,
hierarchical judicial system, while perversely placing alienage jurisdiction and suits involving citizens of two or more states ("diversity jurisdiction") within federal trial jurisdiction but leaving cases arising under the
Constitution, treaties or federal laws ("federal question jurisdiction") to
those supposedly untrustworthy state courts? And why were the opponents of the Constitution much more pleased with the Judiciary Act of
1789-hailed in later years as one of the more remarkable and enduring
achievements of the First Congress-than were the supporters of the
Constitution, who overwhelmingly populated that First Congress?
Strangely enough, most historians have not noticed these questions.'
Despite two centuries of almost constant and often harsh struggle over
the power and place of our national courts-centuries during which
other questions about such courts have been endlessly debated-it has
seemed axiomatic to these historians that the nature and function of
courts are timeless and thus courts are all alike, that all governments
must have court systems, that our national court system was and is
merely a clone of other court systems, and that the Judiciary Act of 1789
followed in a more or less logical and expected way from these premises.
1. There are exceptions. John Frank in 1948 posed some extremely good questions for further
inquiry:
If it had not been for the necessity of settling international admiralty disputes, would either
the Convention or the Congress of 1789 have created a federal lower court system?...
Why-a mystery truly dark-why did the Congress of 1789 provide that appellate jurisdiction should be sufficient in federal question cases while there should be trial court jurisdiction in diversity cases? Why diversity at all? ... [T]here is sufficient mystery left in the
origins of the federal judiciary to keep a good many researchers busy for a long time.
Frank, HistoricalBases of the FederalJudicialSystem, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 28 (1948).
This essay seeks to answer all three questions.
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Apparently unaware that they were looking with narrow and highly
politicized hindsight, these whiggish historians 2 have confidently divorced law from politics in order to lavish praise upon "the growth of" a
supposedly neutral, apolitical, legalistic federal judiciary, and a judicial
system that supposedly has developed progressively into just the court

structure that our nation needs. 3 As a result, there has never been a good
critical history of the federal courts.
Such a history would tell the chronology of the origin of the federal
courts within a socioeconomic context. This essay is an attempt to begin
that history. The results turn out to be surprising and instructive.
B. A Solution to PoliticalProblems
A major puzzle at the very beginning is the astonishing lack of com-

ment upon the need for a national court system inthe period immediately before the Constitutional Convention.

As Judge Friendly

accurately told us, "A search of the letters and papers of the men who
were to frame the Constitution does not reveal that they had given any
'4
large amount of thought to the construction of a federal judiciary."
There was some talk about the need for national courts of admiralty during the Confederation period.5 Among the elements a Grand Committee

of Congress proposed to add to the Articles of Confederation in August
1786 was a "federal Judicial Court" to try national officers for crimes
2. For purposes of this essay, "whig" history assumes relatively uncritically that "now" is
both good and inevitable; it then sees the past as a relatively straight-line progression from a dark,
uncivilized, simple, disorganized "then" to a happy, genteel, sophisticated, efficient "now."
3. Although each is researched thoroughly and each contains its own excellences, prime examples of the whiggish history of our national courts are the classics: F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927); J.
GOEBEL, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971); C. WARREN, THE SUPREME

COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1928). This is true even of such recent ingenious
contributions as Aimar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985); Clinton, A Mandatory View of FederalCourt Jurisdiction:
A Guided Questfor the Original UnderstandingofArticle III, 132 U. PA. L. REV.741 (1984). Still
whiggish and positivistic, but better in terms of critique and a better historian is Casto, The First
Congress's Understandingof its Authority over the FederalCourts' Jurisdiction, 26 B.C.L. REV. 1101
(1985). Closer still to the criterion of critique, with many insights but still full of error and often
stubbornly wrongheaded, is W. CROSSKEY & W. JEFFREY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953 & 1980). Other modern writers have a much greater
sense of critique than the whiggish norm. See, e.g., Jay, OriginsofFederalCommon Law (pts. 1-2),
133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1231 (1985); Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). A genuinely critical history is W. RITz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF
THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW

EVIDENCE (1990).
4. Friendly, The HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (1927).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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and "misbehaviour in their Offices" and to sit upon appeals from "the
Judicial Courts of the several States" in cases dealing with national treaties, the law of nations, the powers of taxation, and the regulation of commerce which the Committee proposed also to give to Congress, or
"questions of importance [where] the United States shall be a party."' 6

This proposal died after desultory debate, without submission to the
states, and little else seems to have been said.
However, it would not be accurate to conclude from such a sparse
record, as Friendly concluded about diversity jurisdiction, that federal
courts were "not a product of difficulties that had been acutely felt under

the Confederation" or that "fears of local hostilities... had only a speculative existence in 1789." 7 As we shall see, debtors suffered "acutely"

during the Confederation period, thereby creating "difficulties" for creditors that the Constitution was designed to solve. 8 Debtors then by and
large opposed the Constitution. As one of the most sensitive and astute
political analysts among the creditor element reported, "the articles [of
the Constitution] relating to Treaties-to paper money, and to contracts,
created more enemies than all the errors in the System positive and negative put together." 9
The federal court system was established to attempt to deal with
what the Framers considered to be problems of the first order of social
difficulty, problems intrinsic to the economic history of the 1780s. During this period, creditors and proto-capitalistic elements were confronted
6. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 497 (J. Fitzpatrick ed.
1934) [hereinafter JOURNALS]. The restricted jurisdiction proposed for the court probably reflects
the politics of the committee members. Three of the thirteen later became ardent Anti-Federalists
(Nathan Dane of Massachusetts, Melancton Smith of New York, and Timothy Bloodworth of North
Carolina), another became a Jeffersonian (Charles Pinckney of South Carolina), and a fifth was to
oppose the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a member of Congress (Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire).
This probably also accounts for the proposal's exclusion of Members of Congress and other national
officials from being judges, and for its provision "that the trial of the fact by Jury shall ever be held
sacred, and also the benefits of the writ of Habeas Corpus." Id. at 497-98. For a discussion of the
proposal, see M. JENSEN, THE NEw NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 418-20 (1950).
7. Friendly, supra note 4, at 484, 510. To do Friendly justice, he recognized that local animosity was tremendously important in the establishment of alienage jurisdiction, and that "a general
feeling in favor of centralizing the administration of maritime law" also existed. Id. at 484 n.6.
Friendly's views have become orthodoxy through their acceptance by Felix Frankfurter. See
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 499, 520 (1928); Frank, supra note 1, at 22-28. Friendly has been challenged, however, in a
perceptive but short treatment that prefigures the sorts of findings and discussion of the origins of
federal jurisdiction forming the heart of this essay. See Yntema & Jaffin, PreliminaryAnalysis of
Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869, 873-76 (1931).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 59-96, 106-26.
9. Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, reprinted in 11 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 297 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds. 1977) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
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with state legislatures and courts that responded in a more or less democratic fashion to the needs and desires of an essentially debtor-oriented,
pre-capitalist majority of the citizenry. The creditor element-many
merchants, some planters, lawyers, most of those involved in speculation
in commercial paper and land, all those (mostly in the cities of the seaboard) caught up in the ethos of competitive individualism that is part
and parcel of the world of capitalism, then coming to power-viewed
such activity as dangerous, contemptibly immoral, and the product of
irrational, localistic bias.
The founding of our national judiciary thus is an episode in the rise
to dominance of capitalistic social relations in the United States.' 0 This
rise was not inevitable, however, nor did capitalism have to take the
shape it did in nineteenth century America; rather, the story is one of
intense struggle, with the strength of the opponents of capitalism particularly great in the 1780s and 1790s, and remaining powerful until the
slaveocracy was crushed in the Civil War. That strength led to the immediate addition of a Bill of Rights to the Constitution and, more importantly, to a host of serious compromises when the judiciary was
established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.11 The next section of this essay
will detail the reasons for a national judiciary that some Americans saw,
reasons that can be understood only from within the context of the socioeconomic history of the new United States during the Confederation
period.
The third and fourth sections tell the story of the invention of that
national judiciary. The third deals with the Constitutional Convention
and the struggle for ratification that ensued. The fourth section elucidates the compromises resulting from this struggle that became the heart
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and shows that many parts of the Act reflected the battles between debtors and creditors in the new Republic.
Whereas today our lives and world are so imbued with the creditor
morality, language, and worldview that we find it difficult to imagine the
position their opponents took, and while we whiggishly think that this
10. One recent study in the American legal history of this period, which roughly parallels this
essay in its approach and findings, shows how the disappearance of indentured servitude, the emergence of free labor, and the differentiation of slavery from other forms of unfree labor common
theretofore (all legal categories) were all part of the rise to dominance of capitalistic social relations.
R. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor in the United States (unpublished manuscript [in my
possession] 1989); see also Steinfeld, PropertyandSuffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN.

L. REv. 335 (1989) (arguing that the exclusion of paupers from suffrage was integral to the history
of American democracy in the nineteenth century).
A short discussion of the utility of my loose categories of debtors and creditors, and of the
relevance of the organizing principles of "capitalism" and class to the subject of this essay is found at
infra note 28. A longer discussion of class is provided in Appendix 2.
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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triumph was not only inevitable but also must have occurred in Congress
in 1789,12 the greatest surprise to be derived from the history of the invention of the national judiciary is that the compromises written into the
Judiciary Act of 1789 in large part favored debtors.
II.
A.

THE SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE JUDICIARY

Local Bias and Admiralty

Prizes of war and other ships captured by American privateers during the Revolution occasioned the earliest grumblings about local bias
and its Siamese twin (but more neutral-sounding) argument, the lack of
uniformity in commercial law. Whether a vessel or its cargo was in law a
prize of war and who would receive the proceeds once a prize was declared, were questions within the jurisdiction of admiralty courts and admiralty law. As early as November 1775, Congress recommended to the
states that they establish separate admiralty courts to deal with captured
ships, although Congress purported to retain full authority to adjudicate
appeals. 13 Apparently in reaction to autocratic practices of British ViceAdmiralty courts, Congress also recommended that facts be determined
by juries, an ancient English method of asserting popular control over
judges that was theretofore foreign to admiralty practice. Ten of the
thirteen states established such courts and all used juries, while at least
12. For example, in Marbury, Why Should We Limit FederalDiversity Jurisdiction?,46 A.B.A.
J. 379, 380 (1960), William Marbury confidently asserts:
It is generally agreed that the institutions of the Federal Government reflected to a marked
degree the need of the commercial community for a stabilizing agency in the chaotic situation which was paralyzing commerce in the states supposedly united under the Articles of
Confederation, and subjecting the infant nation to economic suffocation. The thrust of the
forces which we associate with [Alexander] Hamilton's name was all in the direction of reestablishing confidence in those entrepreneurs on whose willingness to take risks the building of the nation depended.... Hamilton... insisted that judicial institutions of known
stability be created to which the citizens of every state might look for protection if they
ventured beyond the communities where they were on familiar ground.
Id. No critique of the entrepreneurial position, not the faintest concern for debtors (who must also
have been in chaos), no hint that any other future besides capitalistic commercialized growth might
have been useful and good, not the slightest thought that all the key words in his language assume
the correctness of a pro-creditor position (especially including the supposedly neutral ones such as
"confidence," "stability," or--one he did not use but could have---"uniformity"), ruffled the calm
whiggishness of Mr. Marbury's prose.

13. H.

BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE

COURT OP THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787, at 44-48, 57-75 (1977). Bourguignon provides
an expanded discussion of the material in this section. Id. at 57-75, 101-34, 243-51, 297-343.
Although deficient in some respects, particularly in its failure to indicate the degree and promptness
of enforcement by state courts of most decrees of the federal admiralty appeals courts,
Bourguignon's study clearly supersedes all previous treatments of the national judicial experience in
admiralty law during the Confederation. See also 3. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 147-82.
For the Congressional resolves of 1775, see 3 JOURNALS, supra note 6, at 371-75.
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one of the three states that apparently relied14 on their colonial admiralty

establishments also permitted trial by jury.
The jurisdiction given to the new admiralty courts, however, varied
widely from state to state, and several states decided to restrict the right
of appeal to Congress. Massachusetts and New Hampshire, for example,
passed quite restrictive statutes, at first allowing an appeal to Congress
only when made by owners of ships commissioned and fitted out by Congress, later adding appeals by foreigners with whom the United States

was not at war. Contrarily, Virginia at first allowed appeals only by
enemies with whom the United States was at war, then later allowed all
appeals save those where both parties were Virginia citizens.15
In notorious cases, Pennsylvania's court refused to enforce a federal

decree overturning its admiralty jury's prior determination of facts, and
New Hampshire refused to enforce a federal decree emanating from an

appeal taken by an American citizen whose ship had not been fitted out
by Congress. 16 Although much remains to be investigated, it is clear that
several other federal decrees failed because of a lack of enforcement (or
at least swift enforcement) by state courts, 17 demonstrating in Henry
Bourguignon's words that "at the time it must have been clear to all that
the states ultimately could determine how far congressional writs could
run.9

18

The state courts also showed little respect for the decrees of other
states. Aaron Lopez, a wealthy Jewish merchant from Boston who

owned extensive property in Jamaica, had his ship Hope seized by two
Connecticut privateers in 1778. At trial in Hartford County Court, the
14. H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 13, at 59.
15. Id. at 60-61, 64-65, 70-71.
16. The first instance, that of The Active, is treated comprehensively by H. BOURGUIGNON,
supra note 13, at 101-11, 322-23. The litigation lasted intermittently until 1809, culminating in a
federal trial of Pennsylvania militia officers who forcibly resisted federal marshals-marshals who in
turn were enforcing a decree of the Supreme Court upholding the federal award made in 1778. See
Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 160 (1792); Olmstead v. The Active, 18 F. Cas. 680 (C.C. D.
Pa. 1809) (No. 10,503a); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); United States v.
Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C. D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647).
The second instance, that of The Lusanna, treated comprehensively by H. BOURGUIGNON,
supra note 13, at 242-51, 307-17, also resulted in an important Supreme Court decision, one that
upheld Congress's 1775 arrogation of plenary appellate authority to itself in prize cases. See Pennhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 53 (1795) (vessel erroneously called "The Susanna").
17. E.g., The Sally (Spencer v. Peters), discussed in H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 13, at 265 &
n.61; Hope (Lopez v. Brooks), discussed in Friedman, Aaron Lopez'Long Deferred Hope, 37 PUBL.
AM. JEWISH HIST. Soc'Y 103 (1947) (Connecticut trial court refused to enforce 1779 federal decree,
but Connecticut Superior Court reversed and enforced the decree in 1783). I am indebted to Wil.
liam Casto for this last reference. Bourguignon notes the federal decree in Hope, but does not deal
with Connecticut's intransigence on remand. H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 13, at 226 & n.105, 253
n.31.
18. H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 13, at 318.
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privateers offered flimsy evidence that Lopez was a Tory, whereas Lopez
produced substantial evidence to the contrary. The judge refused two
verdicts from the jury, presumably in Lopez' favor, and impaneled a second jury that obligingly found against the Massachusetts citizen. 19 In
1779, a Massachusetts jury awarded a prize entirely to a capturing Massachusetts privateer despite the latter's clear agreement with a Rhode
Island privateer to share all prizes, and the decree was affirmed by the
Massachusetts superior court. 20 In that same year two neutral vessels
from Spain were captured, and a Massachusetts court awarded one of the
ships and both cargoes to the privateers as British property. The Massachusetts superior court denied an appeal to Congress until the Massachusetts admiralty statute was amended to allow appeals by friendly
foreigners; the federal court promptly reversed except as to part of the
cargo of one of the vessels. 21 Connecticut privateers regularly plundered
ships belonging to New York citizens who lived on Long Island, which
was under nominal British authority, and their actions were upheld by
the Connecticut admiralty courts when they claimed prize, without proof
of any actual British ownership or involvement. 2 2 These examples
demonstrate why local bias against nonlocal citizens, both American and
foreign, was obvious to many in the prize litigation emanating from the
Revolution.
Bourguignon shows 23 that no fewer than twenty of the fifty-five
members of the Constitutional Convention either had practiced before
the federal admiralty courts or had served as judges thereof.24 Only one
of these twenty, Luther Martin, ultimately opposed the Constitution.
James Wilson had been a judge in ten cases and counsel in six (including
Hope as counsel for Lopez), whereas Oliver Ellsworth had been involved
in nine cases, had presented the report to Congress condemning Pennsylvania's refusal to adhere to the federal decree, and had actively partici19. Friedman, supra note 17, at 104-10.
20. Anna Maria (Bucklin v. White), in H. BOURGUIGNON, supra note 13, at 302-05.
21. Valenciano (Luca v. Cleveland) and Santanderylos SantosMartires (Tracy v. de Llano), in
id. at 305-07.
22. See British Goods (Gray v. Scudder, Wells v. Judson, McCluer v. Ston, Gardiner v. Johnson, and Hart v. Foster), in id. at 257-63.
23. Id. at 328-31 & nn.22-24, 26.
24. Before 1780, various committees of Congress had served as the court of appeal from the
state admiralty courts, so there was a large number of federal appellate "judges" of admiralty. After
the establishment of an actual appellate court in 1780, only four men served: Cyrus Griffin of
Virginia, William Paca of Maryland, John Lowell of Massachusetts, and George Read of Delaware.
Titus Hosmer of Connecticut accepted an appointment but died before ever sitting as judge. Washington later appointed Griffin, Lowell, and Paca (despite the latter's opposition to the Constitution)
to federal district court judgeships in 1789, as well as Francis Hopkinson, who had served Pennsylvania as admiralty judge, and Richard Law, who had served Connecticut similarly. See id. at 79100, 116-21, 330-31.
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pated in drafting the 1789 legislation establishing the federal courts. 25 Of
the thirteen federal district judges appointed by Washington after passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, three had served as counsel before the
federal admiralty court, three had been judges of it, and two had served
as admiralty judges in their states. These men presumably understood
the problems of localism that the national experience with admiralty had
presented during the Confederation and shared the general attitude of
1789 that admiralty jurisdiction should be an exclusively national
26
matter.
B.

British Credit Produces "'BritishDebts"

1. Debt Accrues Before the Revolution: Virginia. Petty if persistent local favoritism in fights between merchants (domestic or foreign)
and other merchants or shipping magnates or privateers-maritime en-

trepreneurs whose predatory activity would have been piracy if it had not
been sanctioned by the chaotic and survivalistic necessities of war-was

one thing. After all, admiralty law was a branch of the law of nations.
The notion of national admiralty courts neither caused nor reflected
deep-seated and fundamental social conflict.
Quite another matter was presented by disputes between urban
merchants, speculators in land and currency, and other relentless creditors (many of them British subjects) motivated primarily by profit rather
than civic responsibility and enmeshed in an endless web of debt and

financial obligation which made them "panting for their pound of
flesh, ' ' 27 on the one hand, and southern slaveholding planters and the
overwhelmingly agricultural yeomen and peasants comprising the bulk

of the citizenry of the United States in the 1780s, on the other. 28 The
25. See id. at 329-339.
26. John Frank comments that:
The experience of the Confederation convinced virtually every conscientious patriot of the
1780's that the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be totally, effectively, and completely in the
hands of the national government, and an extended search has not revealed a criticism
from any contemporary source of the constitution granting federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Frank, supra note 1, at 9.
27. R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION AND THE COURT 80 (1967). Ironically Morris, while
an assiduous researcher, was one of our more creditor-oriented historians.
28. Most historians dismiss class analysis as not being pertinent to United States history because, as Richard Morris said about the turbulent and crucial period 1775-1805, "too many members of the different classes are found on both sides." Morris, Class Struggle and the American
Revolution, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 3, 20 (1962). Criticism of the same stripe has been leveled
at this essay, over what the critics perceive to be my imprecise definitions of the debtor and creditor
elements, as well as over my having lumped southern planters together with yeoman and peasants in
the debtor class. An atomizing corollary of this critique is that ideas and sensibilities of individuals
and small groups-the very stuff of history, in this view-get trampled into the dust by the onrush of
material forces.
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latter group had fought or endured eight years of devastating and grindI believe that such critics have not undertaken to pursue the fundamental assumptions of educated life, that they "know themselves," for such a self-investigation would demonstrate their own
belief systems to be founded upon positivistic assumptions which greatly overprivilege the individual
over the group as a unit of social study and contemplation. No possessive individualist or positivist,
Marx himself used the term "class" at different levels of abstraction and specificity, depending upon
his purpose. See Olman, Marx's Use of "Class," in B. OLLMAN, SOCIAL AND SEXUAL REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MARX AND REICH 33-48 (1979); B. OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPTION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 3-69 (2d. ed. 1976).

There are three fundamental and interlocking problems with those who hold the class-dismissive viewpoint. First, they ignore or misconstrue deepseated power relationships of oppression based
upon economic, gender, ethnic, religious, or other factors of existence which transform the dynamic
interaction which is life into struggle. The moral pivot of this essay is the reality of socioeconomic
struggle. Second, they imagine groups to be only collections of individuals. Their analysis begins
and ends with individuals, so they are unable to understand socioeconomically defined groups engaging in struggle. Their very method of definition by separation and disjunction is narrowing; they are
thus unable to see human history broadly, as a matter of connections and junctures. Third, it is
actually they (not scholars who use class analysis) who delete humans from history. They are too
mechanistic and deterministic, leaving little or no room for the progress, possibility, education, and
change that are the most important universal features of human existence.
These deficiencies render it impossible for Morris, and for those who think as Morris did, to see
the fundamental class conflict burgeoning in the new United States, a conflict between those groups
who benefitted from and championed a new way of life built around "free labor" and the organization of economic institutions to produce profits, and those groups who benefited from and championed an older way of life built around unfree labor and the organization of "economic" institutions
to produce status and prestige. The rise of capitalist classes to power had been long underway in
Great Britain by 1775, and many of the social and ideological tentacles of capitalism had been
increasingly percolating through and enshrining themselves in the colonies, especially in the cities.
The old social and ideological patterns, centered around the older economic organization, still
predominated in the colonial countryside and in most colonists' ways of thinking. Essentially simultaneously, a major anticapitistic form of socioeconomic organization, slavery, began to grow in the
very bosom of the development of capitalistic growth in the colonies. It retained and adapted most
of the older mores and ways of thinking, since (though it was fundamentally commercial) its ultimate socioeconomic organization and object or goal was production for status and prestige, not for
profits.
Socioeconomic revolutions do not take place overnight, and indeed are never "complete" but
continue as a matter of struggle: the moment of the passing of predominance from one class and one
mode of production to another becomes relatively stark and shattering only in historical hindsight.
Moreover, the class interactions which take place during them are quite complicated in actual fact.
See, eg., K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE (1963). American protocapitalistic developers, merchants, speculators, and entrepreneurs allied themselves with European
credit at the close of the Revolution, to fund what they saw to be the necessary industrial growth of
the United States. They were opposed by debtors, both rural and poor, and rich planters, who
shared an older, more mutual language and who captured a certain amount of control of many
institutions of power in various of the states. Vigorous social struggle ensued in the 1780s and early
1790s.
This is the socioeconomic context against and within which the national court system of the
United States was invented. Strictly speaking, debtors and creditors do not form coherent classes,
since they do not relate in precisely opposite ways to ownership of the means of production. But
during this brillant and poignant actual historical moment, they did represent major opposing social
polarities, and their clash produced the essential features of the court system, both in the Constitution and in the Judiciary Act of 1789. My purpose is to tell that story, and for my purpose I need no
more specificity in my terminology than to indicate the opposition of a debtor element to a creditor
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ing warfare against a British enemy that they believed (as widely depicted

in American war propaganda) a haughty colonialistic oppressor attempting to reduce or eliminate the fundamental freedom of a self-governing
nation. They were also people for whom the ethics and mores of capital-

ist life were mostly alien, disquieting, inhumane, and threatening. Here
was a clash between two incompatible economic ways of life-between

two moral visions of the good-and the conflict was bound to be harsh
and bitter.

A useful place to begin the story is with the revolution that took
place in credit relations between British merchants and Virginian planters and yeoman farmers in the 1740s and 1750s. 29 Hard money was
scarce in Virginia's extractive economy, so large-crop tobacco planters
financed by credit, with the planters pledging their future crops for the
building materials and goods that fed their increasingly ostentatious and
opulent lifestyles. Equally wealthy consignment merchants (essentially
bankers) in London and Bristol extended the credit and the planter

element during the first two decades of the existence of the United States. A more complicated
discussion of these matters of class, with a partial bibliography, is provided in Appendix 2.
29. Excellent primary research in economic, political, and legal history has developed the basis
for the Virginia portion (that is, the major portion) of the story of debt crisis, debtor resistance, and
oppression of Loyalists told in this section. Although I have supplemented this research with my
own primary research for the period after 1783, nevertheless I have been dependent on the research
of others for the period before that time and have found it extremely helpful. The best contributions,
listed chronologically in their order of publication, are: Price, The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 1707-1775, 11 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 179 (1954) [hereinafter Price, Rise of
Glasgow]; Soltow, Scottish Tradersin Virginia, 1750-1775, 12 ECON. HIST. REV. (2d ser.) 83 (1959);
Sheridan, The British Credit Crisisof1772 and the American Colonies, 20 J. ECoN. HIST. 161 (1960);
Evans, PlanterIndebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d
ser.) 511 (1962) [hereinafter Evans, PrerevolutionaryIndebtedness]; Evans, PrivateIndebtedness and
the Revolution in Virginia, 1776 to 1796, 28 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 349 (1971) [hereinafter Evans,
Indebtedness During Confederation]; Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the FederalCircuit
Court of Virginia, 1790 to 1797, 92 VA. MAO. HIsr. & BIOGRAPHY 176 (1984). Although dated and

somewhat sophomoric and adventuresome, I.

HARRELL, LOYALISM IN VIRGINIA

(1926), is still

quite useful. And helpful insights and facts are found in Main, Sections and Politics in Virginia,
1781-1787, 12 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 96 (1955); Gipson, VirginiaPlanterDebtsBefore the American Revolution, 69 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 259 (1961); Tate, The Coming of the Revolution
in Virginia. Britain's Challenge to Virginia'sRuling Class, 1763-1776, 19 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.)
323 (1962). Less comprehensive, but still quite useful, treatments of similar problems, trends, and
events in the other states are cited below. Indispensable for a background understanding of monetary and credit policy for the period before the Revolution is J. ERNST, MONEY AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA 1755-1775: A STUDY IN THE CURRENCY ACT OF 1764 AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF REVOLUTION (1973). Only Hobson and Gipson, however, seem to glimpse how successful the
resistance of the Virginia debtors was. The profound if largely unspoken and unconscious creditor/
capitalist orientation of modern American culture makes it almost impossible to assess matters from
the debtors' perspective, even when one tries to do so.
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shipped the crops on consignment, also making all the transatlantic shipping arrangements. 30 Spurred both by a desire for a greater share of the
lucrative Virginia tobacco market and a large and rapidly growing
French demand for tobacco, which the French obtained through an increasingly centralized purchasing process, Glasgow merchants borrowed
31
heavily and organized their businesses inventively to get into the trade.
This inventiveness meant pooling the bankers' capital with the
merchants' salesmanship and the shipowners' vessels.
The Glaswegians enjoyed the advantage of a quicker passage to the
Chesapeake (by two to three weeks) compared to bankers located further
south who had to get around Ireland. Agents in Virginia were hired to
purchase tobacco there, so that the merchants had to assume the risks of
passage but were able to put together a shipload of tobacco before the
arrival of a ship, thereby lessening the turn-around expenses of insurance, dockage, and crew salaries while ships lay idle at an American
dock waiting their lading-the highest costs of the business. They established great chains of stores upriver in the newly-opening tobacco areas
of the Piedmont where the conservative and agentless consignment
merchants were reluctant to go, in order to tap the supplies of the yeoman and peasant farmers who raised small crops. 32 These small farmers
incurred small debts (and purchased necessities rather than luxuries at
the Scottish stores), but there were a great many of them. The largest of
these concerns, William Cuninghame's three interlocking Glaswegian
firms, had fourteen stores in Virginia and seven more in Maryland while
owning six oceangoing ships. At the commencement of the war they
claimed that they were owed more than £135,000 on thousands of small
accounts, the vast majority of them for sums under £25, few over £100.
'33
"For the mid-eighteenth century, it [£135,000] was a fantastic sum."
30. Evans, PrerevolutionaryIndebtedness, supra note 29, at 517-19; Soltow, supra note 29, at
84. "By the 1750's and 1760's few commentators failed to mention the extravagant, luxurious, and
even ostentatious tastes and habits of the large Virginia planters." Evans, supra, at 518-19; accord,
Gipson, supra note 29, at 260.
31. Kulikoff, The Economic Growth of the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake Colonies, 39 J.
ECON. HIsT. 275, 287 (1979); Price, The Economic Growth of the Chesapeake and the European
Market, 1697-1775, 24 J. EON. HIST. 496, 508-09 (1964) [hereinafter Price, Economic Growth].
The decline after 1758 of Amsterdam as a European tobacco entrepot rivaling London and Glasgow
increased the Scottish advantages. Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 190-91.
32. Price, Economic Growth, supra note 31, at 509; Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at
187-95; Soltow, supra note 29, at 84, 87-89.
33. Evans, PrerevolutionaryIndebtedness, supra note 29, at 518; Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra
note 29, at 195, 197 (source of quote); Soltow, supra note 29, at 85. One-half the total debt from
Virginia to Great Britain in 1776 was for sums under £100, and almost all of those were less than
£25. Kulikoff, supra note 31, at 288.
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The key innovation of the Scottish factors, however, was in the field

of credit: they essentially invented the credit account with a floating upper limit (much like today's credit cards), allowing the remainder of one

year's unpaid debt to be rolled over to the next if it were not unbearably
large. Only British creditors took such risks, and they did so largely
because of increasingly heavy competitive pressures. 34 In the generation
before the Revolution, the amount of debt owed to British mercantile
firms rose astoundingly, especially in the last ten years of that period.

The actual totals will never be accurately known, but one knowledgeable
historian claimed: "At the outbreak of the American Revolution colonial [mercantile] indebtedness to Great Britain exceeded five million
pounds. The southern colonies were most heavily encumbered; among

them Virginia stood first with a debt of over two million pounds. ' 35
Just as the inexorable logic of profit-driven competition both drove
frugal, ingenious, and well-organized Scottish merchants to extend credit
beyond reason and entrapped specie-poor "third-world" yeomen and
peasants by their desires for what by fashion and usage had become nec-

essary household items, so the logic of a pre-capitalist world found the
rural planters, yeomen, and peasants alike "hopelessly in debt."'36 The

nuances and mores of the possessive-individualistic ethos which characterized an increasingly virulent and virile capitalism in Great Britain had
only penetrated so far into a Virginia society colonial in both senses of
that word. 37 Planters selling crops as commodities knew about markets
34. Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 195-98; Soltow, supra note 29, at 86, 89-91. A
Scottish historian noted in 1777 that "the trade, after the period of of 1750, being exceedingly increased, and factors established in every corner of the [American] country, the interests of these
gentlemen began to interfere with one another; ambition for who should be possessed of the largest
share of the trade took possession of them; they lent to the planters large sums of money, in order to
secure them for customers, they gave them unlimited credit; and rendered the commerce with the
people of America, rather a speculative, than a solid branch of business." J. GIBSON, THE HISTORY
OF GLASGOW, FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS TO THE PRESENT TIME 212 (1777), quoted in Price,
Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 195. "All surviving correspondence between Scottish (or English)
merchants and their American employees is but a variation on the theme of the near-bankrupt
employer beseeching his extravagant representative to be less easy with credit in the future." Price,
Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 196. The competition is evidenced by the fact that many Virginia
planters and some yeomen were in debt to more than one firm in 1775. One planter, for example,
owed four firms in London, four in Glasgow, and one in Bristol. A study of the lists of debtors ofsix
consignment firms (five in London, one in Bristol) and two Glasgow factor firms found a number of
individuals owing debts to two or more of them. Sheridan, supra note 29, at 183, 180-81.
35. Evans, PrerevolutionaryIndebtedness,supra note 29, at 511. See also id. at 517-18, 524-25;
Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 196-98.
36. Gipson, supra note 29, at 260. Planters "did not let their indebtedness deter them from
ordering large amounts of British goods." For example, John Syme (Patrick Henry's half-brother)
owed £8000 at the outbreak of the Revolution. Evans, PrerevolutionaryIndebtedness, supra note 29,
at 519-23.
37. For possessive individualism, see C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962). For the rise of commercial market ways in Vir-
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and dealt in market ways, but did not fully understand them and certainly did not accept them as dominant forces in their lives. Yeoman
farmers were even further removed from market ways.
Still living in essentially a barter economy, most failed fully to appreciate or grasp "the impersonal action of the organized market which
determined prices, paid for tobacco, and charged for goods without reference to their needs or their deserts, without prejudice or favor."38 They
continued to accept the credit offered them and shopped around for
39
more; it was credit that freed what funds they had for other projects
and gave at least the planters the ability to flaunt their wealth and gain
prestige and power in a world still centered around status and human
sentiment, still wary about profits and the invisible, impersonal hand. 4°
The clash between older and newer ways produced a certain moral ambivalence and ambiguity.
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina followed the Virginia pattern of indebtedness to British merchants. And indebtedness
also existed in the colonies north of the Mason-Dixon Line, but to a
much smaller degree. Virginians held about forty-five percent of the
debt, depending upon which set of calculations one uses, and five of the
top six debtor colonies were southern. Among the northern colonies,
only Massachusetts had a large debt at the time the Revolution
41
commenced.
2. The Revolution Produces "'LegalImpediments." The beginning of the Revolution is usually dated for debt purposes in 1775-for
Virginia, in May 1774 4 2-because long before the Declaration of Independence the courts in many colonies closed as a result of the turmoil
attendant upon the collapse of British authority. This meant that their
debt collection agency of last resort was unavailable to British creditors.
And the courts stayed shut during the lengthy hostilities, insofar as British creditors were concerned, for the laws of each of the belligerents forginia, see Konig, "Commercial Relations and the Legal System in Prerevolutionary Virginia" (paper
delivered at annual American Society for Legal History Conference, Feb. 10, 1990).
38. Soltow, supra note 29, at 94, 97.
39. Price, Rise of Glasgow, supra note 29, at 197.
40. Cf.E. GENOVESE, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY OF THE SLAVE SOUTH 16-18, 283 (1965); E. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLD-

ERS MADE 165-74, 184-90 (1971).
41. For the claims as advanced by the British creditors, which ranked Virginia first with 46%
of the debt and the other four Southern states second through sixth (except Massachuetts, at fifth)
with another 38% of the debt, see Duncan Campbell, John Nutt, and William Molleson, "Lists of
debts due by the Citizens of the United States of America to the Merchants and Traders of Great
Britain . . ." (Chatham Papers) (PRO/Gifts and Deposits/30/8, vol. 343).
42. Tate, supra note 29, at 336-37.

1436

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:1421

bade enemy aliens to sue in the courts of their adversaries. Most British
merchants packed their belongings carefully, including their account
books, and went home full of bitterness and determined to collect the
enormous debt once hostilities ended. They had to collect, since they
were heavily in debt themselves. They wanted to collect, because, in the
world of commerce and profits, contractual obligations are sacred and
payment is the blood flow of life. The merchants owned the right to be
repaid-with interest, they thought. It was only just.
The war was a long, bloody, expensive, and utterly draining strug4
3
gle; it was fought almost entirely on American soil, and saw former
friends suddenly become murderous enemies. Many people huddled on
the bleak margins awaiting the outcome, since they disliked both sides of
a war whose soldiers were farmers' lads but whose proponents were local
merchants desiring release from the political power of transatlantic
merchants. 44 New York, northern New Jersey, Virginia, and the more
southern states were constantly crisscrossed and their villages and farms
pillaged and destroyed by the contending armies. Norfolk and several
New England coastal towns were put to the torch. Savannah (with much
of Georgia), Charleston (with some of the surrounding hinterlands), and
Philadelphia were occupied by British troops for lengthy periods of time,
while New York City (with Westchester, Staten Island, and Long Island)
suffered a British occupation for the duration of the conflict-indeed,
General Sir Guy Carleton did not evacuate the city until late November
1783, though the treaty had been provisionally ratified the preceding
April.
Americans were by no means gentle with Tories and British prisoners, but British viciousness was unexcelled. Brutality by those British
commanders who took no prisoners and devastated the countryside
from Virginia to Georgia contrasts favorably to the fetid sweltering British prison hulks in Florida and the Caribbean that "housed" prisoners of
war. Economic devastation was as severe. The withdrawal of the British
43. For the horrors of the Revolution recounted in the following paragraph, see R. MORRIS
THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 1-6, 34-38, 41, 53 (1987); E. COUNTRYMAN, THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION 140, 160-62, 183 (1985); M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 37-43, 234-35, 275,
303-04. For more detail, consult the works cited in Countryman's superb bibliography, supra, at
269-70.
44. Ernst's massive study of the colonial political economy in the decades before the revolt

shows
the existence of a direct and fundamental conflict of interest between the British and American commercial classes. In an effort to protect their right to exploit or invest in the riches
of the New World, the British political nation was fully prepared to ride roughshod over
the colonials. The colonial ruling classes proved no less aggressive or less aware of their
interest. They showed a remarkable determination to have a voice in the management of
their own economic destinies.
J. ERNST, supra note 29, at viii.
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manufacturing and mercantile connection drained the rural countryside
of commodities and whatever little specie it had; the value of paper
money the states and Congress had issued to pay for the war evaporated,
soldiers went unpaid in terms of purchasing power (and often in fact),
and a staggering public debt mounted. The British encouraged slaves to
flee within their lines, and it took little prodding for thousands of blacks
to escape bondage. Shiploads of slaves left when Charleston and New
45
York were evacuated.
During the war every state, in indignation and dire need as much as
in retaliation, passed laws confiscating (at least some) Loyalist property. 46 Confiscation proved lucrative to governments that were desperately short of money. Maryland, for example, sold a quarter million
acres of Loyalist land (including the two largest iron manufactories in
the United States); North Carolina's sales brought in six hundred thousand pounds by the end of 1782 and a total of nine hundred thousand
pounds by 1790; and New York's sale of confiscated property (mostly
accomplished after the peace) raised nearly four million dollars. 47 In ad45. Evans, Indebtedness DuringConfederation, supra note 29, at 360-61 ("[Ihe refusal by...
Sir Guy Carleton to return slaves who had been carried away during the war.., proved crucial in
the subsequent development of Virginia attitudes on the debt question."); Jones, The British Withdrawalfrom the South, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE SOUTH: POWER, CONFLICT, AND
LEADERSHIP 258,

270-77 (1979); J. NADELHAFT,

THE DISORDERS OF WAR: THE REVOLUTION IN

SOUTH CAROLINA 91 (1981).
46. The laws penalizing Loyalists are collected in C. VAN TYNE, THE LOYALISTS IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 318-41 (1902). For contrasting treatments of the situation and problems

presented by the Loyalists and the British debts during and after the Revolution, see M. JENSEN,
supra note 6, at 16-18, 68-69, 265-81, 302-26 (from the debtors' perspective); R. MORRIS, supra note
43, at 154-59, 174-75, 196-203 (from the creditors' perspective); R. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 73-92
(same); A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 1775-1789, at
644-56 (1924) (same). Even the best recent synthesis of the history of the period - one with a
sophisticated if not very hard-nosed understanding of socioeconomic struggle clearly comprehending
that "courts functioned as the agents of the creditor interests demanding the payment of private
debts," M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 309, but forgetting this when it discusses the anti-democratic
implications of the Constitution-pays little attention to these issues. See E. COUNTRYMAN, supra
note 43, at 152, 156-59, 165-72, 176, 182-84, 200-04, 227-29. They are completely ignored by the
massive, creditor-oriented "standard" history of the era. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).

Some discussion of the debt controversy may be found in diplomatic history. For the American
point of view, see S. BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 132-43 (2d
ed. 1962); for the British point of view, see C. RiTCHESON, AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION: BRITISH
POLICY TOVARD THE UNITED STATES 1783-1795, at 49-69, 77-87, 147-51, 236-50 (1969). Ritch-

eson must be used with extreme caution on the legal points, as he seems to have misunderstood,
misstated, and/or misdated most of the various American "legal impediments."
47. For Maryland, see N. RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS 1781-1800, at 106-07 (1978);
Stiverson, Necessity, the Mother of the Union: Maryland and the Constitution, 1785-1789, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 133 (P. Conley & J. Kaminski eds. 1988) [hereinafter
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES]. For New York, see Kaminski, Adjusting to Circumstances:
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dition, New York enacted a Trespass Act, allowing Patriot owners who

had fled before the enemy troops to recover damages and accrued rent
from those British citizens who had used the property during the long
48
occupation.

Several states also passed statutes specifically impeding or restricting
the ability of British creditors to recover their debts. North Carolina,
alone among the states, confiscated British debts.4 9 Maryland and Vir-

ginia allowed debtors to discharge British debts by payment into their
treasuries; 50 since paper money was a tender for such purposes and it
depreciated rapidly, debtors could acquit themselves by paying much less

than the actual value of their loans. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
and New Hampshire closed their courts to British creditors,5 1 whereas

South Carolina simply closed its courts to all plaintiffs.5 2 Pennsylvania
suspended executions to enforce judgments, and New York suspended
executions on British debt judgments until three years after the evacuaNew York's Relationshipwith the FederalGovernment, 1776-1788, in id. at 228. For North Carolina,
see H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, NORTH CAROLINA: THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN STATE 221
(1954). Sales of confiscated land in Virginia were accomplished only sporadically during the war.

Sales totaled more than three million pounds, but most of this was paid before May 1782 in depreciated paper money and thus hardly benefited the state. Some escheated property was set aside specifically for education, and Transylvania University and Hampden-Sydney College today sit on such
property. The funds from confiscation sales were set aside for redemption of soldiers' pay certificates. See I. HARRELL, supra note 29, at 94-103.
48. Act of Mar. 17, 1783, ch. 31, 6th Sess., 1777-1784 N.Y. Laws 552, extended by Act of May
4, 1784, ch. 54, 7th Sess., 1777-1784 N.Y. Laws 700.
49. For a complete treatment of the several North Carolina confiscation acts between 1777 and
1782, see J. Waldrup, James Iredell and the Practice of Law in Revolutionary Era North Carolina,
286-88 n.6 (1985) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
50. See An Act for calling out of circulation the quota of this state of the bills of credit issued
by Congress, and the bills of credit emitted by acts of assembly under the old government and by the
resolves of conventions, Sess. of Oct. 1780, ch. 5, § 12, 1780 Md. Laws [no pagination]; An act for
Sequestering British Property, enabling those indebted to British subjects to pay off such debts, and
directing the proceedings in suits where such subjects are parties, Sess. of Oct. 1777, ch. 9, §§ 3, 5, 9
THE STATUTES AT LARGE 379-80 (W. Hening reprint ed. 1969) [hereinafter HENING,] repealed, An
Act repealing part of the act .... Sess. of May 1780, ch. 3, 10 HENING, supra, at 227.
51. See An Act to prevent suits on certain debts for a limited time, Sess. of Apr. 1782, ch. 55,
1782 Md. Laws [no pagination]; An Act directing the mode of adjusting and settling the payment of
certain debts and contracts, and for other purposes, Sess. of Nov. 1781, ch. 22, § 3, 10 HENINO,
supra note 50, at 472 (Va.); An Act to repeal so much of a former act as suspends the issuing of
executions upon certain judgments until December, 1783, Sess. of May 1782, ch. 44, 11 HENING,
supra note 50, at 75 (same); An Act to amend an act entitled [previous act], Sess. of Oct. 1782, ch.
45, §§ 1, 8, 11, HENING, supra note 50, at 176, 180 (same); An Act for establishing courts of law,
and for regulating the proceedings therein, ch. 2, § 101, Sess. of Nov. 1777, 1 Pub. Acts of Gen.
Assy. of North Carolina 226 (2 vols., rev. ed. 1804); see also N. RISJORD, supra note 47, at 111-13,
117, 119 (Va., Md., and N.C.); L. TURNER, THE NINTH STATE: NEw HAMPSHIRE'S FORMATIVE
YEARS 30-32 (1983) (New Hampshire).
52. Act of Feb. 26, 1782, ch. 1150, 4 S.C. Stat. 513 (1838).

Vol. 1989:1421]

INVENTION OFFEDERAL COURTS

1439

tion of New York City.5 3 New York also suspended wartime interest. 54
Courts in most states were of a similarly anti-British mind. They allowed
juries in British debt cases to deduct some or all interest for the period of
the war, sometimes going so far as to deduct it themselves, and many
state courts allowed the settlement of decedents' estates, legally discharging debts to all creditors who did not file timely claims, despite the inability of British creditors to receive notification or to fie.
3. The Peace Treaty Condemns "Legal Impediments." In England, Loyalists and the British merchants were well aware of these legal
restraints and considered them not only illegal but immoral and dangerous. They organized into pressure groups and repeatedly urged their
government to remember them when the terms of peace were negotiated.55 Although anger at British hauteur and devastation as well as the
knowledge that the Confederation could not force recalcitrant states to
obey kept the American commissioners from giving in on the Loyalist
property issue, only the aged self-made artisan Benjamin Franklin felt
that American restrictions on recovery of their debts by the British
merchants were justified on moral grounds. John Jay and John Adams,
lawyers from above the Mason-Dixon Line, saw the debt issue from the
standpoint of creditors and within the ethos of capitalism. They believed
that honesty as well as the burgeoning credit needs of the fledgling undeveloped nation demanded that contracts be honored without reference to
the wartime conditions. Using Franklin's fulminations about British
depredations to advantage as leverage, the American commissioners
went even further than the British commissioners imagined possible by
agreeing to language in article 4 (proposed by Adams) that required
flatly: "Creditors on either Side shall meet with no lawful Impediment to
the Recovery of the full value in Sterling Money of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted."' 56 Little hesitation about the power of Congress
53. See Act of Mar. 12, 1783, ch. 53, Sec. 3, 1782-1785 Pa. Laws 138; Act of July 12, 1782, ch.
1, 6th Sess., 1777-1784 N.Y. Laws 499.
54. Act of July 12, 1782, ch. 1, § 5, 6th Sess., 1777-1784 N.Y. Laws 500.
55. For their organization and pressure, especially that of the efficient merchants, see C.
RITCHESON, supra note 46, at 50-59, 64-65. The Glasgow merchants recognized the "Prohibitory
Laws" that had "prevented them from recovering payment of their just Debts" in a memorial to the
government in May of 1782. The Memorial of the Merchants of Glasgow Interested in the North
American Trade Previous to the Year 1776 (May 30, 1782) (Shelburne Papers, vol. 87:49, William
L. Clements Library, University of Michigan).
56. The Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783. The Treaty is conveniently reprinted in S.
Bemis, supra note 46, at 442-50. The story of the negotiations, in this and the next paragraph of the
text, is taken from R. MORRIS, THE PEACEMAKERS: THE GREAT POWERS AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 341-80 (1965). The debt issue was at an impasse until Adams arrived. At his first session, without having consulted his fellow Commissioners on this point, Adams exclaimed: "I have
no notion of cheating anybody." On the side of the British commissioners, "Strachey's face lit up,
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to enforce such a predictably unpopular provision impeded the pro-creditor morality of Jay and Adams on this point.

By contrast, article 5 more realistically required Congress to "earnestly recommend" to the states that they restore the confiscated property of "real British Subjects" and Loyalists "who have not borne Arms

against" the United States, and that they repeal all of the wartime laws
against Loyalists.5 7 The wealthy South Carolina merchant Henry Laurens, the only southerner who actually served on the Commission (since
Thomas Jefferson never sailed for Europe), arrived on the next-to-last

day of the months-long negotiations in time to grouse sufficiently about
British theft, murder, and pillaging that the weary British commissioners
accepted language in article 7 guaranteeing that the British would evacuate their armies and fleets without "carrying away any Negroes or other
Property of the American inhabitants," 58 a promise regarding slaves that

the British did not keep and probably had no intention of keeping.
4. Peace Increases "Legal Impediments." Many Americans
greeted the news of these provisions with disbelief, derision, uproar, and
rejection. Loyalists, British creditors, and their agents already had begun
to enter the United States after Lord Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown
in late 1781, and they had been met with outrage and violence.5 9 Archi-

bald Maclaine, a North Carolina attorney, was physically attacked in
and his fellow Scotsman, Richard Oswald, wore a broad smile.... Franklin ... for months had been
insisting that both the commissioners and Congress lacked the power to deal with the subject. Now
that Adams chose to put it on high moral ground, Franklin saw it was useless to protest." Id. at
361. Even then, the original draft of what became article 4 restricted the American agreement to
debts incurred before 1775, but on the last day the Americans in a strange fit of generosity suggested
the elimination of this language. Id. at 380; Letter from Richard Oswald to Lord Townshend (Nov.
30, 1782) (PRO/FO/95/l/511) (demonstrating that the American Commissioners suggested the
change).
57. Definitive Treaty of Peace, art. 5.
58. Article 6 did command that there would be "no future Confiscations" or prosecutions
against Loyalists, and article 5 required that Loyalists who had taken up arms against the United
States be given one year to return "unmolested in their Endeavours to obtain the Restitution of such
of their Estates Rights & Properties as may have been confiscated." S. BEMIs, supra note 46, at
447-49.
59. See generally M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 265-76. A Virginia agent of a Glasgow firm
advised his partner: "I would recommend your staying in Glasgow .... you would find Virginia not
the same as when you left it things are so materially changed and it will require some considerable
time to wear off the prejudices which the Citizens of this state have imbibed against the Merchts.
who left this Country & as it were became voluntary partners in the war against them .... [Y]ou...
have never favoured the subjugation of America, but the people at large are not capable of discriminating & will involve any person from Scotland in the same predicament & view them with the same
jealous Eye." Letter from William Hay to James Baird (Mar. 25, 1783) (PRO/T/79/27, "John Hay
& Co. & Jas. Baird.").
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1782 when he attempted to appear in court on behalf of a Loyalist.
This kind of reaction by the American populace to the representatives of
the hated enemy continued, indeed increased, in 1783 and 1784. A
crowd seized and nearly lynched a Loyalist returning to New Hampshire. 61 An agent of a British creditor returning to North Carolina in
1783 was indicted and tried for treason; he was acquitted only after he

was forced to swear that he would collect no debts. 62 In early 1785 an

agent still found it necessary to warn his principal in Scotland of the
63
physical danger inherent in the latter's returning to North Carolina.
The several state governments followed the popular lead, expressing
their dissent from the Treaty by enactments that completed implementa-

tion of the wartime confiscation statutes in apparent disregard of article
664 and by actions in conflict with the part of article 5 guaranteeing Loyalists a year's grace to attempt to reclaim their property.6 5 Article 4,
requiring the enforcement of the prewar debts, received the roughest
treatment. Massachusetts and Connecticut acts allowed courts and juries
to deduct wartime interest from prewar British debts. 66 Pennsylvania
allowed executions for debts due between July 4, 1776, and January 1,
1777, to be made only in three equal annual payments commencing in
1785.67 When the North Carolina legislature, under heavy pressure from
60. J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 255. The Loyalist Joseph Williamson returned to Virginia in
1782 with the written permission of the Governor and the state Council, but he was nevertheless
tarred and feathered by an angry crowd. The crowd's leader was thereafter elected to the state
legislature, which then relieved him of possible liability for his deeds by a private act. I. HARRELL,
supra note 29, at 137-38; Letter of Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 24, 1784), re-

printed in

OMITTED CHAPTERS OF HISTORY DISCLOSED IN THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF EDMUND
RANDOLPH 74 (M. Conway ed. 1888) [hereinafter RANDOLPH PAPERS].
61. C. WARREN, supra note 3, at 32.

62. Memorial of John Spence, assignee of John Buchanan, to the British Claims Commission of
1802 (1806) (PRO/T/79/6, "Chas Reid & Co (Factor John Buchanan)").
63. Letter from John Syme to Archibald Hamilton (Jan. 15, 1785) (PRO/AO/13/85).
64. See Act of Dec. 23, 1783, ch. 406, 1776-83 N.J. Laws 384-87; Act of Dec. 23, 1788, ch. 49,
1788-92 Md. Laws [no pagination]; An act for safe keeping the land papers of the Northern Neck in
the register's office, Sess. of Oct., 1785, ch. 47, § 5, 12 HENING, supra note 50, at 112 (Va.); An act to
dispose of the waste and unappropriated lands in the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the eastern
waters, Sess. of Oct. 1785, 12 HENING, supra note 50, at 100 (Va.); an Act directing the sale of
confiscated property, ch. 6, Sess. of Oct., 1784, 1 Public Acts of Gen. Assy. of N.C. 373-75 (rev. ed.
1804); Act of Dec. 29, 1785, ch. 7, 1 Public Acts of Gen. Assy. of N.C. 396 (rev. ed. 1804); Act of
Mar. 22, 1786, ch. 1338, 4 S.C. Stat. 756-59 (1838); Act of Feb. 22, 1785, ch. 310, 1775-1801 Digest
Ga. Laws 316-17; Act of Feb. 10, 1787, ch. 376, 1775-1801 Digest Ga. Laws 361-62.
65. Governor Benjamin Harrison of Virginia proclaimed in December 1782 and again in July
1783 that no Loyalist who departed the state in 1777 or thereafter might return. I. HARRELL, supra
note 29, at 125-26; M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 280.
66. An Act relative to debts due to persons who have been and remained within the Enemies
power or lines during the late war, [no ch. nos.], Sess. of May 1784, 1784 Conn. Laws 283-84; Act of
Mar. 11, 1785, ch. 24, 1783-1789 Mass. Laws 252-53.
67. Act of Dec. 23, 1783, ch. 169, 1782-1785 Pa. Laws 412-15.
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creditor interests to obey the Treaty, took equivocal action in 1784, the
courts refused to Open themselves to British creditors.6 8 And the Georgia courts refused to entertain suits for British debts despite the absence
of legislation. 69 A South Carolina law continued the closure of its courts
in 1783, and then in 1784 another law again continued the closure until

January 1785, requiring in addition that judgments for debt obtained
thereafter be paid in four equal annual installments not to commence
until January 1, 1786, and denying interest on debts before January 1,

1780.70 British creditors found it difficult to collect their debts in the
Pennsylvania courts. 71 A New York court in a well-publicized case,
Rutgers v. Waddington, refused to overturn the Trespass Act in 1784
despite Alexander Hamilton's eloquent argument that allowing owners
of realty to recover rent and damages from users of their property during

the British occupation of New York City violated both the Treaty and
the law of nations. The judge, a nationalist with his ear to the ground-

swell of opinion, confusingly but diplomatically found that the Treaty

72
applied to a portion of the plaintiff's claim but not to the other portion.

68. N. RiSjORD, supra note 47, at 119. The spring 1784 General Assembly in North Carolina
entertained "five or six different Bills" about debts and Loyalists, "but the Parties were so ballanced
that not one passed." In the fall 1784 session, a bill postponing recovery for British creditors for
"some four or five years hence without Interest" also failed. Letter from Willie Jones to Archibald
Hamilton (Dec. 30, 1784) (copy, PRO/AO/13/85).
69. In the summer of 1783, Georgia Judge George Walton "set aside a writ in the [unreported]
case of Thompson (a British subject) v. Thompson," on grounds that the treaty had not yet been
definitively ratified (ratification took place only in the late spring of 1784). Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to George Hammond (May 29, 1792), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS 211 (1833). This ruling was interpreted by the courts of Georgia to bar suits by British
creditors in the state. Letter from George Hammond to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 5, 1792), reprinted
in id. at 196; Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds (Nov. 10, 1789), reprinted in 1896
Annual Report: Letters ofPhineasBond, British Consulat Philadelphia,to the Foreign Office ofGreat
Britain, 1787, 1788, 1789, 1897 AM. HIST. ASS'N 625. Jefferson's cagily legalistic rebuttal of Hammond's argument does not in fact deny Hammond's claim. See Letter from Jefferson to Hammond,
supra, at 211-12, Further, a 1792 letter from the Senators and Representatives of Georgia states that
since the peace, no suit by a prewar British creditor had reached a judgment either for or against the
creditor, indicating the substantial truth of Hammond's claim. Letter from William Few, James
Gunn, Abraham Baldwin, and Francis Willis to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 25, 1792), reprinted in I
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra, at 236.
70. Act of Mar. 16, 1783, ch. 1180, 6 S.C. Stat. 627-28 (1839); Ordinance of Mar. 26, 1784, ch.
1237, 4 id 640-41.
71. "State of the grievances complained of by Merchants and other British subjects, having
estates, property and debts due to them in the several States of America," [undated], 31 JOURNALS,
supra note 6, at 786. The British merchants complained that "the Lawyers, dreading the resentment
of some of the most violent among their Countrymen, have refused to engage in the recovery of these
unpopular demands, and the Committee are well assured that not one Action for the payment of an
old British debt has been prosecuted in this State." Id.
72. A thorough treatment of this 1784 case and other actions under the Trespass Act may be
found in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 282-543 (J. Goebel ed. 1964). The case
was given contemporary explanation by Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May
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Debates in the Virginia legislature made clear that many Americans
had a different view of the morality of contractual obligations than did
merchants. Certainly the ravages that the war had inflicted upon Virginia's economy meant the people were unable to pay: The Treaty demanded payment not just in hard money, but in pounds sterling;
Jefferson estimated that "[w]ere all the creditors to rush to judgement.
together, amass of two millions of property would be brought to market
[in Virginia] where there is but the tenth of that sum of money in circula''73 In addition, the wartime anti-British legislation
tion to purchase it.
gave a certain impetus to peacetime anti-British legislation.
No society rests its actions upon grounds it deems overtly immoral.
Virginia's debtors also claimed high moral justification for their refusal
to repay. The prewar ambivalence about capitalistic ways was shattered
by the harsh experience of the war and its ensuing depression, 74 though
some planters at the apex of Virginia society remained morally ambivalent about the British debts. Most of those rural Virginians who had
been tempted by the newer ways turned away from them and embraced
wholeheartedly the pre-capitalist ethos in response to the crisis in their
affairs. They were joined by many who had never been ambivalent.
These Virginians proclaimed adherence to a much more contextual
and substantive concept of consideration than that of the merchants. Repayment would be grossly immoral, in that conceptualization. The debts
were contracts founded on and naturally incorporating the realities of the
time and place where they were made. Each contracting party expected
the other to be honorable, but the British by haughtily and illegally forcing an unjust war upon their colonists had destroyed that trust. Further,
the debts had been obtained upon the expectation that the fruits of Virginia's land and farms would provide the means to repay them, but the
British had destroyed this consideration by laying waste to cattle, fields,
crops, implements, and buildings, and by capturing or enticing away
thousands of the slaves whose labor was commonly understood to be the
most significant productive factor of all for the planters and many farmers. The destruction of consideration was enhanced by the British refusal
to adhere to the Treaty provision by returning or paying for the transported slaves.
29, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 210 ("The first part [of
the court's opinion]... was an unequivocal decision of the superior authority of the treaty over the
law."); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Secretary of State (Apr. 19, 1792), reprinted in id. at 232
(same).
73. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander McCaul (Apr. 19, 1786), reprintedin 9 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 388 (J. Boyd ed. 1954).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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The British refusal to evacuate nine forts commanding the crucial
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence water passage completed their perfidy and dishonor in the eyes of these debtors. 75 These forts, strung strategically
along the Canadian border but all within the territory the British had
ceded to the United States in the 1783 treaty, were not turned over despite the requirement in article 7 that all British forces be removed from
American soil. 76 Indeed, most of the forts remained in British hands
until 1796.
In 1783 George Mason reported that everywhere he heard the question, "If we are now to pay the Debts due to British Merchants, what
have we been fighting for all this while?" 77 A petition from the citizens
of Halifax County assumed that the debts were forfeited with the rest of
the British property. With the amazingly persuasive Patrick Henry leading the debtor forces, aided by Richard Henry Lee but opposed by
Mason, James Madison, and the lawyers (but not by all of the planters)
at the top of Virginia's leadership, Virginia's General Assembly defeated
bills in May 1783 and May 1784 which proposed to repeal all laws contrary to the Treaty and to open the courts to British creditors (allowing
recovery in five annual installments). In the fall session of 1784, boosted
by both a petition from Glasgow merchants accepting installment payments and Henry's absence in the gubernatorial mansion, the two houses
of the Assembly approved slightly different versions of a plan that allowed payment in seven annual installments and denied wartime interest.
The James River froze, however, apparently keeping four legislators
from attending the last two days of the session, and without a quorum
the bills died and Virginia's courts stayed shut. In 1787, the Assembly,
displaying a pre-capitalist understanding of substantive consideration, resolved not to repeal the obnoxious legislation until the forts were evacuated and the slaves were returned or paid for, and then only in a manner
consistent with the exhausted condition of the economy. 78
75. This allowed the British to continue to inflame and supply the Indians in western New
York and along and beyond the Ohio with whom the United States was still at war, to control the
immensely lucrative fur trade of the old northwest, and to prevent American trans-Appalachian
settlers from shipping their produce to market via the St. Lawrence.
76. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Art. 7, reprintedin S. BEMIS, supra note 46, at 449.
77. Letter from George Mason to Patrick Henry (May 6, 1783), reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF
GEORGE MASON 769 (R. Rutland ed. 1970) [hereinafter MASON PAPERS].
78. For a discussion of Virginia's outraged refusal to repay British debts outlined in the previous three textual paragraphs (including the Halifax County petition and the 1783-87 activities in the
General Assembly), see I. HARRELL, supra note 29, at 144-47; N. RISJORD, supra note 47, at Ill15; Evans, IndebtednessDuring Confederation, supra note 29, at 358-70; Main, supra note 29, at 98104; see also Letter from William Anderson to Samuel Gist (Feb. 1, 1783) (PRO/AO/13/30) ("The
depredations & plunder Committed by the British Army were indeed horrid. And the consequence
is a determination here to make no retribution for British Property, and to proscribe british subjects
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5. The Depression of the 1780s. Economic necessity joined righteous indignation to produce continued intransigence on the British debt
question. In 1783 and 1784 there was a short, deceptive boom fueled by

a flood of British goods dumped on a nation made hungry for commodities by eight years of homemade goods or no goods at all; these British
goods were, however, mostly paid for with more debt. But by mid-1784,
flood had become glut. With the closing of America's lucrative West
Indies trade by a British government determined to continue America's

economic dependence, with a succession of staple crop failures in the
deep south and eventually a drastic fall in tobacco prices, with a hemor-

rhage of circulating specie as overextended British creditors called in
their loans and as many states increased taxes (which had to be paid in
hard money) to pay off war debts, and with the elimination of wartime

paper money as states assiduously followed contemporaneous economic
thought and called it in, a deep recession commenced in late 1784 and
lasted into the 1790s. For the average farmer or planter or rural householder, there was nothing to pay debts with and a lot of debts to pay.

Creditors needed cash to pay their creditors, so the payment in kind that
might have been accepted in a world passing away was no longer allowed. 79 The courts of the nation suddenly filled to overflowing with
from recovering their debts."); Letter from John Syme to Archibald Hamilton (Jan. 15, 1785)
(PRO/AO/13/85) ("Mr. Wm.Moore [in North Carolina] who owes you considerably, prod[uce]d
his accot. in the late Assembly, and ballanced it by depredations done by Lord Cornwallis & Lieut.
Col. John Hamilton [Archibald's Loyalist brother and raider commandant]."). A somewhat sympathetic British agent, who had stayed in Virginia throughout the war, in a moment of exasperation
wrote home some lines reflecting the pre-capitalist views of Virginia's debtors, with whom he dealt
on a regular basis while trying to collect his debts: "I find that the Creditors have still an Idea of
getting the last farthing of the[ir] Companies Debt, however unreasonable it may be that the destructive consequences of the War should fall only on one party." Letter from William Hay to James
Baird (Dec. 27, 1789) (PRO/T/79/27, "John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird"). The sharply contrasting
impersonal morality of the capitalist world-and yet the link between the two worlds-is displayed
poignantly in one of the letters of London consignment merchant John Nutt to his South Carolina
attorney, Charles Pinckney.
[I]f comparing sufferings would produce any advantage to either party[,] what it is that I
have not suffered, if I was to enter into a calculation of the amount[,] it would appear
incredible, for it is not the diminution of my Fortune by deaths & other accidents which
constitutes the heaviest part of my Loss, it is being deprived of an honorable & profitable
business for 13 or 14 years, a business equal to the warmest wish of the heart of Man, at the
same time by being wholly cut off from the use of a Capital justly acquired by the Industry
of many years hard labour[.] I have been deprived of the means of entering into any Engagemts. or carrying on any business for want of that Credit which my fortune so well
entitled me to, & has been so hardly withheld from me, & what outstrips all my Misfortunes is that of being left to the mercy of every- one of my Creditors for personal liberty,
Creditors that are no longer the same people they were in better days & that are clearly &
loudly calling on me for paymt. of very large sums which I cannot discharge ....
Letter from John Nutt to Charles Pinckney (Sept. 5, 1788) (PRO/T/79/5, "John Nutt & Co.").
79. The best concise treatment of the credit crunch, the resulting money shortage, the ensuing
depression, and the serious distress of the mostly rural debtor majority is D. SZATMARY, SHAYS'
REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 19-36 (1980), which deals mostly
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debt suits, as creditors were forced to sue by their web of commercial
obligations as well as by their moral obligations. S0
South of the Mason-Dixon line, the debt crisis produced still more

legislation aimed at British creditors, while the courts in North Carolina,
Virginia, and Georgia remained shut to their claims.81 South Carolina in
with Massachusetts (and somewhat with the rest of New England) but aptly characterizes the
phenomenon as a whole. An older, more extended national treatment that still rings true, despite
excessive optimism about "development," is M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 183-93, 238-40, 302-12.
Resolutely pro-creditor, but more recent, is R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 130-48.
For accounts of the recession in the South, see J. NADELHAIr, supra note 47, at 145-58 (excellent treatment of South Carolina); Evans, Indebtedness During Confederation,supra note 29, at 36163 (Virginia); Stiverson, supra note 47, at 134-37 (Maryland); J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 110-14
(North Carolina). See also N. RISjORD, supra note 47, at 161-70 (Maryland, Virginia, and North
Carolina).
For the rest of the country, see L. TURNER, supra note 51, at 44-47 (New Hampshire); V.
HALL, POLrrIcs WrrIHotrr PARTIES: MASSACHUSETTS,

1780-1791 (1972) (supplements D.

for Massachusetts); I. POLISHOOK, RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION 1774-1795, at 10309 (1969) (excellent treatment of Rhode Island); Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 229 (New York);
Murrin, New Jersey andthe Two Constitutions,in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note
47, at 60-61 (New Jersey); Doutrich, From Revolution to Constitution:Pennsylvania'sPath to Federalism, in id at 41-42 (Pennsylvania); Hancock, DelawareBecomes the First State, in id. at 27-28; J.
SZATMARY

MUNROE, FEDERALIST DELAWARE

1775-1815, at 141 (1954) (both Delaware).

80. In rural northeastern North Carolina where James Iredell practiced, the years from 1782 to
1790 saw an "explosion of lawsuits" caused in large part by the "postwar depression which made
debtors unable to pay their obligations." J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 106, 110. See generally id. at
91, 100-14, 147-52, 239. There were "thousands of insolvencies" in New York in the 1780s, where
"[tiwo or three debtors petitioned for [legislative] relief each week in 1784 and 1785." In the same
period, "[d]ebt-collection cases flooded the courts" of Virginia; between 1782 and 1785, the six
county courts in the rural Valley of Virginia docketed and tried more than 18,500 cases, most of
them for debt. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, at 115, 200-01 (1974). I am obliged to Kathryn
Preyer for bringing this volume to my attention. In Massachusetts in the period between August
1784 and August 1786, there was "a dramatic rise in court actions against debtors" that involved a
huge percentage of the male rural population. "During 1786, Connecticut creditors initiated more
than 6,000 actions, taking over 20 percent of state taxpayers to court." Similar floods of debt litigation occurred in Vermont and New Hampshire. D. SZATMARY, supra note 79, at 29-30.
81. In a famous letter written to the British Ambassador George Hammond, who had complained that the courts were closed to British debts in some of the southern states, Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson asserted that the courts in Virginia "have been open and freely resorted to by the
British creditors, who have recovered and levied their moneys without obstruction." Jefferson also
implied that the courts were equally open in North Carolina and Georgia. Letter from Thomas

Jefferson to George Hammond (May 29, 1792), reprinted in AMERICAN

STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN

211 (1833). Jefferson relied upon letters from the Senators and Representatives of these
states, which made the same claims or implications. See Letter from North Carolina Senator Samuel
Johnston to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 13, 1792), reprintedin id. at 233 (1833); Letter from Georgia
Senators and Representatives William Few, James Gunn, Abraham Baldwin, and Francis Willis to
Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 25, 1792), reprinted in id. at 236; Letter from Virginia Senator James
Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 1, 1792), reprinted in id. at 234; Letter from Virginia Senator
William Branch Giles to the Secretary of State (May 6, 1792), reprinted in id. at 234.
The best that can be said about the claims made by these honorable and distinguished gentlemen is that they were disingenuous and legalistic, stretching or pinching the truth in the cause of
patriotism. The only suits by British creditors pursued to judgment in the state courts of these three
RELATIONS
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1785 obliged a winning creditor to take property tendered by the debtor

at three-quarters of its value as appraised by a local magistrate, and no
creditor could sue without first asking the debtor in writing for payment. 82 The law quickly became known as the Pine Barren Act, since
debtors bought up and offered worthless scrub pine country to their cred-

itors; this Act along with the Installment Act effectively kept South Carolina's courts closed too. 83 Then, in 1787 and again in 1788, additional
installment acts were passed, the former requiring three annual installstates before 1793 were essentially uncontested by the defendant either because a compromise had
been negotiated whereby both parties gave up something (the defendant usually giving up interest
during the war out of necessity or hopelessness), or because the defendant was a decedent's personal
representative who, as a result of opposition by the heirs, devisees, or distributees to payment of
British creditors, had to have a judgment on the record before he could pay the plaintiffs claim and
close the estate, or because the defendant had decided the debts were just and should be paid but
wanted a judgment to fend off the opprobrium of his neighbors. See infra note 179. The Johnston
and Few-Gunn-Baldwin-Wilis letters, supra, each admit that very few of these suits had been
brought in North Carolina and Georgia respectively.
For examples of the overwhelming evidence against Jefferson's claims with regard to Virginia,
see Affidavit of Benjamin Waller, (Sept. 12, 1810) (PRO/T/79/3, "Alexander Donald & Co."); Letter from Peter Lyons, Judge, Virginia Court of Appeals, to William Hay (July 8, 1799) (PRO/T/79/
27, "John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird"); Letter from John Warden to William Hay (June 22, 1799)
(PRO/T/79/27); Letter from William Hay to William Moore Smith, (Feb. 3, 1799) (PRO/T/79/27,
"John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird") ("As the laws of Virginia prohibited the Recovery of British Debts,
few ventured to try the Experiment of a Suit, except in cases where they knew the Defendants would
not avail themselves of the Plea of British Debt, or where the Decision of a Court was necessary to
justify Executors and Administrators in paying Debts which they thought were just and ought to be
paid, but which the Legatees or Representatives of the deceased would not consent to pay .... ").
For evidence with regard to North Carolina, see Letter from John Hamilton to Lord Grenville (Apr.
4, 1793) (PRO/FO/5/2); Letter from John Hamilton to Lord Grenville (June 22, 1796) (PRO/FO/
5/15). For evidence regarding Georgia, see supra note 69.
82. Act of Oct. 12, 1785, ch. 1293, 4 S.C. Stat. 710-12 (1838).
83. See J. NADELHAFr, supra note 45, at 158-67. The Pine Barren Act was ruled expired, on a
technicality, by South Carolina's Court of Common Pleas in January, 1787. Id. at 169. The effect of
the Installment and Pine Barren Acts in closing the courts to British (as well as all other) creditors,
and the pre-capitalist consumption propensities of the South Carolina planters, is evident from a
letter of a South Carolina lawyer to his London consignment firm:
From an intire stopage of our Courts of Justice we have been able to collect but a very
small proportion of the debts due us from the Planters. For tho' they are chiefly People of
the first distinction they prefer speculating in Lands and Negroes to paying off their debts.
I believe that such a Villainous Law as our Tender Law never before disgraced a Country
thought to be civilized. By our endeavouring to inforce payment from some of those owing
to us we have had within these few weeks past, several thousand acres of Pine Barren
tendered to us, none of which lays within 150 miles of this City [Charleston].
Letter from William Scarborough to John Lane (Oct. 7, 1786) (PRO/T/79/33, "William Parker").
An unreported opinion of the South Carolina high court in 1795 confirmed that these statutes effectively closed the courts:
As to the time which elapsed since 1774 to the present period that is easily accounted for:
from 1774 to 1783 the war prevented any thing being done and from 1783 to 1793 the
repeated interference of the Legislature between Creditors and Debtors made it altogether
impossible to recover debts during that time.
Greenwood & Higginson v. Air (S.C. Mar. 20, 1795) (unreported) (John Mathews & Hugh Rutledge, JJ.) (PRO/T/79/36, "Strachan, Mackenzie & Co.").
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ments, 84 the latter (passed after the state had ratified a Constitution
85
seemingly outlawing such legislation) requiring five.

North Carolina legislation of 1785 closed its courts to Loyalist landrecovery suits. After arguments in 1786 and a lengthy wait while the
judges hoped the legislature would repeal the statute, a courageous supe-

rior court in the celebrated case of Bayard v. Singleton in 1787 overturned the statute as violative of the North Carolina constitution's
guarantee of jury trials. The court supported the jury's verdict in favor
of a Patriot purchaser of the confiscated estate, however, on grounds that
the Loyalist former owner was an alien incapable of owning land in

North Carolina, against the plea that the Treaty forbade such a holding.8 6 Both of the court's rulings catered to North Carolina's agrarian
debtor majority. The North Carolina judges were (according to the British consul at Philadelphia) "by no means held in respectable point of
view by the other states,"' 87 but the alienage holding in Bayard was confirmed by a very respectable court, Maryland's Court of Chancery, in
1789.88
The debt crisis caused the Virginia and North Carolina legislatures
in 1785 and 1786 to vote down attempts to open their courts to British
creditors. 89 In response to Congress's plea in the spring of 1787 that laws
contravening the Treaty be repealed, Virginia's complying legislation was
rendered nugatory at the insistence of the debtor's great orator, Patrick

84. Act of Mar. 28, 1787, ch. 1371, 5 S.C. Stat. 36-38 (1839). George Miller, the newly-arrived
British Consul for Georgia and South Carolina, thought that this installment act would be satisfactory to the British merchants. Letter from George Miller to Lord Carmarthen (July 10, 1787)
(PRO/FO/4/5).
85. Act of Nov. 4, 1788, ch. 1431, 5 S.C. Stat. 88-92 (1839).
86. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787); Act of Dec. 29, 1785, ch. 7, 1 Public Acts of Gen.
Assy. of North Carolina 396 (rev. ed. 1804); J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 259-79.
87. Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds (July 12, 1789), reprinted in 1896,Annual
Report,supra note 69, 1897 AM. HIsr. Ass'N 600.
88. Harrison's Reps. (Md. Ch. 1789) (unreported) (secret trust in 1782 will whose beneficiaries
were British subjects could not be enforced, since aliens could not hold Maryland real property
either at law or beneficially), as summarized in Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds,
App. XVII (Nov. 10, 1789) (PRO/FO/4/7); see also Letter from Bond to Leeds (July 12, 1789),
reprintedin 1896 Annual Report, supra note 69, 1897 AM. Hisr. Ass'N 600; Letter from Senators
and Representatives of Maryland John Henry, Charles Carroll of Carrollton, John Francis Mercer,
Samuel Sterret, Joshua Seney, William Vans Murray, Philip Key, and Upton Sheredine to the Secretary of State (undated), reprintedin I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 233 (1833)
[hereinafter Letter from Maryland Senators and Representatives]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
George Hammond (May 29, 1792), reprintedin id. at 204.
89. I. HARRELL, supra note 29, at 147-49 (Virginia); N. RISJORD, supra note 47, at 119 (North
Carolina); id. at 135-36, 149-54 (Virginia); J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 258 (North Carolina).
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Henry, and repeal was made expressly contingent upon prior British
compliance. 90
In the summer of 1786 an aroused crowd of debtors gathered at the
courthouse in Charles County, Maryland, to protest the filing of more
than a hundred suits on behalf of a Glasgow creditor. Though the courts
technically had been open in Maryland for more than two years, these
were among the first suits filed. When faced with the action of the people
embodied in an angry crowd, the thoroughly frightened lawyer dismissed
his suits while the equally frightened judge closed the court. 91 It took the
intervention of a creditor-oriented governor to get the suits and others
like them back on the docket. 92 And in 1787, the Maryland legislature
prohibited recovery by British creditors who refused to give bond for all
93
debts they might have owed to Maryland citizens.
6. Non-Slave States Repeal "Legal Impediments." Despite the
continuance of the debt crisis in the South, hostility to British creditors
90. Act of Dec. 12, 1787, ch. 34, 12

HENING, supra note 50,

at 528; I. HARRELL, supra note 29,

at 148-53; Evans, Indebtedness During Confederation, supra note 29, at 365-71. At conferences

which Ambassadors John Adams and Thomas Jefferson held in London in 1786 with Duncan
Campbell, the chair of the British merchants' committee, the merchants at first adhered to their
acceptance of installments only if the wartime interest were also paid; later they buckled, accepting
installments foregoing seven years' interest if the principal and all other interest were paid. See I.
HARRELL, supra note 29, at 149-50. So much for the real sanctity of contract in the new morality of
the commercial world: In fact, anything goes, all can be compromised, there is absolutely nothing
sacred or unpurchasable (as the law-and-economics literature demonstrates with each page today);
and the precocious 16th century description of life in capitalism by Thomas Hobbes (a war of all
against all) turns out to be the most accurate description of commercial "morality."
91. N. RiSiORD, suupra note 47, at 170-71. Agents for British creditors claimed that pressure
was put on more than one Maryland attorney who, because of this pressure and the "violence" used
in Charles County, were "deterred from bringing others [suits] very generally." Letter from W.
Cooke to Thomas Kearney (Sept. 15, 1806) (PRO/T/79/34, "Assignees of John & Gilbert
Buchanan"); see also Memorial to British-American Claims Commission of 1794 (Nov. 28, 1798)
(PRO/T/79/27, "Geo. & Andrew Buchanan").
92. Letter from Maryland Senators and Representatives, supra note 88, at 233; Letter from
John Gwynn to William Vans Murray (Apr. 23, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
FOREIGN RELATIONS

233-34.

The Governor's success in opening the Charles County courts to British creditors in 1786 apparently was permanent. The Glasgow merchants reported to the British Foreign Office early in
1788 that they had "no complaint to make against the State of Maryland, for they have opened their
Courts of justice and our Debtors are settling and making payments. It is against Virginia and
North Carolina that we now chiefly complain." Letter from James Ritchie to Henry Dundas (Apr.
3, 1788) (PRO/FO/4/6).
93. Act of Jan. 20, 1787, ch. 49, § 3, 1788-1792 Md. Laws [no pagination]. See Memorial to
British Claims Commission of 1802 [undated] (PRO/T/79/34, "Assignees of John & Gilbert
Buchanan"); Letter from W. Cooke to Thomas Kearney (Sept. 15, 1806) ("Although the Act requires security for the payment of the Debts due here; yet as it could not be known certainly what
the amount of those Debts were, it became an invariable practice to require security to the full
amount of the [British creditor's Maryland] claims ....) (PRO/T/79/34, "Assignees of John &
Gilbert Buchanan.").
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seems to have begun to pass from the historian's view during this time
north of the Mason-Dixon line, although there was still much actual popular resistance. Courts and juries still deducted war interest throughout
the nation, based on a corollary of the theory of substantive consideration that debtors did not owe what the interdictions and exigencies of
war prevented them from paying. 94 In a ruling similar to that in Bayard
94. We have clear evidence that in the 1780s judges and juries in New York and Pennsylvania
deducted war interest, despite the lack of legislation like that in Massachusetts and Connecticut
permitting them to do so. See supra text accompanying note 66; Hoare v. Allen, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 102
(Pa. 1789) (court ruled that American debtor could not be held liable for interest on mortgage due
British creditor, since it would be a violation of law to pay debt to enemy); Neale's Ex'rs v. Sands
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1786) (unreported) (insuit by executors of British creditor for prewar debt, Chief
Justice of New York charged jury to act as Chancellors with power to reduce interest; jury subtracted wartime interest in its verdict; verdict was enforced), noted in Letter from Phineas Bond to
the Duke of Leeds, App. XII (Nov. 10, 1789) (PRO/FO/4/7); Osborne v. Mifflin's Ex'rs (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1787) (unreported) (in suit by British creditor on prewar debt, Chief Justice of Pennsylvania
directed jury to abate 7 1/2 years' war interest; jury deducted 6 1/2 years' interest; verdict was
enforced), noted in Letter from Bond to Leeds, supra;Letter from William Rawle to the Secretary of
State (Apr. 9, 1792), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 236 (1832)
("The Hoare v. Allen court, in this.., directed the jury to deduct seven and a half years' interest.
The jury, however, deducted eight and a half years' interest.")
Since states south of Maryland did not permit suits by British creditors, it is unlikely that their
judges or juries were able to entertain the question. It is likely that judges and juries in the other
states from Maryland northward deducted interest in the 1780s. See N. RISJORD, supra note 47, at
117-18 (county judges in Maryland before 1790 gave conflicting opinions on recoverability of war
interest); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hammond (May 29, 1792), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 214 (1832) (After Massachusetts' legislature in 1787
declared repealed all state laws contrary to the treaty, Massachusetts' courts in unreported and
unnamed cases "changed their rule relative to interest during the war, which they have uniformly
allowed since that time."); [Hartford] Connecticut Courant, May 9, 1791 (indicating that the Connecticut courts and juries had deducted war interest until the Connecticut statute permitting the
same was overturned, as violative of the Treaty, in the first decisions of the new federal courts
finding a state statute unconstitutional, in Elliot v. Sage and Deblois v. Hawley [C.C.D. Conn. 1791]
[two unreported cases, Records of the Circuit Court (for Connecticut) from the April 1790 Term to
the September 1796 Term, Connecticut Federal Court Files, RG 21, National Archives Regional
Records Center, Waltham, Mass.]); Memorial to the British-American Claims Commission of 1794
(Nov. 15, 1798) (PRO/T/79/5 "Henry White") ("before the organization of the federal courts the
Law [of New Jersey] on this Subject was considered as finally settled and in all adjustments of British
Debts before that period, the abatement of interest was claimed as a right by the Debtor and allowed
as a matter of Absolute Necessity by the Creditor"; the Memorial also claims that the state courts
did not deviate from this principle thereafter).
The records of one Maryland creditor exhibit fourteen judgments on prewar debts certified by
the clerk of court, dated between May 1786 (when the courts opened) and October 1792, all in favor
of the creditor. In two judgments, interest was granted by the jury from before 1776; in two others,
interest was granted from the 1760s, but these were expressly made subject to the court's opinion
whether interest during the war was recoverable from British creditors; in yet two more, interest was
granted payable only from 1783; in seven other judgments, interest was granted payable from various dates in 1784; and in one other, interest was granted payable from Feb. 19, 1793. (PRO/IT/79/
34, "Assignees of John & Gilbert Buchanan"). An agent in North Carolina claimed that in North
Carolina interest was allowed only from the time a demand could be proved, "which in Case of
Deaths &c, leaves the Date of the Writ the only Evidence which can be produced, & the Interest
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v. Singleton, a Pennsylvania court held in late 1788 that where a Loyalist's estate had been confiscated but a debt owing to it had not actually
been collected, the legislative act of confiscation was complete and final
and thus collection would not violate article 7's guarantee against future
confiscations. The court also held that article 4, eliminating all legal impediments to the collection of debts, gave its freedom to sue only to "real
British subjects"-that is, to persons always adhering to the crown of
Great Britain-and not to persons who at first had professed loyalty to
the United States but had subsequently proved themselves disloyal (for
the plaintiff had gone over to the enemy long after independence was
declared). 95 And a New Jersey indictment of a Loyalist for a wartime
atrocity-the lynching of a patriot in retribution for the hanging of a
Loyalist spy-in direct contravention of article 7's prohibition of further
prosecutions for war-related activity demonstrated that many folks in the
96
northern part of the country were still very angry at the British.
However, John Jay, now Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the
Confederation, studied the state of American compliance with the Treaty
in 1786 at the urging of both John Adams, now Minister to England, and
Lord Carmarthen, the British Foreign Secretary, and complained to the
Continental Congress that violations were widespread, 97 especially in
New York and Virginia. The Continental Congress in spring 1787 found
with a surprising unanimity that violations existed, and it requested all of
the states to repeal any legislation contrary to the Treaty. 98 By February
1788, with New York acting only after the Constitution had been ratified, all the states north of the Mason-Dixon line except New Jersey
passed repealing legislation or found that no offending legislation existed;
but only the legislatures of Maryland and North Carolina below the line
complied fully, 99 and of these two states the courts in North Carolina
therefore is limited to the Bringing of the Suit." Interrogatory of William Hines (Apr. 25, 1803)
(PRO/T/79/27, "John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird").
95. See Camp v. Lockwood, 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 393 (Phila. Ct. Comm. Pleas, Pa. 1788), noted in 3
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS 157-58, 172-73 (J. Moore ed. 1931). There is a short but useful
discussion of the problems of ascertaining what was meant by the term "real British subjects" in J.
KUTINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 183-87 (1978).

96. This is the unreported 1788 case of John Smith Hatfield, best explained in Letter of Elias
Boudinot to the Secretary of State (Apr. 11, 1792), reprintedin I AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 232 (1832). The outcome of the case is uncertain. Apparently Hatfield at first
jumped bail, then pleaded the Treaty as a complete defense on appeal of the trial court's denial of his
habeas corpus action, and the case was still pending without action by the New Jersey attorney
general in the spring of 1792. Id.
97. The diplomatic exchange that provoked Jay's report, as well as the report itself, can be
found in 31 JOURNALS, supra note 6, at 781-874.
98. 32 JOURNALS, supra note 6, at 177-84.
99. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 228-31 (1832) (containing copies
of reports of the various states). The Governors of New Jersey and South Carolina sent letters
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stayed shut to British creditors despite the legislation. Whatever contrary feelings may have existed in the Yankee countryside, as the shrewd
Loyalist who performed as British consul in Philadelphia predicted, "the
Courts of Law etc. in those States which have adopted the recommendatory resolve of Congress will make the Treaty of Peace the rule of decision." 10 0 By the spring of 1792 the British Ambassador, George
Hammond, could report to his government that "in the New England
and other states, which are attached to the present form of government,
there exists the strongest disposition to observe implicitly the terms of
the treaty."' 01 After 1787, in those states where capitalist mores were
strongest, opposition to the Treaty seemed to melt away, at least among
judges, legislators, and other officials. In the slave south, where leaders
and rural folk alike held to pre-capitalist ways, resistance to repayment
remained absolutely adamant.
The notoriety of the transgressions against the Treaty made by legislatures and courts under the spell of debtors was widespread among the
creditor element. They despaired of capturing control of the states and
were certain, in Friendly's concise statement, that "[local animosity was
so great that only national tribunals could compel the enforcement of a
national treaty."' 1 2 Congress's request was sent just about the time the
Constitutional Convention was beginning its work, and noncompliance
was then a national phenomenon. About the same time, James Madison
wrote that "an appeal should lie to some national tribunal in all cases
which concern foreigners, or inhabitants of other states."' 10 3 National
union, national honor, and more importantly national credit depended
upon the "establish[ment of] justice" in forums freed from popular pres4
sures, in which solemn treaty obligations could be safely enforced.1
Only nationalists who lived among the debtors and knew their strength
and determination could conclude, as did Madison, that such strong-arm
tactics might not work: "[I]ll-timed or rigorous execution of the Treaty
of Peace against British debtors" in the new courts might escalate the
claiming that no such impediments existed, but the latter was in error, as the text has shown. The
Virginia General Assembly passed an act conditioning repeal upon prior British compliance, which
clearly does not count either. See supra text accompanying note 90.
100. Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke of Leeds (Nov. 10, 1789), reprintedin 1896 Annual
Report, supra note 69, 1897 AM. HIST. ASS'N 625.
101. Letter from George Hammond to Lord Grenville (Mar. 6, 1792) (PRO/FO/4/14).
102. Friendly, supra note 4, at 484 n.6.
103. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), reprinted in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 370.
104. See generally M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 422-28; E. COUNTRYMAN, supra note 43, at 167-

74, 200-04.

Vol. 1989:1421]

INVENTION OFFEDERAL COURTS

1453

level of debtor cohesiveness and opposition to a point dangerous or even
fatal to the union.10 5
C.

The Domestic Debt Crisis and Democracy

The damage done by the depression of the 1780s did not confine
itself to the debtors of British merchants. Specie and currency evaporated for all, while debts remained and mounted for most. Domestic
creditors pressed, sued, and jailed their debtors with an enthusiasm rivaling the most hardbitten of their British counterparts.1 0 6 And the debtors, blessed with a heightened consciousness (thanks to revolutionary
ideology) and, in many places, with heightened power (thanks to the
democratic constitutions of the new states or to their status as "rich"
and powerful planters), responded as sorely pressed debtors usually do.
They picked up and moved out of town-a flood of immigration poured
into the newly won western lands beyond the Alleghenies. They demanded relief in the forms of debt moratoria, a circulating and depreciated medium, and tender laws at least guaranteeing that such a medium
would be acceptable for debts, at most reverting to barter. They stopped
paying taxes. They resisted foreclosures and debt executions with the
armed might of the local community. And at the height of the depression, they exercised their recently won right of revolution and tried to
shut down the courts, which as always "functioned as the agents of the
10 7
creditor interests demanding the payment of private debts."
By 1786 seven states had yielded to the debtor pressure to issue paper money, the bulk of which was legal tender for most purposes; it depreciated as expected in four states but did not in three.10 8 Madison was,
as we have seen, quite aware of the debtor pressure, and he thought that
"the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to the uneasiness
which produced the convention" than the lack of power of the Confeder105. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (July 24, 1788), reprintedin 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 196.
106. The conditions causing the depression were by no means confined to foreign debts. See
supra notes 71, 72 and accompanying text.
107. M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 309. Several of the assertions made in the text will be developed in the succeeding paragraphs. For a discussion of the heavy taxes and tax revolts, see id. at
304-09. For a treatment of the problem within one state, see J. NADELHAFr, supra note 45, at 12527, 157-58 (South Carolina). For the flood of migration west, and its accompanying problems of
land speculation, border disputes, separatist movements, and conflicts with Native Americans, see
M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 112-15, 310-11, 330-45, 350-59; R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 220-44.
108. Merchants still opposed it in general, except in South Carolina, where it could not be used
to pay foreign or out-of-state debts. The story of the tender law and paper money controversies is
well told in M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 309-26. See also R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 154-59.
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ation government. 0 9 The uneasiness was all on the part of the creditors,
whose capitalist morality was aptly displayed in this instance by William
Livingston, Governor of New Jersey and soon to be a delegate to the
convention, in language that today has become ordinary rather than controversial: "The interest of the creditor coincides with that of the community. Not so the interest of the debtor. The former desires no more
than his own. The latter wants to pocket the property of another." 110
The paper money episode culminated juridically in 1786 and 1787 in
Trevett v. Weeden, a case in which Rhode Island's superior court judges
ruled that the state's Emission Act was unconstitutional because it denied a jury trial to creditors who refused to accept the paper. The state
legislature promptly reversed the decision, and all the judges save one
failed to win re-election."'
Stay laws were also enacted. The South Carolina installment laws
operated on domestic debts as well as foreign ones; Governor William
Moultrie defended them as creating for British citizens "no other difficulties, or impediments, than have [been created for] the citizens of
America, in the recovery of their debts."" 2 Rhode Island's legislature
enacted a series of personal debt moratoria, one of which was overturned
in 1792 in one of the early decisions of the new federal courts holding a
state law unconstitutional."13
Most distressing of all to the creditors were the popular uprisings
provoked by the debt crisis. The most famous was Shays' Rebellion in
Massachusetts, in which impoverished and indebted farmers and yeomen
from the western part of the state rose in rebellion to close the courts,
and created havoc from late summer 1786 until early summer 1787, well
after the beginning of the Convention.11 4 Similar but much shorter debtbased rural outbreaks in 1785, 1786, and 1787 temporarily closed local
courts in South Carolina, Maryland, Connecticut, and Virginia (where a
109. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 212.
110. M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 316 (quoting Livingston's essay signed Primative Whig, which
first appeared in the New Jersey Gazette.)
111. The case is unreported, but is treated in, e.g, M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 325; 1. POLISHOOK, supra note 79, at 133-42, 153-54; D. SZATMARY, supra note 79, at 52-53.
112. Letter from William Moultrie to John Jay (June 21, 1786), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 231 (1832).

113. Champion v. Casey (C.C.D.R.I. 1792) (unreported) (finding unconstitutional a debt moratorium law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts"), discussed in The Providence Gazette and
Country J., June 16, 1792; [Boston] Columbian Centinel, June 20, 1792. "In Conformity to a Decision of the Circuit Court, mentioned in our last, the Lower House of [the Rhode Island] Assembly
voted on Wednesday, that they would not grant to any Individual an Exemption from Arrests and
Attachments for his private Debts, for any Term of Time." The Providence Gazette and Country J.,
June 23, 1792.
114. D. SZATMARY, supra note 79, passim.
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courthouse was razed), led to marches and tumults in New Jersey and

Pennsylvania, and held the New Hampshire state legislature captive for
five hours. 115 An upcountry South Carolina judge warned that "the people would not suffer ... creditors to sue debtors." 11 6 The words of a
Pennsylvania merchant summarized the fears of the creditors: The

rebels wanted "[a] total abolition of all Debts both public and Private
and even a general Distribution of Property .... ,,17
The popular concern about debt and depreciation, about speculation

in land and the commercial paper that evidences debts, and generally
about the intrusion of capitalist values into rural lives expressed itself in
other ways too, including jury verdicts. Friendly dismissed the argument
consistently put forward by contemporaneous supporters of the Constitution that popular bias against out-of-state creditors infected state
courts. 18 However, Friendly's evidence is solely from the few reports of
appellate opinions from the 1780s (opinions which, he concluded, show

not the absence of bias altogether but rather no "undue prejudice"
against out-of-staters)." 9 Appellate courts at the time could not deal
often with biased fact-finding or damages awards since trial juries had the
final word on such matters, typically via the general verdict. Friendly's
dismissal is founded upon no evidence whatsoever of jury activity in trial
courts, and he utterly fails to see the question of local bias within its
115. Id. at 59, 78-79, 124-26. See also R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 258-66.
116. Charleston Morning Post & Daily Advertiser, Feb. 21, 1786. The speaker, Judge Aedanus

Burke, would soon become an important opponent of the Constitution.
117. Letter from Charles Pettit to Benjamin Franklin (Oct. 18, 1786), reprintedin 8 LETTERS OF
MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 487 (E. Burnett ed. 1936).
118. Friendly, supra note 4, at 492-94. It must be noted that Friendly stated accurately that the
"early state reports give us only a fraction of the cases heard before the appellate tribunals, themselves an infinitesimal fragment of the total amount of litigation," id. at 493, and that he clearly
recognized the profound impact which debtor legislation such as tender laws and insolvency laws
had on the shaping of diversity jurisdiction (a "principal reason" which was "by no means without
validity," id. at 497). His relative open-mindedness as a historian is in contradistinction to that of
subsequent chroniclers of the origins of the federal judiciary: He goes so far as to say that if evidence
were presented that "state judges had been notoriously unfair to foreigners [that is, to out-of-staters]," the story of state court bias repeatedly told by Madison, James Iredell, and other supporters
of the Constitution during the ratification struggle, see infra note 194, would be acceptable. (Subsequent writers find the possibility of state court bias unthinkable.) Without such evidence, however,
Friendly finds the argument insincere.
One purpose of this essay is to begin to present such evidence. I suspect, however, that
Friendly's use of "notoriously" in the preceding quote-a very high standard of proof for those who
wish to throw suspicion on state courts-is a good indication that most commentators today who are
oriented toward the states-sovereignty view, as was Friendly, will want more evidence than can ever
be presented that there was legitimate reason to suspect bias in the state courts of the 1780s merely
because at crucial moments the judges fell into anti-creditor stances or, worse, did not prevent juries
from doing so.
119. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
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context of the vehement opposition of Anti-Federalists to the lack of jury
trial guarantees in the proposed Constitution.
Evidence is hard to come by, since we do not have many reports of
state judicial activity in the 1780s and since digging up the facts involves
back-breaking labor in musty court archives. But I have found some evidence, all of it interestingly enough from North Carolina, one of the two
states that would soon reject the new Constitution. Conservative, creditor-oriented lawyers led an attack during the mid-1780s on the three
judges of the North Carolina Superior Court (at the time, the state's
highest court) for their dilatoriness, argumentativeness, and lack of ability.120

The perhaps rough-edged and ill-educated judges whose dockets

were suddenly crowded with debt cases may have been guilty of these
charges, but they also were opposed to the Treaty and to the return of the
Loyalists, and any dilatoriness in handling cases worked to the benefit of
debtors. In 1786 creditor-oriented lawyers offered to prove misconduct
to the legislature in an attempt to get the judges removed. They specifically argued (among other matters) that the judges' refusal to overturn
the indictment of two Loyalists for returning without permission violated
the Treaty, that the judges had disallowed suits by Loyalists whose property had been confiscated, and that one judge had struck six years' war
interest off a British creditor's claim when the jury did not deduct interest. 12 1 However, the General Assembly not only voted two-to-one to dismiss all charges, they warmly commended the three judges.
A second instance involves apparently blatant bias by local juries
against a famous out-of-state person of wealth. Robert Morris of Pennsylvania was the first great American entrepreneur; a merchant and
trader on a vast scale by the 1780s, he "may well have been the biggest
real estate speculator of all time." 12 2 As one of the first and foremost
Americans engaging in the games of big-time finance, he was often the
out-of-state creditor par excellence, and he was hated by many for his
wealth, his foreclosures, his speculation, and widely rumored war profiteering during his stint as the nation's first minister of finance; but he was
120. The leaders of the attack were attorneys John Hay and Archibald Maclaine, the former an
agent for British creditors in North Carolina and the latter the relative and friend of, and legal
advocate for, many Loyalists, both with uncompromising natures, fiery tempers, and acerbic
tongues. The story and the lively personalities of the various dramatispersonae may be followed in
P. HOFFER & N. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 87-91 (1984); P. Smith, Creation of an American State: Politics in North Carolina, 1765-1789, at 488-91, 495-96, 517-21, 554-57
(1980) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rice University); J.Waldrup, supra note 49, at 109-14,
300-21.
121. Obviously the parties to that suit had agreed on the amount in advance, since the North
Carolina courts were otherwise closed to such litigation.
122. Frank, supra note 1, at 19 (footnote omitted).
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inevitably also sometimes sued for debt. In 1782 one John Cooper at-

tached Morris's considerable North Carolina assets for a debt of
£2700.123 The jury in December 1783 awarded Cooper a verdict of
£9700, more than three times what he had sued for. Then in 1787, in
another attachment against him, Morris suffered a second defeat at the
hands of a North Carolina jury whose verdict he also thought to be
against the law and the evidence.
Although in these cases Morris was a debtor, the juries treated him
according to his reputation as a harsh out-of-state creditor. Morris
thought both juries biased against him, and his lawyer, Samuel Johnston,
praised his reaching a settlement with Cooper without risking a new trial

because "it would have been much against you to defend a Law Suit at so
great a distance from home against an Adversary on the Spot ready to

avail himself of every circumstance."' 124 Johnston found the Cooper ver125
dict "a very unfair attempt upon your property."
Morris was in a position to do something about local bias, for he was

one of the best-known and most powerful personages of his time. He was
one of only two men to sign the Declaration of Independence, the Arti-

cles of Confederation, and the Constitution, and he had served from 1781
to 1784 as the United States Minister of Finance. President Washington

later would accept the hospitality of Morris' home when the national
capital moved from New York to Philadelphia in 1790, and Morris
would serve as a Pennsylvania delegate to the Constitutional Convention
and then as one of Pennsylvania's first two United States Senators. Johnston, Morris' lawyer, also attained prominence: He would become Governor of North Carolina and then one of the first two North Carolina
Senators after that state finally joined the union. Although the jury ver123. The story of Robert Morris' troublesome North Carolina litigation is told in more detail in
Holt & Perry, Writs and Rights, "clashingsand animosities'" The First ConfrontationBetween Federal and State Jurisdictions,7 LAW & Hisr. REv. 89 (1989).
124. Letter from Samuel Johnston to Robert Morris (Apr. 1, 1785) (Hayes Collection, Southern
Historical Collection, Library of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
125. Id. Trial records of Morris' North Carolina jury defeats are available in the North Carolina
State Archives. See Cooper v. Morris, Trial Docket 1781-86, Chowan County Court of Pleas and
Quarter Sessions (entries for June, Sept., and Dec. 1782, Mar., June, Sept., and Dec. 1783, and Mar.,
June, Sept., and Dec. 1784); Allen v. Morris, Trial Docket 1786-87, Chowan County Court of Pleas
and Quarter Sessions (entries for Dec. 1786 and Mar., June, and Sept. 1787); Minute Docket, 1787
and 1795-96, Chowan County Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions (entries for Mar. 29, 1787 and
June 28, 1787); Morris v. Allen, Record of the Pleadings and Decrees in the Court of Equity, 1788,
at 252-98 (Superior Court of Law and Equity for Edenton District); see also Letter from Robert
Morris to John Williams (Nov. 23, 1784) (John Williams Papers, North Carolina State Archives).
Additional materials are available in the Hayes Collection, Southern Historical Collection, Library
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. See Letters from Robert Morris to Samuel
Johnston (Feb. 8, Mar. 10, and Mar. 15, 1785); Letter from Samuel Johnston to Robert Morris
(Apr. 1, 1785).
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dicts against Morris represent victories for debtors against creditors only
in a sense, it is still a most meaningful sense because local bias was precisely the explanation for them subscribed to by these nationally prominent and influential members of the creditor group.
D. FederalCourts as the Response to State Bias
Courts and juries usually help creditors collect debts. But in the
new United States during the democratic and depression-ridden 1780s,
the tables were turned. John Marshall found that Virginia court reform
in 1784 was opposed by those who were "against every Measure which
may expedite & facilitate the business of recovering debts & compelling a
strict compliance with contracts." 126 A solution to this problem was to
establishfederalcourts, whose judges might not be so susceptible to local
clamor raised by debtors and whose marshals might select a different sort
of jury, or who might sit without a jury in the fashion of equity and the
civil law. Indeed, mused the British minister instructing his representative to the peace negotiations with the Americans in October 1782, appeals to a federal court might give "Some Security [to British creditors]
as to the American Courts of Justice, in lieu of their Right of Appeal [to
the Crown] which subsisted when the Debts were contracted."'' 27 Debts,
paper money, and violation of the Definitive Treaty of Peace by the nonpayment of British debts were among the forces impelling the Framers to
travel to Philadelphia in 1787.128 Other events, many related to such
concerns, seemed to cry out to those interested in preserving the possibilities of commercial, manufacturing, and extractive development of
the new country that changes in the Articles of Confederation were necessary. An august assemblage of Americans gathered in Philadelphia in
the spring of 1787 to accomplish just that end, and among other things
the invention of a federal judiciary was on their minds.

126. Letter from John Marshall to Charles Simms (June 16, 1784), reprintedin 1 THE PAPERS
OF JOHN MARSHALL 124 (1974).
127. Memorandum from Lord Shelburne to Henry Strachey (Oct. 20, 1782) (Shelburne Papers,
vol. 87:194, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan), interpreted similarly by R. MORRIS, supra note 27, at 78.
128. Edmund Randolph of Virginia, whose creditor mentality is demonstrated by his belief that
paper money was an "asylum opened in the temple of Fraud" because the chief reason for its public
support was to allow British debts to be paid off cheaply, thought that British debts had to be dealt
with at Philadelphia by rendering the Treaty paramount to ordinary law. Letter from Edmund
Randolph to James Madison (Apr. 4, 1787), reprintedin RANDOLPH PAPERS, supra note 60, at 72;
Letter from Edmund Randolph to Arthur Lee (Sept. 24, 1788), reprintedin id. at 72.
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FEDERAL COURTS ARE INVENTED: THE CONSTITUTION

A. A Pro-CreditorConstitutionalConvention
It was fairly clear to contemporaries just who would be running the
show at the Philadelphia Convention and just which direction the new
plan would take. In state after state, representatives of debtor interests
refused to accept places in their delegations to Philadelphia, preferring
not to be tainted with its inexorably nationalistic and pro-creditor outcome. 129 Only New York elected a delegation with a majority opposed
to a strong central government, and that majority, Robert Yates and
John Lansing, left the Convention in disgust in July. 130 They were joined
131
in leaving by John Francis Mercer and Luther Martin of Maryland.
George Mason and Edmund Randolph of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts waited until the end, but then refused to sign the
document. 132
Four plans of government were advanced at Philadephia, the most
important-and ironically, coming from Virginia, a very nationalizing
and centralizing one-being that of Edmund Randolph and James
Madison of the Virginia delegation. Each of the four, plus Mason's unsubmitted plan for a national judiciary drafted after August 27,133 con129. Prominent skeptics of the Convention who boycotted it despite having been selected to their
state's delegations include at least agrarian spokesperson Abraham Clark of New Jersey, Murrin,
supra note 79, at 61, 67; agrarian leader Erastus Wolcott of Connecticut, Collier, Sovereignty Finessed: Roger Sherman, OliverEllsworth, and the Ratification of the Constitution in Connecticut, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 47, at 95-96; Samuel Chase of Maryland, Stiverson, supra note 47, at 136, 142; Patrick Henry, Thomas Nelson, and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia,
Briceland, Virginia: The Cement of the Union, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note
47, at 205, 207; and Willie Jones of North Carolina, P. Smith, supra note 120, at 554, 558, 564-65.
Domination of the state government by the lowland aristocracy probably explains the failure of
South Carolina to elect any representatives of the majority that opposed strong centralization, such
as Rawlins Lowndes, Aedanus Burke, and Thomas Tudor Tucker. See J. NADELHAFT, supra note
45, at 179-80. Sam Adams of Massachusetts, a determined opponent of the Shaysites but not a
representative of the creditors, refused election perhaps because he understood the lack of strength
that opponents of centralization had in the Massachusetts legislature which made "[n]o attempt...
to include anyone [in the Philadelphia contingent] who represented the interests of the Regulators
[Shaysites], debtors, or farmers." Pro-debtor in his sympathies, the wealthy merchant John Hancock also was excluded from the Massachusetts delegation. Elbridge Gerry slipped through, but he
opposed the final document because it outlined too strong a central government. See Fox, Massachusetts and the Creation of the Federal Union, 1775-1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATES, supra, at 117-20, 122-23, 125.

130. See Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 233-36.
131. See Stiverson, supra note 47, at 142-43.
132. See Fox, supra note 129, at 120 (Gerry); Briceland, supra note 129, at 208 (Mason).
133. Mason probably wrote his plan in reaction to what he would always consider the overly
centralizing language which emerged from the Convention's Committee on Detail. He nevertheless
often mirrored or tracked the Committee's language.
The terminology "Mason's plan" will be used throughout this paper, since it was found in
Mason's papers and formed the basis for Mason's consistent advocacy of change in the federal judici-
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tained provisions for a national supreme court that would form a
separate, third branch of the new government.1 34 Little space in members' sparse notes of the Convention's debates--especially the notes assiduously taken by James Madison-is devoted to the judiciary branch,
135
and there is no recorded debate on the extent of its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, much of the strongly nationalist views promoting a national judiciary can be gleaned from the plans, from the one fierce debate
over the judiciary that did eventuate, and from the work of the Committee of Detail, which actually drafted most of article III (dealing with the
judiciary).
Four of the proposals gave the national court system jurisdiction
over suits involving aliens,1 36 whereas the fifth (plus two of the others)
extended jurisdiction over "Questions... on the Construction of Treaties
' 37 Two (including Mason's)
made by U.S."1
gave the United States the
ary, both in the Virginia ratification convention and later. "With two or three further Amendments," he wrote in September 1789, "[s]uch as confining the federal Judiciary to Admiralty &
Maritime Jurisdiction... I cou'd chearfully put my Hand & Heart to the new Government." Letter
from George Mason to Samuel Griffin (Sept. 8, 1789), reprintedin 3 MASON PAPERS, supra note 77,
at 1172. However, the plan was in the handwriting of John Blair.
134. The Virginia plan, drafted by Madison before the Convention opened and introduced by
Randolph (as Governor of Virginia) on May 29, formed the essential basis for much of the Constitution that emerged. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-22 (M.
Farrand rev. ed. 1937) (references in this essay are always to Madison's notes) [hereinafter FEDERAL
CONVENTION RECORDS]. The New Jersey plan, submitted on June 15, was the only other plan used
in debate. See I id.at 242-45. For Alexander Hamilton's plan, submitted on June 18, see I id. at
291-93; for Charles Pinckney's plan, drafted before the Convention and submitted May 29 but not
debated thereafter, see 3 id. at 604-09; and for Mason's judiciary plan, which later became the basis
of the Virginia ratification convention's proposed amendment on the federal judiciary, see 2 id. at
432-33.
135. Madison does say, most tantalizingly, that on July 17 "[s]everal criticisms [were] made on
the definition" of "[the jurisdiction of Natl. Judiciary," 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 134, at 46, but neither he nor any other note-taker tells us what those "criticisms" were.
The Convention's consideration of a national judiciary may be found in Iid. at 104-05 (June 4),
119-21, 124-25 (June 5); 2 id. at 27-29 (July 17), 45-46 (July 18), 400-01 (Aug. 24), 428-32 (Aug. 27),
437-38 (Aug. 28), 587-88 (Sept. 12), 628 (Sept. 15).
On the reliability of our evidence for the constitutional debates in the Convention, see generally
Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 1 (1987).
136. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 22 (Virginia Plan) ("jurisdiction
..to hear and determine... cases in which foreigners ...may be interested"); l id.at 242 (New
Jersey Plan) ("authority to hear & determine ...in all cases in which foreigners may be interested");
1 id. at 292 (Hamilton's plan) ("jurisdiction ... in all causes in which ... the citizens of foreign
nations are concerned"); 2 id. at 432 (Mason's plan) ("jurisdiction... shall extend.., to controversies ... between a State and the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects").
137. 3 id. at 608 (Pinckney's plan); Iid. at 244 (New Jersey Plan) ("authority to hear & determine.., by way of appeal in the dernier resort.., in all cases ...in the construction of any treaty or
treaties"); 2 id. at 432 (Mason's plan) ("jurisdiction ...shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under... treaties made or which shall be made under their authority").
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power to create courts of admiralty,1 38 the other three extended jurisdiction over cases of capture, 139 and two of those others also provided jurisdiction over piracies and felonies on the high seas.140 Only the strongly
nationalizing Virginia plan provided for jurisdiction over cases between
citizens of different states and for jurisdiction over "questions which may
involve the national peace and harmony."' 4 1 Although four granted
jurisdiction over cases involving collection of the revenue,' 42 only Maunder
son's very late draft provided for jurisdiction over cases "arising
43
this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties."'
The problem of debts and the paper money, tender, and other laws
enacted by states in response to debtor pressure lay heavy over the whole
proceedings of the Convention. In introducing the Virginia Plan on May
29, Randolph noted that in 1777 (when the Articles had been drafted)
"no rebellion had appeared as in Massts.-foreign debts had not become
urgent-the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen-treaties had
not been violated."' 144 During the debate about whether to give Congress
a veto over state legislation, on July 17, Madison records himself as having quite bluntly said: "Confidence cannot be put in the State Tribunals
as guardians of the National authority and interests."' 145 "What was to
be done," Madison queried, in a direct reference to the British debt and
other debt cases during the debate over whether to have lower federal
courts, "after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the
biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an un146
directed jury?"'
138. 2 id. at 432 (Mason's plan) ("judicial power of the United States shall be vested in...
Courts of Admiralty to be established in such of the States as Congress shall direct" and extending
the jurisdiction "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"); 3 id. at 608 (Pinckney's plan)
C" 'in each State a Court of Admiralty'... 'for hearing and determining' all 'maritime Causes' which
may arise therein").
139. 1 id. at 22 (Virginia Plan) ("captures from an enemy"); 1 id at 244 (New Jersey plan)
("captures from an enemy"); Iid.at 292 (Hamilton's plan) ("in all causes of capture").
140. 1 id. at 22 (Virginia Plan) ("all piracies & felonies on the high seas"); 1 id. at 244 (New
Jersey Plan) ("all cases of piracies & felonies on the high seas").
141. l id.at 22 ("cases in which... citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be
interested").
142. 1 id.(Virginia Plan) ("cases... which respect the collection of the National revenue"); 1
id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan) ("ceases . . .which may arise . . . on the collection of the federal
Revenue"); 1Id. at 292 (Hamilton's plan) ("all causes in which the revenues of the general Govern.
ment... are concerned"); 3 id. at 608 (Pinckney's plan) ("on the Regulations of U.S. concerning
Trade and Revenue").
143. 2 id. at 432.
144. 1 id.at 18-19.
145. 2 id. at 27.
146. 1 id.at 124. In his great speech of June 18 supporting his own plan, Hamilton foreshadowed Madison's FederalistNo. 10 andk epitomized the creditor viewpoint:
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Yet there was by no means a consensus on the deficiencies of state

courts, and only the Virginia Plan explicitly required lower federal courts
other than admiralty courts. 147 The New Jersey and Pinckney plans
specifically provided that federal jurisdiction would be appellate only (except for impeachments).1 48 The Virginia Plan's requirement of lower
courts was adopted at first, and then one day later at the strong insis-

tance of lawyer and planter John Rutledge (who was hopelessly in
debt1 4 9) inferior courts were struck out by a vote of five states to four,
with two states divided.15 0 Rutledge thought the "State Tribunals are

most proper to decide in all cases in the first instance,"' 51 and that "the

right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal... [was] sufficient to
secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts."15 2 He also thought
(and was seconded strongly on this point by the planter Pierce Butler of

South Carolina) that lower courts would be "an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States" that would create "unnecessary
obstacles to their adoption of the new system."1 53 Roger Sherman of
Connecticut had a different reason: He thought lower courts too expensive, "when the existing State Courts would answer the same
purpose."154

In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few
& the many. Hence separate interests will arise[.] There will be debtors & Creditors &c.
Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few they will
oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have power, that each may defend itself agst.
the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money-instalment laws &c[.]
l id. at 288.
147. 1 id. at 21 ("National Judiciary... to consist of ... inferior tribunals...
148. 1 id. at 244 (New Jersey Plan); 3 id. at 608 (Pinckney's plan).
149. R. BARRY, MR. RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 359 (1942). Rutledge was so notoriously
in debt and unable (or unwilling) to pay his creditors that even a staunch supporter, replying to an
attack on Rutledge upon his nomination as Chief Justice of the United States in 1795, described his
debt situation as one of "embarrassment[ ]" and lamely argued (in capitalistic language separating
public from private morality) that "[pecuniary independence is not prescribed by the Constitution,
as a qualification necessary to such as fill that office .... [1]f Mr. Rutledge was unable to answer on
demand, every debt he owed, it was his misfortune .... His private moral character has nothing to
do with his official uprightness ....
John Rutledge, Vindicated: A South Carolinean to Benjamin
Russell, [Boston] Columbian Centinel, Aug. 28, 1795, reprintedin 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 791 (M. Marcus & J. Perry eds.
1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT]. See also id. at 792 n.4
(detailing Rutledge's debt obligations).
150. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 104-05 (first vote successfully added inferior tribunals, on June 4); 1 id. at 125 (second vote defeated them, on June 5).
151. 1 id. at 119.
152. 1 id. at 124.
153. 1 id. at 124-25.
154. 1id.at 125.
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Madison and Robert Morris' lawyer, the "irrepressible speculator"
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, 155 were convinced that lower federal
courts "dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in
many cases" were absolutely necessary because of the ungovemability of
state juries and state judges subject to debtor pressures and opposed to
the interests of foreigners. 156 When the provisions requiring inferior
tribunals were voted down, Madison and Wilson proposed, and the Convention accepted, that Congress be allowed to institute inferior tribunals
if it desired. 157 In July a strong attempt was made to repeal even this

compromise and to deny completely any lower national courts. Butler
repeated his confidence that state courts could do the job, and debtor

representative Luther Martin of Maryland concurred: "They will create
jealousies & oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of
which they will interfere." 15 8 Randolph, ever to the point if not always
blunt, protested: "[T]he Courts of the States cannot be trusted with the
administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such
as will often place the General & local policy at variance." 159 The motion to reconsider ultimately was lost, and the possibility that Congress
could create lower federal courts remained. But it was clear that the
conjoined problems of debts and the degree of respect accorded to
debtor-oriented state judiciaries would be among the biggest issues in
contention when the finished Constitution was debated. Even these nationalists had wavered and were disputatiously divided on the issue.
155. R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 132. Already in severe financial difficulty in 1789 and thus
passed over for Chief Justice in 1795 and 1796, Wilson eventually suffered the collapse of his pyramid of speculation, was jailed in New Jersey and again in North Carolina for nonpayment of debt
while still retaining his seat as Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and died in abject, feverish poverty in his room in a tavern near the home of his friend and Supreme Court colleague James
Iredell, in August 1798 in Edenton, North Carolina. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 149, at 613-14, 842, 858, 858-59, 869 (letters of prominent Americans
discussing Wilson's difficulties); Diary of Thomas Shippen, (Shippen Family Papers, Library of Congress) (entry for Sept. 3, 1797); see also 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 149, at 46-48 (biographical sketch of Wilson).
156. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 124.
157. 1 id. at 125-27.
158. 2 id. at 45-46.
159. 2 id. at 46. George Mason, who can be described (with Randolph and Gerry) as the Convention members on the dividing line between acceptance and rejection of the Constitution, supported lower federal courts. 2 id. at 46. But in his own plan for a federal judiciary, he eliminated
diversity jurisdiction and lower federal courts (except admiralty courts), retaining appellate federal
jurisdiction over questions arising under treaties. He remained ambiguous as to whether appellate
federal jurisdiction extended to alienage cases-though he included "controversies ... between a
State and the citizens thereofand foreign States, citizens or subjects," that language raises the question whether the "and" between "State" and "the citizens thereof" is conjunctive; could it mean
"or"? 2 id. at 432.
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The jurisdictional language that emerged from the Committee of
Detail is also worthy of close attention. The Convention's resolutions on
the judiciary that went to that Committee on July 23 amounted to vague

compromise language in a Madisonian proposal that was clearly
designed to allow the Committee to flesh out the difficult matters: "'The
jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the Natl. laws: And to

such other questions as may involve the Natl. peace & harmony.'"160
Four eminent lawyers were elected to the Committee, including strong

nationalists Wilson and Oliver Ellsworth, a Connecticut judge, and moderate nationalists Rutledge and Randolph. Wilson and Randolph had

strong convictions and apparently matured ideas concerning the judiciary, and with Rutledge's aid they filled out the Convention's resolution

in amazing detail. 161 "Questions involving the national peace and harmony" turned out to include controversies between citizens and foreigners (alienage jurisdiction), controversies between citizens of different
states (diversity jurisdiction), and "all" admiralty cases. "All" cases arising under the national laws were retained directly from Madison's resolve.1 62 The pressure to facilitate debt recovery in forums not subject to

local debtor pressures played a significant, perhaps controlling, part in
the introduction of these heads of federal court jurisdiction.

Changes in the jurisdictional and other provisions made by the Convention were equally significant. On August 25, Madison moved to
amend what would become the Supremacy Clause of article 6, so that
after the words "all treaties made" were inserted... [without dissent]
the words "or which shall be made". This insertion was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties preexisting, by making
160. 2 id. at 46, 132-33.
161. It appears that the industrious Randolph produced a draft in which Madison's "cases involving the national peace and harmony" were broken down into cases concerning the national
revenue, diversity and alienage cases, and disputes between different states. Rutledge added admiralty and the jurisdiction later negatived by the eleventh amendment-"disputes between a State & a
Citizen or Citizens of another State" (hereinafter referred to as "eleventh amendment jurisdiction"),
2 id. at 146-47. Wilson produced a more elegant and finished design (from which the final draft was
derived), that included jurisdiction over ambassadors, admiralty, diversity, and alienage. Rutledge
added to it disputes between different states and eleventh amendment jurisdiction. 2 Id. at 167 n.17,
172-73. Both drafts included what we now call "federal question" jurisdiction, in language taken
directly from Madison's resolution, but neither extended it to cases under the Constitution or

treaties.
162. 2 id. at 186. "National peace and harmony" also turned out to require that controversies
"between a State and the Citizens of another State" (eleventh amendment jurisdiction) be heard in
the new national courts. Id. This clause was likely inserted to allow those who had loaned money or
property to the states, primarily to finance the Revolution and to supply the army, to sue recalcitrant
states that might plead sovereign immunity in their own courts or might otherwise refuse to be sued
there. These debts were held mostly by speculators and merchants. For a good treatment of the
problems of public debt and speculation in the resulting commercial paper that also plagued the
1780s, see M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 302-08.
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the words "all treaties made" 163
to refer to them, as the words inserted
would refer to future treaties.

On August 27, the "Judicial Power of the United States" was expressly extended to equity cases in which juries did not sit, on the motion
of the Connecticut nationalist, William Samuel Johnson.'" Later that
day, on Rutledge's motion, cases arising under "treaties made or which
shall be made" were added to the jurisdiction of the courts "conformably
to a preceding amendment in another place" (obviously, the amendment
to the Supremacy Clause). 165 Then, when the nationalist and speculator
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania asked whether the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extended to matters of fact "and to cases of

Common law as well as Civil law," Wilson assured him that it did, and a
clarifying amendment adding "both as to law & fact" after "appellate"
was agreed to immediately without dissent. 6 6 "Appellate" jurisdiction
in the mode of the civil law meant essentially a new trial without a jury in
167
the reviewing court.
The members of the Convention wanted to ensure not only that
state violations of treaties could be remedied, but also that courts sitting
without juries, particularly the Supreme Court hearing appeals in the

manner of the civil law, would be permitted. It is clear that they hoped
that the Supreme Court would be able to overturn (to repeat Madison's

revealing words) "improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under
the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an
163. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 417. A clause in the original Virginia Plan gave Congress the power to veto state laws "contravening" the Constitution. On May 31
it had been amended on Benjamin Franklin's motion to add after "Constitution" the words "or any
treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union." I id at 54. When this clause was under
reconsideration on June 8, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina had wanted to make it even stronger,
arguing among other things that treaties had not "escaped repeated violation." I id.at 164. And
Madison, seconding Pinckney, had echoed him: "Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the
States to ... violate national Treaties." 1 id.at 164. However, Pinckney's motion had been defeated, Iid.at 168, and the whole clause was struck out on July 17, 2 id. at 28, whereupon the clause
that was to become the Supremacy Clause-by its terms explicitly binding the "Judges in the several
States"-had been added unanimously, 2 id. at 29.
164. 2 id. at 428. As we shall see,,Johnson, as Senator from Connecticut, was to argue strenuously for equity powers in the federal courts, contrary to the desires of the Constitution's opponents.
See infra notes 282-99 and accompanying text.
165. 2id. at431.
166. Id.
167. See W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 6-7, 67-69. The two most learned and most discerning AntiFederalist writers, "Federal Farmer" (supposed at the time to be Richard Henry Lee, but probably a
New Yorker and not that respected and eminent Virginian) and "Brutus," understood the Constitution's description of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as to law and fact to be a reference to the civil
law's juryless mode of review. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST [hereinafter AIw-FEDERALIST]
2.8.189, 2.8.192, 2.8.194 (H. Storing ed. 1981) ("Federal Farmer's" letters); id. J 2.9.17378 ("Brutus" essays).
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undirected jury." 168 The British creditors would probably be able to obtain their interest as well as their principal, and perhaps out-of-state cred-

itors would find a similarly happy haven in the new national court
system. The broadly phrased but so far noncontroversial provisions

designed to sweep the debt cases of foreigners and out-of-staters into federal courts which might sit (at least in review) without juries,1 69 would
join with the already raging controversy over lower courts to create a
storm of protest during the ratification debates. 170

B.

The Ratification Process Displays Pro-DebtorStrength
It is probable that a majority of Americans in 1787 and 1788 op-

posed adoption of the new Constitution, although an unquantifiable portion of that opposition was not adamant. It is impossible to know which
part or parts of the document (if any) were crucial in engendering this

opposition. An important element was the overall nationalizing and an168. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 124.
169. Ezra Stiles later recorded in his diary that Connecticut resident turned Georgia citizen and
Convention delegate Abraham Baldwin declared to him that the Convention was "unanimous...
[on] Causes between subjects of foreign or different States." 3 id. at 169-70.
170. The provision permitting citizens of one state to sue another state (eleventh amendment
jurisdiction) would be a similar irritant. As with diversity jurisdiction, eleventh amendment jurisdiction would not be stoutly defended during the ratification debates. Federalists would resort to
defiectory arguments, such as that by Madison in the Virginia ratification convention ("if a state
should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it," 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

533 (3. Elli-

ott ed. 1836) [hereinafter STATE DEBATES], or to downright dissembling, such as that by Hamilton
in THE FEDERALIST No. 81. Hamilton explicitly denied that this provision gave jurisdiction over
suits based upon "an assignment of the public securities of one state to the citizens of another"since the goals were to obtain the broadly phrased constitutional grants of judicial power and to
ensure, through alienage jurisdiction and the appellate review power of the Supreme Court, that the
Treaty would be enforced. John Marshall, in the Virginia convention, also denied that states could
"be called at the bar of the federal court" under this provision, 3 id. at 555-56, but Marshall was not
a member of the Philadelphia convention and may not have been dissembling. From the history I
have recited it must be clear, although perhaps startling, that alienage jurisdiction was the most
important head of jurisdiction in article III.
I do not agree with William Winslow Crosskey's thesis that Madison lied about the states sovereignty compromises he reports during the Convention in order to tone down, late in life, what
Crosskey imagined to be the actual, extremely centralizing votes of that body. See generally W.
CROSSKEY & W. JEFFRIES, supra note 3. Nor do I follow Friendly's argument in his pioneering
article on the origins of diversity jurisdiction that there is no pre-Constitution evidence of state court
bias. However, I do honor their boldness and good judgment in one respect: I too find it necessary
at times to doubt "the sincerity" (Friendly, supra note 4, at 493) of Framers such as Madison,
Marshall, and Hamilton (just as I have doubted the sincerity of Jefferson, Monroe, and William
Branch Giles in their assessment of the openness of Virginia's courts to British creditors, see supra
note 81). On not a few occasions they proved themselves utterly human, in the heat of their nearlyfrustrated desire to maintain and augment the commercial union they had fought and struggled for
so hard. The sweeping jurisdiction of the national courts intentionally allowed by the broad language of the Constitution was one of those times and occasions.
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tidemocratic spirit of an instrument whose drafters had voted overwhelmingly (in secret) to impose a property qualification upon the
officers of the new government, quibbling only over whether a requirement of landed property might not exclude too many manufacturers and
merchants whose small numbers in 1787, Madison (who favored the re17 1
striction) noted, "will daily increase."
The judiciary provisions clearly provoked an outpouring of controversy and antagonism. To many, these broadly and vaguely stated jurisdictional provisions, coupled with the grant of congressional power to
create lower courts and the document's overall (albeit implicit) lack of
faith that state courts would deal fairly with ordinary problems (and with
debt cases in particular), meant the subversion of the state courts.
George Mason raised this theme while speaking at the Virginia ratification convention against federal question jurisdiction:
What is there left to the State Courts?... There is no limitation. It
goes to every thing. The inferior courts are to be as numerous as Congress may think proper ....

Read the 2d section, and contemplate

attentively the extent of the jurisdiction of these courts, and consider if
there be any limits to it. I am greatly mistaken if there be any limitawith respect to the nature or jurisdiction of these
tion whatsoever,
2
courts.

17

Further, many read the language of article III to require exclusive federal
cognizance of all of the instances there mentioned, or at least of the federal question and alienage jurisdictions. 173
171. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 121-26. The Committee on Detail
disregarded its instructions and chose not to establish property requirements for national officials.
The Convention also seriously debated whether to require that voters be freeholders. Oliver
Ellsworth and George Mason were apprehensive that such a restriction would leave out merchants
and manufacturers, while James Madison and Gouverneur Morris demonstrated the wholeness and
systemic nature of the capitalistic worldview and ethos by accurately predicting the demise of the
importance of land ownership in a near future when (in Morris' words) "this Country will abound
with [nonfreeholding] mechanics and manufacturers [artisans] who will receive their bread from
their employers." The Convention voted solidly against freehold requirements for national voters. 2

id. at 201-06.
172. 3 STATE DEBATES supra note 170, at 521; accord, eg., 3 id at 201 (William Grayson of
Virginia); 4 id. at 136-37 (Samuel Spencer of North Carolina); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrruTION 513 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY
OF RATIFICATION] (Robert Whitehill of Pennsylvania); id at 525 (John Smilie of Pennsylvania);
Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State ofMaryland...
[hereinafter cited as Martin, Genuine Information], ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, at 2.4.58;
id. %2.7.41 ("Centinel"-a pseudonym of Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania); Brutus, Essays, reprinted
in id. 11 2.9.7, 2.9.134-158, 2.9.195; A Columbian Patriot [pseud. Mercy Warren of Massachusetts],
Observationson the Constitution (1788), reprinted in 16 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra, at 272,
279 [hereinafter Warren, Observations].
173. Eg., 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 527 (Mason of Virginia on alienage jurisdiction); 4 id. at 138 (Samuel Spencer of North Carolina on federal question jurisdiction); Martin,
Genuine Information, supra note 172, at 1 2.4.58, 2.4.89-91.
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The oppression of debtors (in the South this especially included

"British" debtors) and of poor people in general was also a constant
theme of the opposition to the proposed judiciary. Jurors chosen from
the neighborhoods of poor or debtor defendants could exercise their

power-through general verdicts (that is, those that combined the jury's
judgment as to both law and facts, melded into the unreviewable phrases
"guilty," "not guilty," or the equivalent)-to assess damages and thus to
place a popular brake on tyrannical judges. There is ostensibly
mandatory language in article III that the "supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact." 174 There is also an

absence of any constitutional guarantee ofjury trials in civil cases. Most
modem commentators seem not to understand or even suspect that the
"appellate" jurisdiction given to the Supreme Court can easily be exer-

cised either to revise jury determinations of fact or as a trialjurisdiction,
for that is what what appellate jurisdiction meant in the civil law, in the
New England states, and occasionally in the other states in 1787-89.175

With these facts in mind, Patrick Henry said bluntly: "[T]he trial by
jury is gone: British debtors will be ruined by being dragged to the fed174. U.S. CONsr. art. 3, § 2; see supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
175. For a thorough treatment of "appellate" jurisdiction and Anti-Federalist fears in this regard, see W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 5-7, 30, 35-41, 65-69.
Those opposed to the Constitution, or at least to its judiciary provisions, well understood the
civil law usages with regard to judicial establishment of facts and the lack of any trial by jury in civil
cases. For example, John Smilie argued during the Pennsylvania ratification that:
It was the design and intention of the Convention to divest us of the liberty of trial by jury
in civil cases; and to deprive us of the benefits of the common law. The word "appeal" is a
civil law term; and therefore the Convention meant to introduce the civil law. On an appeal the judges may set aside the verdict of a jury. Appeals are not admitted in the common law.
2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 525 (Wilson's notes); accord, 2 id. at 522 ("1 fear
there is an intention to substitute the civil law in the room of the common law.") (speech of Smilie
on Dec. 7, 1787) (Yeates' notes). The most discriminating of the Anti-Federalist commentators said:
[A]ppeals from an inferior to a superior court, as practiced in the civil law courts, are well
understood. In these courts, the judges determine both on the law and the fact; and appeals are allowed from the inferior to the superior courts, on the whole merits.
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, 12.9.173 ("Brutus" essays); accord, id. 112.8.189, 2.8.192 (Federal Farmer's letters).
In the Convention, as we have seen, supra text accompanying notes 164-68, members had to
ascertain whether the appellate jurisdiction mentioned in article III extended to "cases of Common
law as well as Civil law," 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 431, not whether it
extended to civil law cases, and the amendment that put this language into article III followed
immediately after the raising of these issues. It is an inescapable conclusion that the Framers assumed that the appellate jurisdiction extended to "cases of ... Civil law" and thus intended the
Supreme Court to exercise a civil-law mode of review sitting without a jury to revise juries' factual
determinations or damage awards (i.e., interest in British debt cases), just as the Anti-Federalists
suspected and charged. The back-stepping and dissembling ofthe supporters of the Constitution on
this point-particularly that of James Wilson answering Smilie on the floor of the Pennsylvania
ratification convention, 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 575--can only be attributed to their desire to win the ratification vote.
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eral court, and the liberty and happiness of our citizens gone, never again
to be recovered." 1 76 A poor man who obtained judgment upon a jury
verdict in a federal trial court or even in the state courts could be forced
to retry the case in the Supreme Court, possibly at a distance of 500

miles, Mason noted, and "[h]e must bring his witnesses where he is not
known, where a new evidence may be brought against him, of which he

never heard before .

..

.,177

Of alienage jurisdiction, Mason asked: "What effect will this power
have between British creditors and the citizens of this state? ... I wish
every honest debt to be paid.... [T]here is not, in my opinion, a single
British creditor but can bring his debtors to the federal court." 178 Henry
176. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 579-80; see also 3 id. at 540 ("The verdict of an
impartial jury will be reversed by judges unacquainted with the circumstances."); 3 id. at 545 ("Why
do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents the hand of oppression from cutting you off.");
accord, 3 id at 528 (Mason of Virginia: right of trial by impartial jury of vicinage a "great palladium
of national safety"); Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison, Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 10
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 228 ("that there exists in the constitution a power that may
oppress... and that oppression will result from the appellate power of unsettling facts does to me
appear beyond a doubt"); ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, 4 4.15.4 ("Hampden" essays) ("the
inestimable right of a trial by jury ... is the democratical balance in the Judiciary power; without it,
in civil actions, no relief can be had against the High Officers of State, for abuse of private citizens").
"Federal Farmer" explained the whole argument, in measured tones:
I hold it is the established right of the jury by the common law, and the fundamental laws
of this country, to give a general verdict in all cases when they chuse to do it.... Juries are
constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the people, and freemen of the country:
and by holding the jury's right to return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to
the people at large, their just and rightful controul in the judicial department. If the conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change the
forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their opinions and
determinations, in similar cases.... Nor is it merely this controul alone we are to attend to:
the jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of all causes, and excludes secret
and arbitrary proceedings.... By the common law, in Great Britain and America, there is
no appeal from the verdict of the jury, as to facts, to any judges whatever.., but, by the
proposed constitution, directly the opposite principle is established. An appeal will lay in
all appellate causes from the verdict of the jury, even as to mere facts, to the judges of the
supreme court.
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, 4 2.8.190, 2.8.194 ("Federal Farmer's" letters); see also Warren, Observations,supra note 172, at 7-8. See generally Millon, Positivism in the Historiographyofthe
Common Law, 1989 WIsc. L. REv. 669.
177. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 524; see also 3 id. at 584 ("[We will not agree to a
federal judiciary, which is not necessary for this purpose, because the powers there granted will tend
to oppress the middling and lower class of people."); accord, eg., 4 id. at 143 (Joseph McDowall of
North Carolina); 4 id. at 154 (Samuel Spencer of North Carolina); 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION,
supra note 172, at 513 (Robert Whitehill of Pennsylvania); ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, at 4
2.4.92-94 (Luther Martin essay entitled Genuine Information); id at I 2.9.177-79 ("Brutus" essays);
Warren, Observations,supra note 172, at 9.
178. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 526; accord, e.g., 3 id. at 543 (Henry of Virginia)
("Every man who owes any thing to a subject of Great-Britain ... is subject to a tribunal that he
knew not when he made the contract."); ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, at q 2.7.42 ("Centinel"
essays) ("A London merchant shall come to America, and sue for his supposed debt, and the citizen
of this country shall be deprived of jury trial, and subjected to an appeal [tho' nothing but thefact is
disputed] to a court 500 or 1000 miles from home .... ").
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was similarly worried that alienage jurisdiction would "operate retrospectively," allowing pending cases to be transferred to the new courts,
and perhaps even permitting the reopening ofjudgments (meaning, in the
context, British debt judgments). 17 9 And with regard to diversity jurisdiction, Samuel Spencer of North Carolina exclaimed: "M ery great
oppressions may arise. Nothing can be more oppressive than the cognizance with respect to controversies between citizens of different states.
In all cases of appeal,. .. [there will be] a dreadful expense by going such
a distance to the Supreme Federal Court." 180 Mason also pointed out
that every case involving property or commercial paper could be rendered federal by the simple expedient of assigning title to a citizen of
another state.' 8 1
Patrick Henry summed up much of the opposition to the proposed
courts, explicitly contrasting the pre-capitalist morality of the debtors he
championed to the morality of the Framers of the Constitution:
179. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 542-43; accord, 3 id. at 529 (Mason worried about
what he called ex post facto laws). Most Virginians were well aware that some suits by British
creditors had languished on Virginia dockets for fifteen or twenty years. See, e.g., Holt & Perry,
supra note 123, at 107-08 & n.52. Although the courts in Virginia (and other southern states) had
long been closed to contested claims of British creditors, some British claims had been allowed to
reach judgment by mutual consent, although war interest may have been deducted. For example in
Virginia: "In Novemr. 1785 they agreed to settle the Debt provided half the interest was given up.
The claim being on open accot. [and thus nearly impossible to prove] the terms were agreed to."
Remarks on the Claims of Gibson Donaldson & Hamilton, p. 44 (PRO/T/79/1 1, "Lux & Bowley").
And in North Carolina, one debtor's conscience led him to repay the principal of his debt even
though it was uncollectible:
The debt was on open account. Repeated applications were made in 1784 and the following years for payment. It was reply'd that as the debt had been paid into the Treasury of
North Carolina agreeable to Law [all British debts had been confiscated in that state], no
legal claim existed against him, but as he admitted the justice of the demand, he would pay
the principal, provided it should be taken in a tract of Land at a valuation, but would allow
no interest. Having no evidence of the debt except the Books recourse to law would have
been fruitless; the offer was therefore accepted.
Remarks on the Claims of Gibson Donaldson & Hamilton, p. 59 (PRO/T/9/1 1, "Ransom Southerland"). And in Maryland it was stated:
Your memorialists further shew that thus discouraged by the Popular Clamours, their
Agents Could Make but little progress in the recovery of their said debts, those Suits that
were sustained no Court of Justice would give Judgment for Interest during the War and
the Agents of your Memorialists were obliged in all Cases to relinquish it [in settling
claims.]
Memorial to British-American Claims Commission of 1794 (Nov. 27, 1798) (PRO/T/79/21, "Jas.
Buchanan & Co.").
180. 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 155 ("There does not appear to me to be any kind of
necessity that the federal court should have jurisdiction in the body of the country"); id. at 164
("The state courts can do their business without federal assistance."); accord, e.g., 3 id. at 526
(Mason of Virginia: "Can we not trust our state courts with the decision of these?"); ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 167, S 2.7.42 ("Centinel" essays) ("a very invidious jurisdiction, implying an improper distrust of the impartiality and justice of the tribunals of the states"); ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 167,
2.9.180-84 ("Brutus" essays).
181. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 526, 551.
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It sounds mighty prettily to gentlemen, to curse paper money and honestly pay debts. But apply to the situation of America, and you will
find there are thousands and thousands of [debt] contracts, whereof
equity forbids an exact literal performance. Pass that government, and
you will be bound hand and foot.... Pass this government, and you
will be carried to the federal court (if I understand that paper right,)
182
and you will be compelled to pay shilling for shilling.

The defenders of the Constitution were deeply worried that their
document might fail of acceptance, and they began to backpedal rapidly
on specifics, thereby ,hoping to retain the very broad judicial power outlined in article III by giving in on particulars. They promised repeatedly
that in its first session Congress would legislate to set right all of the
difficulties the objectors had pointed out.1 83 In particular, they said,
Congress would guarantee civil juries and would prohibit the Supreme
Court from reviewing the factual determinations of trial juries;1 84 they
guaranteed that Congress would so regulate both trial and appellate federal jurisdiction as to make them inexpensive and not oppressive;' 8 5 they

suggested that the Supreme Court might be given sessions in different
parts of the country to lessen the distance of travel;1 86 and they broadly
182. Id. at 318-19. Matthew Locke of North Carolina, in his only comments during that state's
first ratification convention, said:
[T]his alteration will not produce more impartiality than there is now in our courts,
whatever evils it may bring forth .... It must be supposed that the same passions, dispositions, and failings of humanity which attend the state judges, will be equally the lot of the
federal judges.... Great reflections are thrown on South Carolina for passing pine-barren
and instalment laws, and on this state for making paper money.... Necessity compelled
them to pass the law, in order to save vast numbers of people from ruin.... [T]he situation
of the country, and the distress of the people are so great, that the public measures must be
accommodated to their circumstances with peculiar delicacy and caution, or another insurrection may be the consequence.
4 id. at 168-70.
183. For example, in THE FEDERALIST No. 80, Alexander Hamilton stated:
If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any
of them [federal judicial powers] into the plan it ought to be recollected that the national
legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences.
184. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton); 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note
172, at 573-74 (James Wilson of Pennsylvania); 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 534 (Madison
of Virginia); 3 id. at 558, 560-61 (John Marshall of Virginia); 3 id. at 572-73, 576 (Edmund Randolph of Virginia); 4 id. at 145, 152 (James Iredell of North Carolina); 4 id. at 151 (Archibald
Maclaine of North Carolina).
185. E.g., 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 519-21 (Edmund Pendleton of Virginia) ("The
appeals may be limited to a certain sum. I make no doubt it will be so .... Congress can prevent that
dreadful oppression which would enable many men to have a trial in the federal court, which is
ruinous."); 3 id. at 572, 576 (Edmund Randolph of Virginia); 4 id. at 146-47 (James Iredell of North
Carolina); "A Landholder VI" [pseud. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut], 3 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 490; "A Citizen of New Haven" [pseud. Roger Sherman of Connecticut], in
3 id. at 527.
186. E.g., 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 535-36 (Madison of Virginia); 4 id. at 147
(James Iredell of North Carolina); "A Landholder VI" [pseud. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut], in
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hinted that Congress would not exercise its power to create lower federal
courts, but would instead use the state supreme courts as the inferior
federal courts.18 7 Charles Pinckney, an important member of the Phila-

delphia convention, told the South Carolina legislature that Congress
would not "ever think of giving these courts a retrospective
18 8
jurisdiction."
The defenders of the Constitution also stressed in state convention

after state convention that national jurisdiction was concurrent not exclusive, meaning that plaintiffs whose case or citizenship fit them within
federal jurisdiction nevertheless would be able to choose to enter state

courts if they wished.18 9 They were eerily silent on the important question of alienage jurisdiction, which would cover the crucial British debt

cases, 190 but, as Friendly said, "the most astounding thing... [is] the
apathy of the defense" of diversity jurisdiction. 191 "As to its cognizance
of disputes between citizens of different states, I will not say it is a matter

of much importance," said James Madison, the first propounder of diversity jurisdiction. 192
3 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 490; "A Citizen of New Haven" [pseud. Roger
Sherman of Connecticut], in 3 id. at 527.
187. E.g., 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 517 (Edmund Pendleton of Virginia); 3 id. at
536 (Madison of Virginia, with Wilson the strongest proponent of mandatory lower federal courts in
the Convention); "A Landholder VI" [pseud. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut], 3 HISTORY OF RATiFICATION, supra note 172, at 490; "A Citizen of New Haven" [pseud. Roger Sherman of Connecticut], in 3 id. at 527. Even Hamilton, who thought that there were "substantial reasons against"
having the state courts become the lower federal courts, was willing to consider the state judges
sitting in the federal circuit courts along with federal judges. THE FEDERALIST No. 81.
188. (Charleston] City Gazette, Nov. 15, 1788. Pinckney was expressly speaking to the question
of British debts. He adhered to his argument in a later letter to Madison, believing
that giving to the federal Judicial retrospectivejurisdictionin any case whatsoever, .. from
it's being an ex post facto provision, & from the confusion & opposition it will give rise to,
will be the surest & speediest mode to subvert our present system & give it's adversaries the

majority.
Letter from Charles Pinckney to James Madison (Mar. 28, 1789), reprintedin 12 MADISON PAPERS,
supra note 9, at 34-35.
189. E.g., 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 518-19 (James Wilson of Pennsylvania); 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 554 (John Marshall of Virginia); 4 id. at 141 (Samuel Johnston of North Carolina) ("The opinion which I have always entertained is, that they will,
in these cases [federal question jurisdiction], as well as in several others, have concurrent jurisdiction
with the state courts, and not exclusive jurisdiction. I see nothing in this Constitution which hinders
a man from bringing suit wherever he thinks he can have justice done him."); 4 id. at 163 (Archibald
Maclaine of North Carolina). Hamilton devoted most of THE FEDERALIST No. 82 to this point.
190. The strange remarks of Madison on this point appear, like those of most defenders and
proponents of the Constitution, completely to miss the point. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at
533-34. An exception was James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratification convention. See infra text
accompanying note 193.
191. Friendly, supra note 4, at 487.
192. 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 533; accord,e.g., 3 id. at 549 (Edmund Pendleton of
Virginia); 3 id. at 556 (John Marshall of Virginia) ("Were I to contend that this was necessary in all
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Although the proponents of the Constitution backed off with regard
to the details, they made it quite clear that the elimination or amelioration of difficulties with credit was the principal reason for having the
alienage and diversity jurisdictions, and that it was one of the most important reasons for a federal judiciary. On the floor of the Pennsylvania
ratification convention, James Wilson presented the position most cogently and clearly. Speaking about both alienage and diversity, he said:
This part of the jurisdiction, I presume, will occasion more doubt than
any other part ....[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either
public or private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just
and impartial tribunal to which they may resort? ... [H]ow will a
creditor feel, who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other
states?... There have been installment acts, and other acts of a similar effect. Such things, sir, destroy the very sources of credit. Is it not
an important object to extend our manufactures and our commerce?
This cannot be done unless a proper security is provided for the regular discharge of contracts. This security cannot be obtained unless we
give the power of deciding upon those contracts to the general government.... Merchants of eminence will tell you that they can trust their
correspondents without law; but they cannot trust the laws of the state
in which their correspondents live.... Further, it is necessary, in order
to preserve peace with foreign nations. Let us suppose the case, that a
wicked law is made in some one of the states, enabling a debtor to pay
his creditor with the fourth, fifth, or sixth part of the real value of the
debt, and this creditor, a foreigner, complains to his prince or sovereign, of the injustice that has been done him. What can that prince or
sovereign do? ...If the United States are answerable for the injury,
ought they not to possess the means of compelling the faulty state to
repair it?193
No sympathy with or understanding of the pre-capitalist world and
its morality infects Wilson's words; and the same was true of all those
who defended the judiciary to be set up under the Constitution. 194 They
cases, and that the government without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment.");
3 id. at 572 (Edmund Randolph of Virginia); 4 id. at 142 (Samuel Johnston of North Carolina).
193. 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 518-20 (reporter's paragraphing
disregarded).
194. See, e.g., Edmund Randolph speaking of the federal judiciary as a whole:
[Tihe judiciary... are to inforce the performance of private contracts. The British debts,
which are withheld contrary to treaty, ought to be paid. Not only the law of nations, but
justice and honor require that they be punctually discharged.
3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 478. James Madison, speaking of appeals to Supreme Court,
said:
It has been urged, that this [appeals where facts could be re-examined] would be oppressive
to those who, by imprudence or otherwise, come under the denomination of debtors.... If
this system should have the effect of establishing universal justice, and accelerating it
throughout America, it will be one of the most fortunate circumstances that could happen
for those men.... To those... who are involved in such encumbrances, relief cannot be
granted. Industry and economy are their only resources. It is in vain to wait for money, or
temporize. The great desiderata are public and private confidence.... The establishment
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were quite sure that contracts must be honored so credit could be obtained, and "just and impartial" new federal courts (as viewed from
of confidence will raise the value of property, and relieve those who are so unhappy as to be
involved in debts.
3 id. at 538. Madison, speaking of alienage jurisdiction, stated:
The States are... independent of each other. We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get
justice done them in these courts, and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from
trading or residing among us.
3 id. at 583. Edmund Pendleton, speaking of diversity jurisdiction, said:
Suppose a bond given by a citizen of Rhode Island to one of our citizens. The regulations
of that state [rendering depreciated paper money into legal tender] being unfavorable to the
claims of the other states, if he is obliged to go to Rhode Island to recover it, he will be
obliged to accept payment of one third, or less, of his money ... Is it just that a man
should run the risk of losing nine tenths of his claim? Ought he not to be able to carry it to
that court where unworthy principles do not prevail? Paper money and tender laws may
be passed in other states, in opposition to the federal principle, and [to the] restriction of
this Constitution, and will need jurisdiction in the federal judiciary to stop its pernicious
effects.
3 id. at 549. James Iredell, speaking of the whole federal judiciary, stated:
The same measure ofjustice... ought to prevail in all [states]. A man in North Carolina,
for instance, if he owed £100 here, and was compellable to pay it in good money, ought to
have the means of recovering the same sum, if due to him in Rhode Island, and not merely
the nominal sum, at about an eighth or tenth part of its instrinsic value. To obviate such a
grievance as this, the Constitution has provided a tribunal to administer equal justice to all.
4 id. at 147. William R. Davie of North Carolina, speaking to the whole federal judiciary, said:
Without a general controlling judiciary, laws might be made in particular states to enable
its citizens to defraud the citizens of other states. Is it probable, if a citizen of South
Carolina owed a sum of money to a citizen of this state, that the latter would be certain of
recovering the full value in their courts? That state might, in future, as they have already
done, make pine-barren acts to discharge their debts.... They might pass the most iniquitous instalment laws, procrastinating the payment of debts due from their citizens, for
years-nay, for ages.... It is essential to the interest of agriculture and commerce that the
hands of the states should be bound from making paper money, instalment laws, or pinebarren acts. By such iniquitous laws the merchant or farmer may be defrauded of a considerable part of his just claims. But in the federal court, real money will be recovered with
that speed which is necessary to accommodate the circumstances of individuals.... It is
necessary, therefore, in order to obtain justice, that we recur to the judiciary of the United
States, where justice must be equally administered, and where a debt may be recovered
from the citizen of one state as soon as from the citizen of another.
4 id. at 157, 159. Alexander Hamilton, writing of diversity jurisdiction, stated:
I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the States.... To
secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision [the privileges and immunities clause]
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed
to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between
the different States and their citizens .... The reasonableness of the agency of the national
courts, in cases in which State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial speaks for
itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80. Hugh Williamson, writing of alienage and diversity jurisdictions, said:
It is provided in this system that there shall be no fraudulent tender in the payment of
debts. Foreigners with whom we have treaties will trust our citizens on the faith of this
engagement, and the citizens of different states will do the same.... [I]t is at least possible
that some State may be found in this Union, disposed to break the Constitution, and abolish private debts by such tenders. In these cases the Courts of the offending State would
probably decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would complain and the nation
might be involved in war for the support of such dishonest measures. Is it not better to
have a Court of Appeals in which the Judges can only be determined by the laws of the
nation? This Court is equally to be desired by the citizens of different States.
Remarks on the New Plan of Government, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 399-400 (P. Ford ed. 1892).
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within their pro-creditor morality, which did not admit that the pro-

debtor position might be just, and within which the application of rules
that allowed creditors to win was considered impartiality) would be there

expressly to see that contracts would be enforced. Strikingly forceful in
this regard were those scattered commentators who saw the new national
courts as a substitute for a standing army. William R. Davie of North

Carolina argued bluntly: "[I]t will be necessary to consider in what manner laws can be executed. For my own part, I know but two ways ....
The first mode is coercion by military force, and the second is coercion
195
through the judiciary."
Even with a strategic retreat from their position on the judiciary, the
proponents of the Constitution were forced to scramble, scheme, organize, and pray for a victory that almost eluded them. Massachusetts vot-

ers elected a majority against the Constitution, but many opponents lived
in the forty-six townships that could not afford to send delegates to the

convention, and many others who attended were subjected to pressure by
those "determined to use every ploy that would help achieve their goal"
(pressure that was repeated in every state ratifying convention). 196 Finally, the surprising conversion of Sam Adams (fearful of disunion) and
John Hancock (whose vanity was flattered) to grudging support of the

document, and the willingness of the Constitution's champions to accept
suggested amendments (rather than required ones), brought victory by
twenty-one votes out of the 355 votes cast. 197 New Hampshire voters
A Maryland writer summed it up in language just becoming modem. Although the writer's
words admitted the intensely controverted state of affairs, it nevertheless assumed the pro-creditor
position to be unquestionably just:
The antifederalists in every state, seem to have conceived a violent antipathy to these
courts, while merchants and those who expect to carry on any sort of commerce with the
citizens of the different states, are anxious to see them established. . . . [W]e hope the
merchants, manufacturers and friends to credit and national character, will appoint men to
the assembly [who elect Senators], and to congress, who are favourers to their speedy establishment.
"Federalicus," Maryland Gazette, or the Baltimore Advertiser, Oct. 3, 1788.
195. 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 155; accord, eg., 3 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION,
supra note 172, at 541-45, 548-54 (quoted passage from 553) (Oliver Ellsworth, in the Connecticut
ratification convention: "[Wle see, how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle.... The only
question is, shall it be a coercion of law or a coercion of arms? There is no other possible alternative. .. . I am for coercion by law, that coercion which acts only on delinquent individuals.").
William Samuel Johnson, in the Connecticut ratification convention, said:
[O]ur commerce is annihilated; our national honor, once in so high esteem, is no more....
The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legislate for states in their political
capacity: that the coercion of law can be exercised by nothing but a military force. They
have therefore gone upon entirely new ground.... The power which is to enforce these
laws is to be a legal power vested in proper magistrates. The force which is to be employed
is the energy of law ....
3 id. at 545-46.
196. Fox, supra note 129, at 121.
197. Id. at 121-27.
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also elected a majority against the Constitution, but thanks to a number
of events, including a strategic postponement of the ratification convention from February to June (by which time eight states of the necessary
nine had already ratified and none had rejected), a few interim delegate
election successes by supporters, the absence of eight opponents on the
day of the vote, and the willingness of supporters to accept suggested
amendments, the Constitution carried by ten votes out of the 104 votes
cast.198 New York voters elected a large majority against the Constitution, and Governor George Clinton also vigorously opposed it. But the
well-organized proponents were able to use complacency and dissension
among the opponents, threats of the secession of New York City, the
willingness of both proponents and some key opponents to accept suggested amendments, and the mid-convention accession of New Hampshire and Virginia to the union (meaning the possible isolation of New
York should she now reject) to gain acceptance by three votes out of the
fifty-seven cast. 199 The election of delegates in Virginia produced an almost evenly split ratification convention and a magnificent debate, but
the pressure of eight states' prior ratification (New Hampshire's ratification did not become known until after the vote), the willingness of
Madison to swallow his pride and agree to suggested amendments, and
Edmund Randolph's swing back to Sam Adams-like support for union
over disunion carried the vote for the Constitution by ten votes out of the
168 cast.20 0 Even after New York became the eleventh state in the union,
North Carolina and Rhode Island rejected the Constitution by huge
20 1
majorities.
The new government had come into being only by the slimmest of
margins, and its supporters' pragmatic backsliding on a few important
constitutional provisions that had provoked strenuous dissent plus the
lack of an articulated but less centralizing alternative were probably the
keys to its reluctant acceptance. 20 2 Proponents knew that their support
198. Daniell, Ideology andHardball: Ratification of the FederalConstitution in New Hampshire,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 47, at 189-98.
199. Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 240-48.
200. Briceland, supra note 129, at 210-21.
201. See Conley, Firstin War, Last in Peace: Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-1790, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 47, at 276-85 (Rhode Island by popular vote
rejected the Constitution overwhelmingly in March 1788, and its legislature refused even to call a
ratification convention until January 1790. Even then a majority of those elected were opposed to
the Constitution, causing one postponement of the convention. Ratification ultimately occurred by a

one-vote margin.); Watson, State's Rights andAgrarianismAscendant, in id. at 260-65 (North Carolina rejected the Constitution by 100 votes out of 268 cast).
202. John Quincy Adams was much later to remark that the Constitution "had been extorted
from the grinding necessity of a reluctant nation." J. ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
A DISCOURSE DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY 55 (1839),
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was to a significant degree weak, suspicious, and liable to dissolve, yet
they believed that the reorganization had to work or else the nation
would be torn asunder by internal and external pressures. Shortsighted
supporters desired to give the opponents no relief for their demands, but
the more clear-headed, like Madison and Oliver Ellsworth, knew that the
shaky national union depended on concessions.
More than two hundred different amendments to the Constitution,
embodying approximately eighty different substantive changes, were suggested by the various state ratification conventions. Sixteen of the eighty
proposed important alterations in the national judiciary. 20 3 Some proposals would have guaranteed jury trials in noncriminal cases, and some
would have limited or eliminated federal question jurisdiction. New
York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania would have restricted the lower federal
courts to admiralty jurisdiction; New York, Virginia, North Carolina,
and the minority in Pennsylvania would have eliminated diversity and
alienage jurisdiction altogether; and Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Maryland would have placed a minimum amount-in-controversy
limitation on diversity cases and a higher limitation on appeals. Maryland would have required trials by jury in all actions on debts or contracts. Virginia proposed that national jurisdiction should "extend to no
case where the cause of action shall have originated before the ratifica2°
tion of this Constitution." 4
It was clear to some observers that
the effect of ... [the restrictions proposed by Virginia] would have
been to divest the General Government of all control, not only over
many questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States but over all questions relative to infractions of the 4th article of
the Treaty of Peace; and questions respecting debts due by citizens of
quoted in R. MORRIS, supra note 43, at 317. Gouverneur Morris, a prominent participant in Philadelphia and a supporter, asked his colleagues in the Senate in January 1802:
if they have not seen the time when the fate of America was suspended by a hair?...
Never, in the flow of time, was a moment so propitious, as that in which the Convention
assembled. The States had been convinced, by melancholy experience, how inadequate
they were to the management of our national concerns. The passions of the people were
lulled to sleep; State pride slumbered; the Constitution was promulgated; and then it
awoke, and opposition was formed; but it was in vain. The people of America bound the
States down by this great compact.
II ANNALS OF CONGRESS 40 (185 1).
203. W. RITZ,supra note 3, at 20; Warren, New Light on the History ofthe FederalJudiciaryAct
of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV.49, 55 (1923). Warren talked of seventy-nine changes, whereas Ritz uses
eighty. Given the large number of proposals, it is difficult to boil them down to generic types, and
the slight difference between these two experts is not surprising.
204. See 2 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 597-99, 623-25 (Pennsylvania); DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 1019

(Massachusetts), 1024-26 (New Hampshire), 1027-34 (Virginia), 1034-38 (New York), 1044-51
(North Carolina); 2 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 550-51 (Maryland).
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Virginia, to citizens
of other states, and to the citizens and subjects of
20 5
foreign nations.
As Professor Ritz has noted, "IT]he dilemma that members of the First
Congress faced was to cater to these [sorts of] demands without seriously
crippling the national judiciary" from their standpoint of support for the
06

2
new order.

IV.

FEDERAL COURTS ARE INVENTED:

THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789

A.

The Stage and the Players

The First Congress under the new Constitution was supposed to assemble and commence its business on March 4, 1789, but on the appointed day only thirteen Representatives and eight Senators had
arrived. 20 7 It took thirty Representatives and twelve Senators to make
quorums. The Senate did not have its quorum until Richard Henry Lee
of Virginia appeared on April 6 and since the House had just previously
made its quorum, Congress could get down to business-albeit a month
late. In the important task of building a government, the House first
took up the problems of revenue, while the Senate undertook to fashion a
20 8
judiciary.
The First Congress's handiwork, embodied in the Judiciary Act of
1789,209 endures essentially to this day as the framework of the national
judiciary. The system in the Act was for all useful intents and purposes
contained in the bill as it emerged in July from the Senate. The Senate
bill in turn was derived in its main outlines and important features directly from the product of the judiciary committee's drafting subcommittee (a subcommittee analogous to the Committee of Detail), which
consisted of Oliver Ellsworth, who had served two years previously on
the first Committee of Detail in the Convention, and two other Conven205. "Marcus" [pseud. Oliver Wolcott Jr. of Connecticut], BRITISH INFLUENCE ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES PROVED AND EXPLAINED 10 (1804). I am indebted to William

Casto for bringing this pamphlet to my attention.
206. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 20; see, eg., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Mar. 29, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 37 ("I hope and expect that
some conciliatory sacrifices will be made, in order to extinguish opposition to the system, or at least
break the force of it, by detaching the deluded opponents from their designing leaders."); Letter from
Tench Coxe to George Thatcher (Mar. 12, 1789) (Independence National Historical Park Collection, Philadelphia) ("If due attention be [illegible] to removing the jealousies & fears of the large part
of the Opposition we may gain strength & stability without impairing one essential [illegible] of the
constitution.").
207. Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Mar. 4, 1789) (Duane Norman Diedrich Collection, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan).
208. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 13.
209. 1 Stat. 73.
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tion delegates, William Paterson of New Jersey and Caleb Strong of
Massachusetts. The remarkable strength and durability of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which was meant to be a temporary compromise solution to
the series of difficult political problems raised about the judiciary during
the ratification debates, is due mainly to three factors operative during
the First Congress, to be detailed, and an overwhelming fourth factorthe happenstance of political history-which will be partially unfolded in
future essays.
First, the Senators had all been reared in what was predominantly a
pre-capitalist world, and were trained to engage courageously and relatively communally in open substantive debate about what were universally regarded as substantive community concerns, rather than having
been given political training in a selfish, procedurally-oriented, publicrelations world like the one we live in, an alienated and centerless world
riven into supposedly separate public and private spheres that has deadened us after two centuries of the dominance of capitalist relations.
Moreover, the skills of the Senators in 1789 had been tested and tempered in the fire of a terrible war in which substantive principles were
constantly alluded to-a war they had won against all odds-and during
and after which intense substantive public concern and debate over political issues were the experience of nearly everyone. They were used to
frequent conversation about first principles, and they lived in a time
when each decision seemed perilous. The debate over the judiciary, as a
result, was full, thorough, and principled.
Second, and a direct result of the first factor, the Senate organized
and conducted itself in a manner designed to achieve optimum substantive results. On their first two important tasks, the judiciary and the
subject of crimes against the national government, the Senators divided
themselves into two "Grand Committees," each containing one Senator
from each state. When new Senators arrived, they were allocated to one
or the other of these two committees. The judiciary committee, at least,
"followed the practice of the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, that is, they proceeded by debating, and either adopting or rejecting, a series of general resolutions. '2 10 They conversed about
general principles, thereby getting antagonisms and problems directly
and clearly into the open.
Third, at least three key people seemed to understand fully the political need to achieve compromise on the controversial subject of the judiciary, and were intelligent and perspicacious enough to grasp and
210. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 13-14, 16 (quotation found at 16). I have taken the liberty to
apply the usage "Grand Committee" here; it was what the Continental Congress called a committee
which had a member from each state. See, eg., M. JENSEN, supra note 6, at 418-20.
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articulate most of the elements necessary to achieve that compromise.
There was the commercially oriented brilliant lawyer from Virginia,
James Madison, who with his unerring ability to foretell the direction
and force of the political winds had grasped the strength and a sense of
the needs of the pre-capitalist countrymen with whom he had been
raised. Madison already had set out several compromise positions for the
judicial bill in his speeches in the Virginia ratification convention, 211 and
he had promised his constituency, when running successfully (against
James Monroe) for a seat in the first House of Representatives, that "the
Judiciary department.., ought to be so regulated, as to render vexatious,
and superfluous appeals, impossible. ' 212 In the First Congress, Madison
ably defended the Senate bill when it came to the House, and worked
tirelessly for a set of constitutional amendments that would satisfy many
Anti-Federalists and fence-sitters without essentially weakening the new
government's overall power.
Helping shape the judicial bill in the Senate was another eminent
Virginian, idolized as the mover of independence in 1776 and perhaps the
best-known member of Congress: Richard Henry Lee. His election to
the Senate, along with that of William Grayson, had been secured in the
Virginia legislature by Patrick Henry to ensure that the views of opponents of the Constitution would be presented ably. A good representative of his debtor neighbors, he was opposed to "vexatious oppressive"
trials in cases "concerning property between Citizens of different States,
and between Citizens and foreigners" in distant courts sitting possibly
without juries. 21 3 However, Lee was not so vociferous and unyielding an
opponent as was Henry, for Lee found in the Constitution "a great many
excellent Regulations . . . and if it could be reasonably amended [it]
would be a fine System."' 21 4 A far-sighted statesman and a good debater,
sufficiently deeply principled and egocentric to press his views even if in a
211. Madison argued that Congress could use the state judiciaries for federal business; he
thought Congress would cure the problem of the absence of jury trials by legislation and would
require the Supreme Court to sit in different regions, "to render it more convenient." 3 STATE

DEBATES, supra note 170, at 534-36. Possible limitations were also thought of by others. The idea
of a jurisdictional amount had been raised in several conventions, for example, and Roger Sherman
casually mentioned the specific possibility that "the courts of the particular states will be authorized
by Congress to try causes under the laws of the Union" (that is, what we call federal question cases).
"A Citizen of New Haven" [pseud. Roger Sherman], 3 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172,
at 527.
212. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), reprinted in 11
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 416-17.
213. Enclosure in letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), reprintedin 3
MASON PAPERS, supra note 77, at 999.
214. Letter from Lee to Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), reprintedin 3 MASON PAPERS, supra note 77, at
1000.
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distinct minority, Lee would prove to represent his moderate position
quite well.
The most important single contribution was provided by Oliver Ellsworth. A creditor-oriented proponent of a strong national government,
Ellsworth combined the tenacious qualities of a Connecticut Yankee lawyer and judge, including tirelessness, with a debating technique that overwhelmed opponents through systematic and repetitious defense of his
position. His blunt but effective statesmanship grew from a grudging but
serious understanding of how important it was to make drastic concessions to the position Lee represented while maintaining the essential
strength of the federal judiciary.
We have little direct evidence for the sources and details of Ellsworth's plan. It is probable, however, that he arrived in New York, the
seat of the new government, with a judiciary plan in mind which reflected serious discussions with his Connecticut friends Roger Sherman,
William Samuel Johnson, Richard Law, and Oliver Wolcott. 21 5 It is
likely that Ellsworth's plan was altered and deepened through discussion
of a Massachusetts plan brought along by Caleb Strong. 216 Quite early in
215. It is clear from surviving letters, the debates at the Connecticut ratification convention, and
the articles Ellsworth and Sherman published in support of the Constitution that these well-educated and intelligent friends (friends both of each other and of the new government, though Wolcott
was only lately converted) consulted each other, and considerable thought had been given to the
framing of the judiciary. See generally W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905).
It is probable that the plan or ideas evolved among these Connecticut thinkers centered on a
system of nisi prius courts, that is, a large body of judges riding singly or in small groups into the
countryside to try cases, but serving as a whole group sitting at the center of government to resolve
difficult or novel questions of law-the system then in force in Massachusetts, New York, and Great
Britain. No district or circuit courts would then have been necessary. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 6063; Letter from Richard Law to Oliver Ellsworth (May 4, 1789) (Jenkins Collection, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College) ("The Sketch you have [sent from New York] appears to me to be
plausible & feasible & preferable to the Plan of Nisi prius Courts"). William Samuel Johnson appears to have been the principal proponent of the nisipriusarrangement of the federal courts. See
Maclay, "The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates," reprintedin 9 DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at 88 (K. Bowling & H. Veit
eds. 1988) [hereinafter MACLAY'S DIARY] (entry for June 24, 1789) ("The first debate that arose was
whether there should be Circuit Courts or courts of Nisi Prius. This distinction was started by Mr.
Johnson of Connecticut."); see also infra text accompanying notes 249-53. Ellsworth apparently
moved away from the nisiprius idea when he encountered the plan from Massachusetts.
216. Strong received several thoughtful letters from his friends on the Massachusetts bench,
particularly from David Sewall (who would become the first United States District Judge in Maine).
Ritz has published Sewall's striking letter of May 2, 1789, as well as a letter from Robert Treat Paine
(another Massachusetts high court judge) of May 18, 1789, and Strong's response to Paine dated
May 24, 1789. W. RITZ, supra note 3, at 201-08. An earlier, even-more striking letter from Sewall
to Strong, published in pertinent part in Appendix 3, infra, suggested (a) limiting the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to questions of law via writs of error, (b) placing the revenue jurisdiction in the admiralty courts, (c) accepting the Massachusetts convention's notion of an amount in
controversy limitation on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and (d) having the Supreme Court sit in
three divisions in different areas of the country-all ideas accepted in Ellsworth's scheme. Sewall
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the deliberations of the judicial committee Ellsworth became the sponsor
of a complicated and ingenious compromise scheme of organization and
jurisdiction for the new courts. His scheme was by and large acceptable
to Lee, upon whom he had made a personal and somewhat petty attack
in a well-known newspaper article of late 1787.217 Ellsworth reported to
Wolcott in late May: "We have no schism, nor much locality. Mr. Lee
as yet goes with us."'2 18 Lee himself wrote almost simultaneously to Patrick Henry: "I am satisfied to see a spirit prevailing that promises to
send this [judiciary]B system out free from those vexations and abuses
' 2 19
that might have been warranted by the terms of the Constitution.
also suggested that the state supreme courts try diversity and alienage cases, and that the federal
admiralty court districts not be coterminous with state boundaries-ideas not accepted in Ellsworth's scheme. Letter from Sewall to Strong (Mar. 28, 1789) (Caleb Strong Manuscripts, Forbes
Library, Northampton, Massachusetts). Similar ideas were expressed in a Letter from Sewall to
Congressman George Thatcher (Apr. 11, 1789) (Chamberlain Collection, by courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library); see also Letter from Massachusetts high court judge Nathaniel
Peaslea Sargeant to John Adams (Apr. 25, 1789) (Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical
Society).
Another probably interlocking group of Massachusetts judiciary thinkers centered around Representative Fisher Ames and John Lowell of Boston, still another high court judge and soon to be
Massachusetts' first federal district judge. Writing to a Boston attorney friend that drafting the
judiciary legislation "will be great work," Ames enclosed "a first imperfect sketch of a Judicial
System, which has been proposed and is the subject of conversation of three or four persons only."
The plan included a district judge for each state with full federal trial jurisdiction, concurrent with
state courts, and a $300 amount-in-controversy limitation on diversity and alienage cases. The objects, as stated by Ames, were "[t]o prevent expence ...and to allay jealousy .... By narrowing
rather than extending jurisdiction, perhaps something may be done towards effecting both." Ames
asked his friend to "converse with the Judges, and such of our brethren of the Bar as you may meet
with," especially James Sullivan and Theophilus Parsons. Letter from Fisher Ames to a Boston
Attorney (Mar. 15, 1789) (American Revolution Collection, by courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library); see also Letter from James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Mar. 29, 1789) (Gerry.
Knight Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society) (Sullivan did not like plan; letter revealed portions
of plan dealing with full jurisdiction for district judges plus their concurrent jurisdiction); see also
Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Apr. 8, 1789) (AMs 771/8, The Rosenbach Museum &
Library, Philadelphia); Letter from Christopher Gore to Rufus King (Mar. 27, 1789) (Rufus King
Papers, courtesy of the New-York Historical Society).
217. In the article, "A Landholder, VI" wrote:
[George Mason's] reasons [for opposing the Constitution]... have been revised in New
York by R.H.L. [widely if probably erroneously thought to be the author of "Letters from
a Federal Fanner"] and by him brought into their present artful and insidious form. The
factious spirit of R.H.L.-his implacable hatred of General Washington [untrue]-his
well-known intrigues against him in the late war-his attempt to displace him and give the
command of the American army to General [Charles] Lee [untrue]-is so recent in your
minds it is not necessary to repeat them.
Letter from a Landholder [pseud. Oliver Ellsworth] to the Connecticut Courant (Dec. 10, 1787),
reprinted in 3 HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 172, at 487.
218. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Oliver Wolcott (May 30, 1789) (Wolcott Papers, Connecticut Historical Society).
219. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (May 28, 1789), reprintedin 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 487 (J. Ballagh ed. 1911) [hereinafter LEE LETTnRS].
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Ellsworth clearly deserves the encomiums he has received as the father of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Like a good lawyer, he had thoroughly
digested the situation and considered his proposed solution; he knew
when to yield but forcefully presented his complex and apt plan; and he
worked ceaselessly to obtain adoption of it. "[M]y chum Ellsworth has
been at it [the judicial bill] night and day these three months," Congress-

man Abraham Baldwin reported to Joel Barlow in mid-June. 220 Con-

gressman William Smith of South Carolina, a supporter of the

Constitution, wrote about Ellsworth's efforts in a revealing letter:
Lee had been much less optimistic in late April, writing "that this Session of Congress will pass
Laws of a nature so gracious as to quiet alarms amonst those who reflect not, that 'the safety of
liberty depends not so much upon the gracious manner, as upon the Limitation of Power.'" Letter
from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Apr. 23, 1789) (Samuel Adams Papers, Rare Books and
Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library, Astor, Tilden and Lenox Foundations). But a
perceptive member of the judicial committee, Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania, hinted on
April 29 that Lee was supporting "a most expensive and enormous Machine of a Federal Judiciary"
(this was the first mention of the judicial bill in a diary that was commenced only on April 24).
MAcLAY's DIARY, supra note 215, at 10. By May 10 Lee was reassuring Sam Adams that the
judiciary bill "will come forth in a spirit of moderation that will quiet the apprehensions of many,
whilst federal justice may be effectually administered thereby." Letter from Lee to Adams (May 10,
1789) (Lee Family Papers, The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University).
Later that month Madison reported to Jefferson that "[b]oth the senators from Virginia particularly
Lee go with the Majority in the Senate." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 27,
1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON-PAPERS, supra note 9, at 185. Another member of the judicial
committee, Senator Paine Wingate of New Hampshire, had assured the President of his state in late
April that "the principal characters who were in opinion not to adopt the new Constitution are not
disposed to continue their opposition, but appear willing to give it their aid." Letter from Paine
Wingate to John Pickering (Apr. 27, 1789) (Gratz Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
220. Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Joel Barlow (June 14, 1789) (Pequot Papers, The
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University).
As early as the end of April, Senator Paine Wingate wrote his brother-in-law Timothy Pickering
that "Mr. Ellsworth seems to be the leading projector, who is a very sensible man." Letter from
Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (Apr. 29, 1789) (Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical
Society). Tristram Lowther, a young North Carolina lawyer visiting in New York City, sent a copy
of the judicial bill as printed by the Senate back to his mentor, James Iredell, with the comment that
"it was principally drawn up by a Mr. Elsworth of Connecticut." Letter from Tristram Lowther to
James Iredell (July 1, 1789), reprinted in 2 G. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES
IREDELL 260 (1857). "ITihis Vile Bill is a child of his [Ellsworth]," Maclay wrote in his diary on
June 29, "and he defends it with the Care of a parent." MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 91
(entry for June 29, 1789). A Connecticut lawyer, upon receipt of a copy of the bill from Ellsworth,
thought that he could "discern by the features that Connecticut folks wasnt far offl] when it was
begotten." Letter from Jesse Root to Benjamin Huntington (June 22, 1789) (Huntington Autograph
Book, Jervis Public Library, Rome, N.Y). A future United States Attorney General wrote that he
had "been Amusing [himself] with the Connecticut reports" because "the judiciary bill smells a little
of the laws of that state." Letter from William Bradford to Elias Boudinot (July 12, 1789) (Wallace
Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). Fisher Ames, on the other hand, thought that "Mr.
Strong, Mr. Ellsworth, and Mr. Paterson, in particular, have their full share of this merit" for the
hard work done on the judicial bill. Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (July 7-8,
1789), reprintedin 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 64 (S. Ames 2d ed. 1854), a portion unaccountably
not printed in 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMES 683-88 (W. Allen 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter AMES
PAPERS].
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Mr. Ellsworth who was principally concerned in drawing the Bill is a
Judge of the State of Connecticut of much reputation for legal knowledge: he is a man of remarkable clearness of reasoning & generally
esteemed a person of abilities. I met him last night & took notice of
some of your objections [to alienage jurisdiction] which he endeavoured to refute [at great length and in great detail, arguing] the

convention had in view the condition of foreigners when they framed
the Judicial ....Juries were too apt to be biased against them, in favor

of their own citizens & acquaintances: it was therefore necessary to
have general Courts for2 21
causes in which foreigners were parties or citizens of different states.

Nevertheless Lee was not far off the mark when, near the end of the
long first session of the First Congress, he wrote Patrick Henry that "I
have endeavoured successfully in the Judiciary Bill to remedy, so far [as]
a law can remedy, the defects of the Constitution in that line. ' ' 222 The
Judiciary Act solved many if not most of the problems raised by the
opponents of the Constitution, 22 3 and was much closer to the wishes of
those opponents than it was to the wishes of Ellsworth, James Wilson,
and the other advocates of a strong, unfettered judiciary. 2 24 Edward
Carrington, a Virginian who supported the Constitution, voiced the fears
221. Letter from William Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9-16, 1789), reprintedin Rogers, The
Letters of William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, June 6, 1789 to April 28, 1794 (pt. 1), 69
S.C. HIST. MAG. 1, 22-23 (1968). Smith usually is called "William Loughton Smith" by historians,
but he did not add his father's name as his own middle name until 1804. Id. at 1.
222. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14, 1789) (Patrick Henry Papers,
Library of Congress). The letter has been printed, but without the quoted portion. Lee was simultaneously decrying the proposed amendments to the Constitution, finding "[a]s they came from the
House of Representatives, they were far short of the wishes of our [state] convention, but as they are
returned by the Senate they are certainly much weakened." Id.
223. There were, of course, lingering suspicions among the opponents of the Constitution.
"Centinel Revived" put into words suspicions he shared with Lee: "[Tihis is but a legislative regulation; that[,] when the public ferment is lulled, may be at any time repealed; and that this is the
intention, no one can doubt, when he beholds this very Congress" restricting jurisdiction by statute
but "decidedly refusing to make it a fundamental alteration in the form of government" by way of
amendment. "CENTINEL Revived No. XXVI," [Philadelphia] Independent Gazette, Aug. 29,
1789. "Centinel Revived" was referring to the refusal of Congress to accept any of the amendments
proposed by the state conventions that restricted the jurisdiction of the federal courts in any way.
See infra text accompanying notes 341-347.
224. Richard Parker, a judge of the Virginia high court, wrote to Richard Henry Lee that the
framers of the committee bill "have taken great pains to make it as little exceptionable as possible
and to have guarded against the Mischiefs which many people dreaded from the Words of the Constitution and I think upon the whole the System a good one." Letter from Richard Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1789) (Lee Family Papers (No. 38-112), Manuscripts Division, Special
Collections Department, University of Virginia Library). And Mann Page, a great Virginia planter,
wrote to Lee later in July that "the Senate have taken great Pains to remove from the Minds of the
People those Apprehensions which they entertained of the Dangers which might arise under that
part of the Constitution." Letter from Mann Page to Richard Henry Lee (July 23, 1789) (Lee Family Papers (No. 38-112), Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library.)
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of many that "the two Govts. will contend in all cases of disputed jurisdiction, with unequal talents & the weakest must be worsted. '225 Surprisingly, however, the compromises over the judicial bill show that it
was the federal government that was "the weakest" of the two in 1789.
B.

The Great Compromise of 1789: Ellsworth's Plan

Most of the fundamental pieces of Ellsworth's compromise solution
had been accepted by the judicial committee two and a half weeks after
the committee began its debate. "Some general principles have been settled by a majority of the committee," Senator Paine Wingate of New
Hampshire wrote the President of that state on April 27, "but the system
is yet immature. ' 226 Those general principles, however, included almost
all of the major points of compromise that were found in the Act when it
was signed into law by President Washington on September 24. A letter
from Senator Ralph Izard of South Carolina shows that the compromise
had been put in place by Friday, April 24, when Congress took a recess
to enjoy President Washington's gala inauguration. 227 The major points
of compromise then decided are:
(A). Severe limitations and restrictions were to be placed upon the
federal courts' jurisdiction:
(1). Federal question cases must be tried in state courts, and
appeals will be allowed to the Supreme Court only
225. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 9, 1788), reprinted in 11
note 9, at 336.
226. Letter from Paine Wingate to John Pickering (Apr. 27, 1789) (Gratz Collection, Historical

MADISON PAPERS, supra

Society of Pennsylvania).
227. Letter from Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge (Apr. 24, 1789) (Ralph Izard Papers (Roll
229), South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina) (published in pertinent part in Appendix 3, infra). Izard's letter apparently copied verbatim the resolutions adopted by the judicial
committee between the date of a previous, lost letter and the date of his writing. Izard concluded by
noting that "[T]he arrival of the President, & the preparations for the ceremonial of his public
reception have interrupted the proceedings of the Committee." Id.
The details cannot be gotten entirely from Izard's letter and must be completed by reference to
several other crucial letters, but Izard's is the only clear evidence that the major point of vesting
federal question jurisdiction in the state courts was in place by April 24.
For those other crucial items, see (listed in apparent chronological order) Extract of a Letter
from a Gentleman at New York to his FriendHere, Dated April 28, 1789, [Savannah] Georgia Ga-

zette, May 21, 1789; Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (Apr. 30, 1789) (Ernst Law
Papers, Connecticut Historical Society); Letter from David Sewall to Caleb Strong (May 2, 1789),
reprinted in W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 201-02 (responding to apparently lost letters from Strong
dated Apr. 18 and Apr. 22, 1789, which probably paralleled the letters from Izard sending verbatim
copies of the resolutions passed by the judicial committee); Letter from Arthur Lee to Charles Lee
(May 8, 1789) (Lee Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society); Extract of a Letter From a Gentleman in New-York to his Friend in Winchester, Virginia, State Gazette of [Edenton] North Caro-

lina, July 30, 1789 (for varying interpretations of this letter by Warren and Ritz, in which Ritz
appears to be correct for the most part, see W. RiTz, supra note 3, at 169-72); Letter from Caleb
Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May 24, 1789), reprinted in id. at 205-08.
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(a). from final decisions in the highest court of the
state, and
(b). in those instances where the state court had ruled
against the federal law in question.
(2). Alienage and diversity cases must be tried in the new national courts, subject to a jurisdictional amount of $500. Appeals to the Supreme Court in such cases will be subject to a
jurisdictional amount of $2000.
(3). Supreme Court jurisdiction would exist on appeal only by
way of a writ of error, a mode of appeal which prevented issues
of fact from being re-examined.
(4). No appeals in federal criminal cases would be allowed.
(B). In return, there would be a highly articulated three-tiered system of national courts:
(1). A district court, consisting of a single judge, would sit in
each state. Its jurisdiction would be confined to admiralty, petty
crimes, custom cases and suits by the United States above a jurisdictional amount of $100.
(2). The United States would be divided into three circuits.
Circuit court jurisdiction would consist of alienage and diversity
cases above the $500 minimum, major crimes, and appeals (subject to a jurisdictional amount of $300, but22with
no limitation on
8
the re-examination of facts) in admiralty.

(3). The circuit courts would not be staffed with separate
judges, but each would have two (of the six) Supreme Court
judges plus the district judge of the state in which it was sitting.
At some time during the two weeks after the inauguration, the last
element of these fundamental compromises was put into place through
committee debate,22 9 probably at the insistence of Lee,230 but perhaps
also because of practical considerations such as those suggested by Judge
David Sewall of the Massachusetts high court, a thoughtful correspond228. Jurisdiction also was to be given to the circuit courts over suits by a state or by the United
States in which the amount in controversy was greater than $300. The former, eleventh amendment
jurisdiction, was later eliminated from circuit court cognizance, and the amount in controversy limitation for the United States was raised to $500 for alienage and diversity. See infra note 258 and
accompanying text.
229. David Sewall's May 2 letter to Strong clearly states that jurisdiction in alienage and diversity cases was not concurrent in the April 22 draft he read. See Letter from David Sewall to Caleb
Strong (May 2, 1789), reprintedin W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 201. None of the other evidence clearly
dated from April 1789 mentions the matter of concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts in those
important heads ofjurisdiction. The first indication of the concurrent jurisdiction comes in the letter
reprinted in the Edenton newspaper on July 30. For a list of these sources, see supra note 227.
230. It was, one might note, only after these two weeks that Lee began to report his feeling of
comfort with the progress of the judiciary committee. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Sa.
muel Adams (Apr. 23, 1789) (Samuel Adams Papers, Rare Books and Manuscripts Div., New York
Public Library, Astor, Tilden & Lenox Foundations,); Letter from Lee to Adams (May 10, 1789)
(Lee Family Papers, The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University); supra note
219 and accompanying text.
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ent of Senator Caleb Strong.23 1 This last element, in effect, changed
point (A)(2), above, to read as follows:
(2). Jurisdiction over alienage and diversity cases above the amount
of $500 would be concurrent between state and federal courts.
(a) Defendants in diversity and alienage cases brought in state
courts would have the power to transfer such cases to the federal
circuit courts, but only before trial.
(b) Litigants in such cases must abide by a choice to stay in
state courts, and litigants in diversity and alienage cases of $500
value or below would never obtain federal jurisdiction, since no
appellate jurisdiction would be established over state court diversity and alienage decisions analogous to that over state court federal question decisions.
(c) Appeals to the supreme court from federal circuit court decisions in alienage and diversity cases would be subject to a jurisdictional amount of $2000.
These provisions tended to solve most of the large problems with
article III put forward by the opponents of the Constitution. State courts
would retain a great deal of that jurisdiction many had thought to be
rendered exclusively federal by the Constitution, but in alienage and diversity cases worth more than $500 only at the option of both parties and
in federal question cases subject to appellate review. The latter was an
arrangement approved by most persons at the time, although some understood that it likely would create friction. 232 The $500 amount-in-controversy limitation would prevent many cases of small amount, thus
presumptively those concerning poor people, from being brought into
231. In a letter to Caleb Strong (May 2, 1789), reprintedin W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 201-02,

Sewall writes:
The Business of the Circuit Court ... seems so large that some doubts may be raised,
whether they will be able to perform it and to meet twice a year ... [as] the Supreme
Judicial. Perhaps a concurrent Jurisdiction in some matters in the State Courts Where the
parties Shall incline to make use of them, may afford some relief, in this Respect.
232. James Monroe pointed out this difficulty in the Virginia ratification convention. "We find,
sir, that two different governments are to have concurrent jurisdiction in the same object. May not
this bring on a conflict in the judiciary? And, if it does, will it not end in the ruin of one or the
other?" 3 STATE DEBATES, supra note 170, at 582.
Proponents of the Constitution often took the position that such conflict would not occur because the two governments would operate upon entirely separate subject matters. Richard Dobbs
Spaight, in the first North Carolina ratification convention, said, "I declare that, in that [Philadelphia] Convention, the unanimous desire of all was to keep separate and distinct the objects of the
jurisdiction of the federal from that of the state judiciary." 4 id. at 139. But such a separation was
impossible, as the compromise in the Senate judiciary committee showed. Federal questions, which
at the time were expected to consist of questions of the unconstitutionality of state laws, would arise
most naturally in the midst of state-law cases, and the compromise recognized this by giving the trial
jurisdiction of these issues to the state courts. As Judge Samuel Spencer of the North Carolina high
court accurately predicted in the same North Carolina convention, "[tihere will be, without any
manner of doubt, clashings and animosities between the jurisdiction of the federal courts and of the
state courts, so that they will keep the country in hot water." 4 id. at 136-37.
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and it also would exclude a huge number of the British

"Retroactive" application of alienage jurisdiction would

be prevented at least to the extent that cases brought by British creditors

already pending on state court dockets could not be transferred. Not all
federal question cases were appealable, though the most important were;
yet only issues of federal law would be considered on those appeals. No
appeal to the Supreme Court of issues of fact would be possible, and the
$2000 limit would save the litigants in many cases-again, especially
poorer litigants-from having to travel to the capital for appeals.
Staffing the circuit courts with Supreme Court justices both saved

money and assured the proponents of a strong judiciary that the most
important judges would sit in the trial of the cases involving alienage and
diversity that were likely to cause the most difficulty, especially those
233. A careful study of tort judgments given by the highest court in Connecticut in 1786-1795
(covering the first three volumes of Connecticut Reports) found only two greater than $66.60, a
$249.75 judgment for assault and battery in 1786, and a $999.00 judgment for total destruction of a
prosperous business in 1792. The lowest judgment was for a penny, and a total of six were under
$10.00. Casto, supra note 3, at 1113-14 & n.93. Casto has converted these judgments into dollars
from New England pounds, which were worth $3.33 in 1789. Id.
For comparative purposes, the average annual wages of the lower-class artisans (i.e., laborers,
mariners, shoemakers, and tailors), who made up a large portion of Philadelphia's population in
1762, were about £60, whereas the other working members of the artisan's family probably brought
in £25-35, all of which went to cover annual expenditures for necessities (including food, rent, fuel,
and clothing, but excluding rum, taxes, medical treatment, soap, starch, candles, chamber pots,
brooms, tableware, and furniture) of about £60. The depression of the 1780s limited the availability
of work and drove wages down. By the late 1790s annual wages for journeyman shoemakers had
risen to about £117, but expenses had risen to about £120. Smith, The MaterialLives of Laboring
Philadelphians,1750-1800, in MATERIAL LIF IN AMERICA 1600-1860, at 233, 243, 247, 251 (R. St.
George ed. 1988).
234. Evans, Indebtedness During Confederation, supra note 29, at 349-50 (the great majority of
the prewar British debts were under £100); Sheridan, supra note 29, at 181 (of the two large Glasgow
firms whose books he examined in detail, 94% of the prewar debts were less than £100); Hobson,
supra note 29, at 181-82 ("The largest class of debts in Virginia was contracted at stores throughout
the Piedmont region ....
Most of these debts fell below the federal jurisdictional amount."); S.
BEMIS, supra note 46, at 436-37; C. RITCHESON, supra note 46, at 66-67; see also, e.g., Notebook
entitled "Considerations on the various Subjects of Enquiry ... ." 16 (PRO/T/79/27, "John Hay &
Co. & Jas. Baird") ($500 amount in controversy limitation on alienage suits in federal courts considered a "legal impediment" under treaty, since so many British debts precluded from recovery
thereby); Memorial to British-American Claims Commission of 1794 (Nov. 28, 1798) (PRO/T/79/
27, "Geo. & Andrew Buchanan") (stating that most of this firm's debts were too small to take to
federal court); (PRO/T/79/25) ("Archd. and Jno. Hamilton & Co.") (contains detailed account
books for three stores, seven from Nansemond, Va., four from Halifax, Va., and three from Wake,
N.C., and the fattest account book from each store lists debtors with debts too small to be sued upon
in federal court).
All of the historians cited in this footnote, plus myself, have carefully examined some or all of
the voluminous materials in the British Public Record Office deriving from the claims made by the
British merchants. There are complete account books of prewar debts from firm after firm like
Archd. and Jno. Hamilton & Co., just cited, and the evidence is overwhelming that the large majority of the debts were under the jurisdictional amount of $500, or £150 sterling at 1789 exchange
rates.
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valued between $500 and $2000 for which no appeal would be allowed.
Proponents could be satisfied that a highly articulated judiciary would
carry the message (through charges to grand juries) of what many considered an alien government and its existence, dignity, power, and capability to the very doorsteps of the people in all of the states. 235 They also
would be pleased both with the absence of a jurisdictional amount limitation on federal question appeals from the state courts and with the jurisdiction of the district courts, which concerned only matters over which
there had been essentially no contention, so that the judgments of the
most numerous and scattered branch of the new judiciary would be likely
to cause no uproar or public condemnation. Whereas there was much in
the plan for proponents of the new government, it was still a weak bill
from their standpoint. 236 Framed from a knowledge of their own weakness, it was mostly a hope for the future. Ellsworth's brilliant choice
escalating the presence and numbers of governmental officials beyond
what most had expected rather than granting judges all the power the
Constitution might allow was nevertheless a choice from weakness; a
position of strength would have demanded that the federal courts be fully
empowered.
By May 11, the committee finished its debate on the general principles of the new judiciary. Strong told Congressman Fisher Ames that
"the principles of the [Judiciary] System are in some forwardness in the
Comee. of Senate," and Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania (a
member of the judicial committee) recorded in his diary that day the
appointment of a subcommittee to draft a bill.2 37 The subcommittee consisted of Ellsworth, William ,Paterson of New Jersey, and Strong; the
latter wrote on May 24 that the subcommittee "have been employed
some time and will not be able to report the Bill until the later part of
235. William Paterson made these arguments, in defending the Ellsworth scheme during debate
in the Senate on June 23, that with circuit courts "you carry Law to their Homes, Courts to their
doors-[you] meet every Citizen in his own State." The expense to litigants would be less, Paterson
surmised, because there would be "not many Appeals," given the presence of Justices of the Supreme
Court at the trial and the dollar limit on appeals. He contrasted this alternative to a system that
used the state courts as federal trial courts: "Appeals from the State Tribunals" would be "Monstrous-you will make it expensive & oppressive." MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 479-80
(notes made by William Paterson in preparation for his speech on June 23).
236. Senator Pierce Butler's very fragmentary notes of the beginning of the Senate debate on the
judiciary bill on June 22 describe Paterson, a drafter of the bill: "He objects to the Bill because it [is]
not Strong Enough." MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 454 (fragmentary notes of Pierce Butler
taken during debate on June 22).
237. Conversation recounted in letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (May 11, 1789) (Fisher
Ames Folder, courtesy of the New-York Historical Society); MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at
33 (entry for May 11, 1789). Maclay commented, "I do not like it in any part. Or rather I generally
dislike it. But we will see how it looks in form of a Bill." lad
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this or the beginning of the next Week."' 238 In fact, the draft bill was not

brought out of the subcommittee until June 12, when Maclay found it
"long and somewhat confused." The committee however reported it to
the Senate, and "a number of Copies were ordered to be Struck off," that
is, printed, for the use of the Senate in the debate and to be sent out for
239
constituent comment.

C. Alternatives: The Virginia Plan and Nisi Prius
Agreement within the judicial committee did not mean that other

schemes of judicial organization would not be put forward. Two alternatives to the highly articulated system Ellsworth supported were

presented: no lower federal courts except admiralty courts, and a system
of nisi prius courts. Both would have reduced the number of federal
24°
judges by eliminating all or many of the district courts.
When the full Senate began debate on June 22 about the committee's

proposal, Lee 241 and Grayson of Virginia presented the Virginia plan
238. Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May 24, 1789), reprinted in W. RITZ,
supra note 3, at 205. Strong's letter gives many details of the bill as it was then in draft in the
subcommittee. It would be a mistake to read all the details mentioned in his letter as having been
already debated and decided in the full judicial committee.
239. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 75 (entry for June 12, 1789).
240. These two schemes also are noted in W. RITz, supra note 3, at 54-56, 61-63, although Ritz
does not see that both schemes meant the absence of district courts. Ritz seems confused when
Maclay tells us that at the end of the debate on these alternatives on June 24, "the Vote was for
district Courts." MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 88 (entry for June 24, 1789). Ritz says,
"Maclay writes as though a system using circuit courts and one using courts of nisiprius were two
different and opposing systems, and says the vote was for district courts. This leaves his meaning in
the air." W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 62-63. It is true that nisi prius and circuit courts were not
mutually incompatible systems, and that a nisiprius system might look very much like the circuit
court system set up under the committee proposal. Ritz is also right to point out that the
Process Act, passed almost simultaneously with the Judiciary Act [in 1789], requires the
process to issue from the supreme or circuit courts to 'bear the test of the chief justice of
the supreme court' while the process from the district court was to 'bear test of the judge of
such court.' This is some indication that the circuit courts were not viewed as a separate
court, but rather as a part of the one supreme court; in other words, they were viewed as
something resembling a nisi prius system.
Id. at 63. But, similarity does not mean identity; and the circuit courts designed by the subcommittee were not supposed to reserve questions of law for all the judges sitting as the Supreme Court, as
would courts ofnisiprius; rather, they were (in Paterson's words) to bring "Courts to their doors[to] meet every citizen in his own State"-and all knotty legal questions were to be decided on the
circuit, either on the spot or after a period of consideration by the judges. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra
note 215, at 479 (Paterson's notes of his own speech given June 23). As Paterson said on June 23 in
defense of the Ellsworth scheme, the "Circuit Courts" were "not in the Nature of Nisi Prius." Id.
The short of it is that the circuit courts were not considered by the Senate in 1789 to be nisi prius
courts, no matter what the resemblance.
241. Lee had worked diligently in the judicial committee to achieve a compromise favorable to
the position of Patrick Henry and the debtors, and he had accomplished a great deal. He also must
have known the views of most of his nineteen colleagues by mid-June. Nevertheless Lee felt dutybound to proclaim openly his support for the pure pro-debtor position on the national courts, a
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that proposed, in Maclay's apt words, "[T]he jurisdiction of the [lower]
Federal courts should be confined to cases of admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction."2 4 2 They desired to use the state courts as the trial courts of
the federal system, a scheme that many Americans-both opponents and
proponents of the Constitution-favored in 1789.243 But the drafters of
the judicial bill argued that such a scheme would "too strongly mark an
inferiority in the State to the federal Courts."' 244 By exercising federal

jurisdiction and probably receiving a concomitant payment of salary,
supporters of the Ellsworth scheme thought that either "they [state
judges] become your Judges & so fixed upon you during good Behavior &
entitled to a permanent Salary" (even if the state retired or impeached
them) or they nevertheless remained state judges, thus rendering federal
judges "entirely dependant upon the State. '2 4 5 The Virginia plan was
voted down by the Senate after a day and a half of full debate. The same
position he had been elected to support. Perhaps he also hoped to be able to achieve an even more
favorable law in the full Senate.
242. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 85 (entry for June 22, 1789). The Virginia plan
derived directly from Mason's unpropounded judiciary proposal written during the Convention and
had been adopted on a recommendatory basis by Virginia's ratifying convention.
243. See, eg., Letter from David Sewall to Caleb Strong (Mar. 28, 1789) (Caleb Strong Manuscripts, Forbes Library, Northampton, Mass.), republished infra in Appendix 3; Letter from Christopher Gore to Rufus King (Mar. 27, 1789) (Rufus King Papers, courtesy of the New-York
Historical Society) (reporting the views of Francis Dana, Boston lawyer and judge); Letter from
Samuel Huntington to William Samuel Johnson and Oliver Ellsworth (Apr. 30, 1789) (Independence
National Historic Park Collection, Philadelphia); Letter from Samuel Livermore to John Pickering
(July 11, 1789) (Dreer Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania); Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1789), reprintedin 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 323;
Letter from William Bradford to Elias Boudinot (Sept. 1, 1789) (Wallace Papers, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania) ("The general opinion this way [inPhiladelphia] is in favor of commencing all suits
in the State Courts .... ).
244. Letter from Caleb Strong to Ichabod Tucker (May 7, 1789) (Tucker Family Papers, Essex
Institute, Salem, Mass.); accord, MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 479 (Paterson's notes of his
own speech, delivered against the Virginia plan on June 23, stating that the Virginia plan "has the
Ap[pearance] of casting a Stigma upon State Courts."). In a letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard
Law (Aug. 4, 1789) (Ernst Law Papers, Connecticut Historical Society), Ellsworth commented that
under the Virginia plan
where must be many appeals or writs of error from the supreme courts of the States,
which by placing them in a subordinate situation, & subjecting their decissions to frequent
reversals, would probably more hurt their feelings & their influence, than to divide the
ground with them at first & leave it optional with the parties entitled to federal Jurisdiction, where the causes are of considerable magnitudeL,] to take their remedy in which line
of courts they pleased.
245. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 478-79 (Paterson's notes of his own June 23 speech);
accord, Letter from Caleb Strong to Ichabod Tucker (May 7, 1789) (Tucker Family Papers, Essex
Institute); Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (Aug. 4, 1789) (Ernst Law Papers, Connecticut Historical Society). Other shrewd observers had of course noticed this. See, e.g., Letter from
James Sullivan to Gerry (Mar. 29, 1789) (Gerry Papers II, Massachusetts Historical Society); Letter
from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Apr. 8, 1789) (AMs 771/8, The Rosenbach Museum & Library,
Philadelphia). Other contemporaries repeated these arguments too. See, e.g., Letter from Robert
Morris to Richard Peters (Aug. 24, 1789) (Peters Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
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plan was put forward by Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina and
several other opponents and mild supporters of the Constitution when
the judicial bill came before the House in late August. Opposition came
from Madison, the fast learner William Smith of South Carolina, Egbert
Benson of New York, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, and others who
rehearsed the arguments of the bill's drafters. 24 6 Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts, however, raised a new argument in defense of the Ellsworth plan:
[T]he object of the present motion... goes to divest the government of
one of its most essential branches .... It is essential that a government
possess within itself the power necessary to carry its laws into execution .... Suppose a state government was inimical to the federal government, and its judges were attached to the same local policy, they
might refuse or neglect to attend to the national business ....

These

are not chimerical suppositions ... ; indeed facts have already occurred to prove to us how dangerous it would be to make the state
legislatures the sole guardians of the national faith and honor .... The
discharge of bona fide debts due from the citizens of America to the
subjects of Britain was all that Britain required .... State after state,
legislature after legislature, made laws in positive opposition to the
treaty; and the state judiciaries
could not, or did not, decide contrary
247
to their state ordinances.

The flaw in this argument-that federal appellate jurisdiction over state judges did not automatically render them federal judges-was astutely and cogently voiced by Edward Carrington, a Virginia supporter of the Constitution. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Aug. 3,
1789), reprintedin 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 323. In fact, appellate jurisdiction already

was given by the plan with respect to federal question cases, without the danger of the state courts
becoming federal courts; and similar arguments could be advanced with regard to the concurrent
jurisdiction the compromise conferred on state courts in alienage and diversity cases. See [New
York] Gazette of the United States, Sept. 5, 1789 (remarks of Congressman James Jackson of Georgia, opposing the judicial bill, on Aug. 29, 1789). Any federalizing of state judges would result not
from the nature of things, but rather from the necessity of the federal government to control state
judges. An amendment to the Constitution, proposed in 1791 by Congressman Egbert Benson of
New York to accomplish the elimination of lower federal judges and their replacement with the state
supreme judges, made this quite clear. See generally Holt, "FederalCourtsas the Asylum to Federal
Interests'" Randolph's Report, The Benson Amendment, and the "Original Understanding" of the
FederalJudiciary,36 BUFFALO L. REV. 341 (1987).

246. 1 Cong. Reg. 263-66, 283-330 (1789) (debates of Aug. 24, 29, & 31, 1789); see also Letter
from Peter Silvester to Francis Silvester (Aug. 27-28, 1789) (Silvester Family Papers, courtesy of the
New-York Historical Society).
247. 2 Cong. Reg. 294-95. In a long memorandum to John Lowell, Fisher Ames mused through
all the various arguments in favor of the Ellsworth plan, concluding:
So far therefore as the public tranquillity may be disturbed by the clashing of intricate
claims of jurisdiction-so far as the energy of the Govt. may be impaired by entrusting its
powers to those who will feel a motive and be furnished with the means of abusing the
trust-so far as the union will be endangered by the diversity of the rules of action and of
the proceedings in courts and by extinguishing the vital principles of it's existence it seems
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The Virginia plan met with the same result in the House, however, being
defeated thirty-one to eleven. 248
After the defeat of the Virginia plan in the Senate, William Samuel
Johnson of Connecticut and some others put forward a second alternative to the Ellsworth scheme. They wanted to replace the district and
circuit courts with a nisi prius system, whereby a large group of judges
would ride out, singly or in small groups, to try cases in the hinterlands
but would return collectively to the center for deliberation, consultation,
and ultimately decision on difficult reserved questions of law. 24 9 Defenders of a nisi prius system argued it would be less expensive, saving the
costs of travel to the center for parties and witnesses, and also would
create uniformity in decision. 250 It is important to note that the loose
and broad language about the judiciary in article III of the Constitution
"is sufficiently flexible so that the Supreme Court could have developed
as a superior court with trial jurisdiction over the entire country.' 25 1 Af252
ter a half-day's debate, the Senate on June 24 also rejected nisi prius.
"It is well to keep in mind, though, that the decision might have been
different," 253 and the resulting judicial system might have been different
in ways we might not be able to imagine. The Constitution places only
very broad limits on the ways in which Congress can use its power to
organize the national judiciary.
D. Adjustment: More Restrictions, Some Expansiveness
The defeat of these two alternatives exhausted any real opposition
and meant the triumph of the Ellsworth plan. 254 The rest of the history
little better than madness to my understanding to adopt the state courts. It is delivering
the Govt. bound hand and foot to it's enemies to be buffeted[.]
Memorandum of Fisher Ames to John Lowell (no date) (Duane Norman Diedrich Collection, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan) (this memorandum originally was enclosed in a
letter from Ames to Lowell [July 28, 1789] [David Library of the American Revolution, Sol Feinstone Collection, No. 59, on deposit at the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia]). I am
grateful to Kenneth Bowling for bringing this memorandum to my attention.
248. Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Sept. 3, 1789) (Duane Norman Diedrich Collection, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan); Letter from Fisher Ames to George
Richards Minot (Sept. 3, 1789), reprintedin 1 AMES PAPERS, supra note 220, at 714. The Virginia
plan for the judiciary was also defeated three times as a part of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, twice in the House in August (just before the debate on the judiciary bill) and once in
the Senate in early September. Warren, supra note 203, at 119-20, 127.
249. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 88 (entry for June 24, 1789). See also supra note 215.
250. Id. at 480-81 (Paterson's notes of debates on nisi prius proposal).
251. W. RITz, supra note 3, at 63.
252. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 88 (entry for June 24, 1789).
253. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 56.
254. There was real apprehension among the supporters of the Ellsworth plan about the possibility that the Virginia plan might be substituted, and perhaps about the nisiprius plan. The fact that
William Paterson made such elaborate preparation for debate on the former issue is one bit of evi-

1494

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1989:1421

of the bill in the First Congress is one of adjustment and tinkering.
Although much of the alteration was accomplished for technical reasons
or to solve minor political problems, the overall theme of the adjustment
of the judicial bill was to restrict the power of the federal courts.
Many restrictions emerged from the Ellsworth-Paterson-Strong subcommittee, which knew the way the political wind was blowing. The
subcommittee scrupulously adhered to the element of the compromise
that protected the right to trial by jury; their draft bill mentions it specifically with regard to the petty criminal jurisdiction of the district court,
requires it with regard to the common law civil actions that were added
to district court jurisdiction in the work of the subcommittee, 25 requires
all civil and criminal actions in the circuit courts be tried to a jury except
dence. For this preparation, see MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 475-80; Letter from Thomas
Dwight to Theodore Sedgwick (Sept. 3, 1789) (Sedgwick I Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society). Evidence of the apprehension is apparent in the letter from Dwight to Sedgwick:
[Thejudicial bill which you mention as being well supported and by a respectable majority
I had supposed would meet with a more formidable opposition than almost any thing else,
& that all kinds of fear & jealousies would be excited on the Subject. It is a pleasing
consideration, that so indispensable a part of the system is like to be established without
difficulty."
Id. See also Letter from John Adams to Francis Dana (July 10, 1789) (Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society); Letter from Fisher Ames to Theophilus Parsons (Aug. 3, 1789), reprinted in T. PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 467 (1854).
255. Section 10 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76
[for the meaning of this notation, see below in this footnote]. The Senate during debate consolidated
these two different jury trial provisions into one, which read: "and the trial of issues in fact in the
District Court, in all causes, except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by
jury." Warren, supra note 203, at 75 & n.61.
There are several numbering problems with regard to the Judiciary Act of 1789. The subcommittee draft (herein called "the draft bill") had thirty-two sections, the first twenty-five of which
were numbered (except that one section was skipped in the numbering process). When this draft was
printed for use and distribution about June 15, 1789 ("the printed bill"), it had thirty-two sections,
which unaccountably were unnumbered.
During the month-long Senate debate, two sections were dropped, four were added, one was
dropped and then put back in, perhaps one was added and then deleted (see infra note 295), and one
was split into two sections. Thus, the bill that passed the Senate ("the Senate bill"), and eventually
was signed into law, had thirty-five sections.
The numbering problems presented to historians by all these changes have been compounded by
the failure of other commentators to be careful or precise. Most importantly, Ritz unaccountably
insists that there were thirty-three sections both in the draft bill and in the printed bill, and that all
the sections in the draft bill were numbered by the subcommittee. W. RITZ,supra note 3, at 127-28,
(These are errors which the editors of his book chose neither to correct nor, erroneously, to point out
in an editorial footnote.) Ritz has the thirty-five sections of the Senate bill correctly numbered, but
he notes only the net addition of new sections 10 and 34 during the Senate debate, id. at 128, failing
to note that, at some unknown time during the debate, Section 26 of the draft bill was divided in two,
becoming Sections 27 and 28 of the Senate bill.
References in this essay to section numbers will, without more, refer to the Senate bill. References to the draft bill or to the printed bill will be so designated. In the footnotes, the Act as codified
will be cited to alone if the relevant language and the numbering persisted unchanged from the
version under discussion.
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those of equity and "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," 256 and re-

quires that trials in the Supreme Court "in all actions at law against citizens of the United States" be by jury. 257 The $500 minimum amount in
controversy limitation on original or removal jurisdiction over diversity
and alienage suits was adhered to,25 8 while a few other minor jurisdic256. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
257. Id. § 13, at 80.
258. Id. § 11, at 78 (circuit court original jurisdiction); ia § 12, at 79 (circuit court removal
jurisdiction).
Wilfred Ritz has insisted that the $500 limitation in section 11 did not apply to diversity and
alienage jurisdiction. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 57-58. He bases his argument upon the semicolon
which appears in both the printed bill and the printed Act. I reproduce below first, the relevant
passage as it appears in the printed bill, second, the relevant passage as it appears in the printed Act,
bracketing the semicolon in both instances.
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance. . . of all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of (500) dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners[;] or a foreigner
or citizen of another state than that in which the suit is brought, is a party.
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance.., of all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners[;] or an
alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.
Although the literal text can surely be taken as Ritz reads it, no court has ever read it in such a
fashion, so far as I can determine, and all of the letters describing the development of this section in
the committee written by those who were in a position to know, and mentioning the $500 limitation,
attach it to alienage and diversity jurisdiction. See Letter from Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge
(Apr. 24, 1789) (Ralph Izard Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, republished infra in Appendix 3); Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law (Apr. 30, 1789) (Ernst
Law Papers, Connecticut Historical Society); Letter from Arthur Lee to Charles Lee (May 8, 1789)
(Lee Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society) (says "$300" instead of "$500," and vaguely claims
that it is to attach "in all CL & equity cases"); Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May
24, 1789), reprintedin W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 205-08.
The Izard letter, just mentioned, and the handwritten draft of the bill used for the first printing
together demonstrate that the semicolon remained in its place due to an oversight. Izard, a judicial
committee member reporting to eminent legal friends at home, apparently was copying verbatim the
resolutions the committee had debated and passed. The relevant one as he copied it reads in pertinent part, with the semicolon again italicized:
That the Circuit Courts have ... original jurisdiction in Cases at Common Law, & in
Equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds Three Hundred Dollars, & a State, or the
United States, be a party; or where it exceeds Five Hundred Dollars, and a Foreigner, or
Citizen of another State be a party ....
The handwritten draft bill as it emerged from the subcommittee reads at the relevant place in pertinent part, omitting language that has been struck through:
[O]f all Suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of [500 written over 300] dollars and the
United States are plaintiffs or petitioners; or a foreigner or citizen of another state than that
in which the suit is brought is a party.
In the handwritten draft, above the language immediately following the semicolon, there appear the words "or a State is plaintiff or petitioner & the Suit is Against," which then have been
struck out. Also struck out from the draft are an ampersand, four words, and a blank space directly
after the semicolon: "& where it exceeds [blank] dollars." Another ampersand at the end of these
last struck words has been changed to read "or," the "or" which immediately precedes "a foreigner
or a citizen of another state."
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tional amounts were added. The $2000 minimum amount in controversy
limitation on the appeal of such cases to the Supreme Court was, curi-

ously, severely restricted so as to apply only to cases appealed to the
circuit courts from the district courts; as a result diversity and alienage

cases originally brought in the circuit courts or removed there from state
courts had only the $500 limitation on appeal. 259 The subcommittee already had removed eleventh amendment jurisdiction from the circuit

court, where the original Senate resolution had placed
lodged it with the Supreme

Court 26 1 because

it,26°

and had

of the extremely controver-

sial nature of that jurisdiction. Then it further clarified such jurisdiction
by excepting from it (consistent with the language of article III, section

'262
2) cases "between a state and its citizens.
Three subcommittee additions each eliminated significant portions

of article III jurisdiction, reserving yet more suits for state courts. First,
section 14 restricted federal courts from awarding habeas corpus to prisoners in state or local jails; habeas could be awarded only to persons in
jail "under or by colour of the authority of the United States"; 263 thus
federal habeas would not lie to a person imprisoned under state law or
It seems that, at some late stage of drafting, the subcommittee decided to delete circuit court
jurisdiction over states as plaintiff, allowing the whole of this sensitive eleventh amendment jurisdiction to reside in the Supreme Court, and it further decided to make the amount in controversy the
same for all the kinds of circuit court jurisdiction mentioned in this place rather than have two
different amounts. But in the making of these changes, the semicolon that Izard's letter shows that,
from the adoption of this resolution, had separated United States and eleventh amendment jurisdiction, on the one hand, from alienage and diversity jurisdiction, on the other (where each of the two
subsets had had its own amount in controversy), inadvertently was left in the section when the two
subsets were merged. The error was never corrected, but there is no reason to believe that the
subcommittee, the committee, the Senate, or the House ever meant from the semicolon's continued
presence that alienage and diversity jurisdiction were not subjected to the $500 amount in controversy required by the compromise.
259. The relevant language of section 21 in the draft bill was as follows:
And upon a like process, may final judgments and decrees in civil actions and suits in
equity in a circuit court brought there by original process or removed there from courts of
the several states, or if the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of (2000) dollars
exclusive of costs, removed there by appeal from a district court; be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court ....
Interestingly enough, this provision passed the Senate unscathed and was only changed back to the
original understanding of the compromise by action of the House. See infra text accompanying
notes 349-350.
260. Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May 24, 1789), reprinted in W. RiTZ,
supra note 3, at 206-07 (where the eleventh amendment jurisdiction of the circuit courts has already
become limited to instances of states being plaintiffs); Letter from Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge
(Apr. 24, 1789) (Ralph Izard Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina),
republished infra in Appendix 3.
261. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80.
262. Id. "Thejudicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies ...between a State and Citizens
of another State." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
263. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.
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authority. 264 Second, in response to criticism by opponents of the new
judiciary, the circuit and district courts were denied jurisdiction over
suits by those persons to whom bonds, notes, or other negotiable paper
had been assigned "unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such
court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made" (the

assignee clause). 265 This restriction would prevent the easy creation of

diversity or alienage jurisdiction in debt cases. Third, in a startling
breach of the general understanding that admiralty and maritime cases
would be exclusively federal, to say nothing of article III's mandatory
language that "the judicial Power shall extend... to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction, ' 2 66 the subcommittee added what has
become known as the saving to suitors clause, which excepted from ex-

clusively federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction certain actions by
"saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where

the common law is competent to give

'
it., 267

264. This of course was not changed until the Habeas Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14
Stat. 385.
265. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. For the opponents' critique that probably
led to the insertion of the assignee clause, see supra note 181 and accompanying text. The assignee
clause did not prevent the creation of diversity jurisdiction by other forms of assignment, notably the
sale of title to land, and during debate the Senate cut back on it even further by excepting "foreign
bills of exchange" from the clause's coverage. See Warren, supra note 203, at 80 & n.73.
Warren says that the assignee clause was added by the Senate after debate began on the bill,
despite the presence of the clause in the printed bill, because it "was written on a separate slip of
paper and pasted to the draft." Id. at 80. Warren makes the error of assuming that the bill that
emerged from the subcommittee would not have been so sloppy as to have been sent to the committee with slips wafered on, so that all waferings must represent action taken during the Senate debate.
He further ignores the fact that the Senate used a printed version in its deliberations, not the single
handwritten draft that embodied the subcommittee's handiwork, see W. RiTz, supra note 3, at 9,
137-38 (describing Warren's false assumption), and the printed version clearly contains the assignee
clause in section 11. He ignores the fact that the assignee clause also appears in the draft bill in a
deleted section in a clerk's handwriting above section 26 (which became section 27 of the Senate
bill). However, the language of this deleted section is very blotted and almost impossible to read
today, so perhaps it was too blotted for Warren to have read correctly when he discovered the draft
bill in the early 1920s. The wafered-on provision containing the assignee clause was probably Ellsworth's last-minute method of moving it from one place in the draft to another, before the bill was
reported out to the full committee.
266. U. S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
267. Section 10 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76.
The subcommittee also added puzzling language to section 21 of the draft bill that seemed to
have the effect of denying the Supreme Court power to hear admiralty and maritime cases by writ of
error. The handwritten draft originally read, "And upon a like process [writ of error], may final
judgements and decrees in civil actions.., in a circuit court... be re-examined and reversed or
affirmed in the Supreme Court .... " Ellsworth added "suits in equity" after "civil actions" and the
lengthy phrase "brought there by original process or removed there from courts of the several states,
or if the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of 2000 dollars exclusive of costs, removed there
by appeal from a district court," after "in a circuit court". These additions violated the resolution
embodying the compromise that limited to a minimum of $2000 all diversity and alienage appeals to
the Supreme Court, so the Senate rearranged the language by exchanging the last two clauses of
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The subcommittee did not act completely contrary to the strong nationalism of its members, though, nor did it forget the needs of creditors,
in particular the British creditors. These sentiments of the subcommittee
were demonstrated in the draft bill in several ways, not the least of which
were several provisions that gave (or might be construed to give) great

power to federal judges. In three of these instances, the Senate after
much debate changed the language of the subcommittee so as to place
greater restrictions on the federal judiciary in debt cases.

Section 25 of the draft bill, the only section of the draft written in
Caleb Strong's handwriting, 268 attempted to take the issue of damages

(that is, interest) away from the jury and give it to the judge as chancellor
in cases on covenants, bonds, or other evidences of debt under seal in
269
which "forfeiture breach or nonperformance" was found by the jury.
Ellsworth's addition, placing the amount-in-controversy limitation after the "removed there by appeal" language.
The preceding section (section 20 of the draft bill) allowed admiralty and maritime cases to go
to the circuit court from the district court by "an appeal" rather than solely on writ of error, meaning, as Ritz astutely notes, that facts could be redetermined by a trial de novo in the circuit court.
See W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 69. This is the only language in the Act that refers to review by appeal
rather than by writ of error, and given the importance placed upon the latter and the fact that it is in
a separate section, the language cannot have been unintentional.
However, admiralty and maritime actions were technically neither "civil actions" nor "suits in
equity" as required by section 21 of the draft bill, so they were technically not eligible for writs of
error to the Supreme Court. Ritz concludes that this result was intentional and the Senate intended
that only one appeal be allowed in admiralty and maritime cases-from the district to the circuit
court. The circuit court, after all, was staffed primarily by Supreme Court justices. Id. at 68-72.
I think, however, that the argument underlying Ritz's conclusion-that admiralty and maritime
causes could not have been thought of as "civil actions"-presents too fine a distinction. It appears
that Ellsworth was trying to prevent the use of writs of error in the minor kinds of civil jurisdiction
in the district court, such as "alien tort" actions and revenue enforcement actions, which had been
added to the draft during the work of the subcommittee and over which circuit courts were given
writ-of-error appellate jurisdiction by the preceding sentence of section 21 of the draft bill. Although
Ritz's careful search discloses no other instance in the Judiciary Act in which the word "action"
refers to anything but "proceedings at law," id. at 95, he does admit that "[t]hese words-['causes,'
'suits,' and 'actions']-were extensively used in the eighteenth century," id. at 93. But sufficient
research has not been done as to show whether they were used so precisely as to draw distinctions
between different types of judicial proceedings. It seems that generally "suits" referred to equity
proceedings, "actions" to proceedings at law, and "causes" to admiralty proceedings or criminal
proceedings. Id. at 93, 94. He further says that "'Cause' is the broadest term used in the Judiciary
Act." Id. at 94. If there was no precise term for an admiralty or maritime proceeding, one might
conceive of using the term "civil action" to refer to it, especially if one were as inventive as was
Ellsworth. In fact as Chief Justice, Ellsworth construed the term "civil action" in section 21 of the
draft, now become section 22, as including admiralty and maritime actions, against precisely the
objection that no writ of error was therein provided for in admiralty cases. Wiscart v. d'Auchy, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 328 (1796).
268. See Warren, supra note 203, at 50.
269. And be it further enacted, That in all causes brought before either of the courts of the
United States to recover the forfeiture annexed to any articles of agreement, covenant,
bond or other specialty, where the forfeiture[,] breach[,] or non-performance shall be found
by jury, by the default or confession of the defendant, or upon demurrer, the court before
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Many British creditors would not have their war interest denied by juries270 if this provision became law. The Senate, however, would not

concur. "The Jury were the proper Chancellors in such a case to assess
the damages," Maclay wrote in his diary, analogizing to the practice of
chancery judges to "chancer" bonds-that is, to reduce the judgment on
a bond from the forfeiture amount of double the debt to that of the actual
debt. 27 1 "I liked them much better than the Judges, they were from the
Vicinity and best Acq[u]ainted with the parties and their Circumstances," he continued in distinctly precapitalist language. 272 The Senate amended the provision to give the issue of damages back to the
2 73

jury.

Section 15, dealing with the required production of evidence, came
from the subcommittee with a clause enabling a plaintiff upon motion to
show "that he has by casualty, and without fault or negligence of his own
been deprived of evidence necessary to support his action"; whereby the
court could "require the defendant to disclose on oath his or her knowledge in the cause." 274 Many British creditors, despite their diligence, did
not have the necessary evidence to prove their cases, either under strict
rules of evidence on unsealed or "book" debts (requiring the testimony of
long-gone clerks or agents), or because the books had been seized by marauding Patriots (a job done by law and local committee in North Caro275
lina) or had become damaged by being hidden from marauders.
whom the action is, shall render judgment therein for the plaintiff to recover so much as is
due according to equity.
Section 25 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 26, 1 Stat. 73, 87.
A suit on a bond or other sealed instrument was essentially a formality, since the instrument
normally contained a liquidated damages or "forfeiture" amount twice the amount of the debt covered by the instrument and confessed judgment and consented to ex parte proceedings if the due
date had passed. On such instruments, "[c]reditors used the judicial system and the sheriffs, not for
the resolution of disputes or the determination of legal questions, but rather as a collection service
for unpaid obligations." J. Waldrup, supra note 49, at 95.
270. See supra text accompanying note 89.
271. For the necessity of having to chancer a bond, see supra note 269. Note that common law
courts often did not have the power to vary the amount due on a bond from the verdict as given by
the jury. The original wording of section 25 would have given federal judges the power to render a
judgment on a bond for "so much as is due according to equity." In the first American case (of
which we have any knowledge) approving the jury's deduction of war interest on a British debt, the
jury reputedly was charged that "they must consider themselves as Chancellors." Neale's Ex'rs v.
Sands (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1786) (unreported), as summarized in Letter from Phineas Bond to the Duke
of Leeds, app. XIII (Nov. 10, 1789) (PRO/FO/4/7); see supra note 94.
272. MACLAY's DIARY, supra note 215, at 97 (entry for July 2, 1789).
273. Warren, supra note 203, at 101.
274. Section 15 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat. 73, 82.
275. See, e.g., Opinion letter of George Keith Taylor (Mar. 30, 1806), contained in Letter from
Thomas Gordon to Gilbert Hamilton (May 22, 1806) (with regard to open or book debts, "proofs to
substantiate the Debts at this late period cannot be procured"). Taylor, having served for a short
while as a federal circuit judge, gave his opinion that:
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Maclay objected to the provision because "extorting evidence from any

Person was a species of Torture and inconsistent with the Spirit of freedom," and his constituents believed that "no Person could be compelled
to give Evidence against himself."' 276 Surprisingly, perhaps, he was supported by Paterson and Strong, and after a long and heated debate lasting
over two days, the whole clause was struck from the bill.2 77

Despite the resolutions and the compromise that talked of limiting
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction by writ of error, 278 a common-law procedure restricting the reviewing court to issues of law, Ellsworth (who apparently drafted the sections of the act dealing with
Supreme Court review of lower courts) used a phrase unknown to the

common law or to any other legal system so far as I know, "petition in
error. ' 279 Although the reasons for this usage are unknown, Ellsworth
may have intended to allow the Supreme Court to interpret the phrase,
or to fashion practice using the "petition," in novel and unfettered ways.
Other writs named in the draft bill, such as mandamus and habeas

[I]f the Clerks or other attendants on the store of the Company commencing an action are
still alive, they must prove that the goods charged were delivered by them or in their
presence or that the articles were charged in their hand writing or that of some other
deceased Clerk or storekeeper with whose writing they were acquainted. Should all the
Clerks and storekeepers be dead the proof of the handwriting of the individual by whom
the Charge was entered on the day book and that he was clerk or storekeeper to the Company will be admitted.
(PRO/T/79/25, "Buchanan, Hastie & Co."); see also Memorial to the British Claims Commission
of 1802 (May 31, 1804) (cannot recover in America due to the near total destruction of books and
bonds that "was occasioned by their anxiety to preserve them from a Party of Men who went about
the Country for the avowed Purpose of destroying them"), and undated Deposition of Sarah Yuille
(stating under oath that the books had been buried to protect them; later her husband, the store
agent, "had them taken up & found them in a ruined situation, very wet & a number of them entirely
rotten & the ink erased") (PRO/T/79/2, "James Murdock & Co."); Memorial to the British-American Claims Commission of 1794 (Aug. 13, 1798) (the original books and the bonds were buried in an
iron chest because of the merchants' haste to leave; by 1784 water had seeped in and "the books were
so much injured as to be perfectly illegible, and the smaller papers totally destroyed") (PRO/T/79/
2, "McCall, Dennistoun & Co."); Memorial to the British Claims Commission of 1802 (undated)
[1806 from internal evidence] (debts had become unrecoverable because one local factor, in debt to
the company, refused to give up the books of his two stores upon demand, and they were soon seized
and carried off by unknown intruders; with regard to other stores, the October 1779 North Carolina
Act appointing commissioners to seize confiscated property, which in North Carolina included debts
owed to British merchants, resulted in the seizure of the books and papers necessary to prove the
debts) (PRO/T/79/6, "Chas Reid & Co. (factor John Buchanan)").
276. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 91-92 (entry for June 29, 1789).
277. Id. at 91-93 (entries for June 29 and 30, 1789).
278. See Letter from Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge (Apr. 24, 1789) (Ralph Izard Papers,
South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina), republished infra in Appendix 3; see also
supra text accompanying notes 227-28, 233-34.
279. Goebel makes the essentially wild claim that "petition in error" was "a method used to
secure review by the House of Lords in England, and still the method of pursuing a supersedeas for
review in Virginia." J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 478. Ritz demonstrates effectively that there was
neither in 1789 nor today "any well-established distinctive judicial procedure known as 'petition in
error.'" W. RITz, supra note 3, at 67.
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corpus, were known to the common law, and if those writs were peremptory and intrusive (such as the two just named), then they were required
to be "agreeable to the principles and usages of law."'2 80 Even this supposedly restrictive language is broad and opaque enough to be relaxed
considerably in practice since there were no "principles and usages of
law" strictly applicable to the novel situation of the national court system
in 1789, but at least limiting language was there for the other writs. It
was totally absent from the phrase "petition in error." This door left ajar
could be used by the Court to fashion a selective review of facts since a
"petition in error" obviously was something different from a "writ of
error." The Senate changed the phrase back to the compromise under'2 81
standing, so that it read "writ of error.
A fourth major battle pitted Ellsworth against the other advocates
of a strong judiciary. This was the battle over federal equitable jurisdiction; courts of equity could reduce judgments because of equitable circumstances, 28 2 but they sat without juries and might also require the
payment of interest where juries would not. Ellsworth, an opponent of
equity, had restricted federal equity jurisdiction in section 16 of the draft
bill, by language which required "[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained.., in any case where remedy may be had by law."' 283 When the
clause came up on July 1, there was much argument against such a restriction led by Johnson of Connecticut, but upon the vote Maclay recorded that "the Clause stood on the Question. ' 284 Nevertheless, equity
proved a contentious issue, and at some later point, "probably before
July 11, the word 'complete' was inserted before 'remedy.' "s285 But, on
July 11, the Senate changed its mind after more furious debate and deleted section 16.286 Then, on July 13, Maclay asked Ellsworth "if he
would not Join me in an attempt to regain the Clause, we had lost on
Saturday. '2 8 7 Ellsworth moved a provision "nearly in the Words of the
Clause we had lost," 288 adding only "plain, adequate and" before "com280. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (habeas corpus); accord, id. § 13, at 81
(mandamus) ("in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law").
281. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 68.
282. See supra note 271 and text accompanying notes 269-73.
283. Section 16 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 8283. Maclay said that Ellsworth "is generally for limiting the Chancery powers." MACLAY'S DIARY,
supra note 215, at 104 (entry for July 9, 1789).
284. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 95-96 (entry for July 1, 1789).
285. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 175-76, 177.
286. Id. at 176; MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 106 (entry for July 11, 1789). The motion
to delete was made by Paterson. Warren, supra note 203, at 96. In general, Warren misunderstood
the sides in this battle, as Ritz explains. See W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 175-77.
287. MACLAY's DIARY, supra note 215, at 107 (entry for July 13, 1789).
288. Id.
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With Lee also in support, Maclay made a long peroration

against federal chancery powers in judges. "[A]s the bill stood [without
290
the section], Chancery was open to receive every thing," he argued;

"all actions may now be tryed in the federal Courts by the Judges, without the intervention of a Jury. The Tryal by Jury is considered as the
Birth right of every american. '29 1 Upon this appeal to the strong sentiment in favor of jury trials, the Senate reinstated section 16 (as
292
amended).
In the meantime, the Senate had raised another important question
concerning equity jurisdiction and debtor-creditor relations. The usual

mode of presentation of evidence in equity was by deposition, but Ellsworth desired to eliminate this practice and had during the composition

of section 16 of the draft bill twice added, then struck, language that
would have required oral testimony in equity as at common law. 293 Similar language was then added to section 28 of the draft bill, where it appeared in the printed version of the subcommittee draft. 294 On July 9,
apparently without deleting this language, the Senate voted to add (as
Maclay saw it) "a Hasty kind of amendment . . that in the Circuit
Courts, under the name of equity they should have all the depositions
copied, and sent up on an Appeal as Evidence to the Supreme Court, on
the rehearsing of facts or Words to that import. ' 295 On July 10, Ellsworth, seconded by Strong, moved at Maclay's suggestion to reconsider
this amendment. Maclay records himself as having argued: "[N]ow we
see what Gentlemen would be at, it is to try Facts on civil law principles,

without the aid of a Jury.... The question was put and we carried

it. ' ' 296

As an ameliorative provision, Ellsworth proposed a new section requir-

ing federal equity courts "to cause the facts on which they found their
289.
290.
291.
292.

W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 176.
MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 107 (entry for July 13, 1789).
Id. at 109 (entry for July 13, 1789).
W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 177.

293. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1182 and opposing

unnumbered page (1986) [hereinafter FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS] (respectively giving the language
Ellsworth added to section 16, the first try of which he crossed out, and exhibiting a photograph of
this sheet of the draft bill showing Ellsworth's interlineations and crossings-out). The added language, "And the mode of receiving testimony in suits in equity & in ca[us]es of admiralty & maritime jurisdiction shall be the same ... as in trials at common law, or as is herein after specially
provided for", is not crossed out on the draft, but it should have been, since Ellsworth shifted this
provision to section 28 of the draft bill, as is seen by the text accompanying the next footnote.
294. Section 28 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
295. This clause, which may have been a separate section, was deleted the next day, and no trace
of it remains among the papers of the judiciary committee. The only evidence we have for it is in
Maclay's diary. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 105 (entry for July 10, 1789).
296. Id. at 106 (entry for July 10, 1789).
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decree" to appear on the record. 297 On July 11 Paterson moved a
substitute that would have required federal equity courts "to cause the
evidence exhibited at the hearing to be reduced to writing"-thereby allowing the reviewing court to see all the evidence and providing a basis
...

for reversal on the facts-but it failed. Then Johnson moved to substitute "evidences" for "facts" in Ellsworth's language, which also would

have resulted in fattening the record with a verbatim transcript of the
testimony, but this motion also failed and the Senate accepted Ellsworth's new section. 29 8 The Senate proved itself to be opposed to judges

sitting without juries and trying or reviewing factual determinations, precisely the position taken by the pro-debtor forces during the ratification
struggle. To underline this position, the Senate added to section 21 of the
draft bill that no reversal could occur in either circuit or Supreme Court

"for any error in fact."2 99
Other, more minor restrictions were also written into the bill by the

Senate. In diversity cases, under the subcommittee draft, neither party
had to be a citizen of the state where the case was brought. The Senate
limited diversity jurisdiction to instances in which one of the parties was
"a citizen of the State where the suit is brought.' ' 3°° Although, pursuant
to the compromise, Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state court
297. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 19, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
298. Warren, supra note 203, at 97-99. Maclay reported that, after the heated July 11 debate,
[a]s we came down the Stairs Docr. Johnson was by my side. Doctor (said I)I wish you
would leave off, using these side Winds, and boldly at once bring in a Clause for deciding
all Causes on civil law principles without the aid of a Jury. No No said he the Civil law is a
name I am not very fond of. I reply'd, you need not care about the name, since you have
got the thing.
MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 106 (entry for July 11, 1789).
299. Section 21 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, I Stat. 73,
84-85.
300. Id. § 11, at 78 (original jurisdiction); id. § 13, at 79 (removal jurisdiction); Warren, supra
note 203, at 79, 90-91. This change can be seen by comparing the portions of Section 11 of the
printed bill, and of the final Act, supra note 255.
Alienage jurisdiction was not similarly limited so as to prevent suits in which aliens were parties
on both sides. Warren, supra note 203, at 79, is wrong in reading the Constitution to require that
aliens be restricted to one side of a controversy, or as requiring anything more than "minimal alienage," where one of the parties to a suit is an alien and an opposing party is a state or a citizen of the
United States. The Constitution says simply: "judicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
However, the language of the Act, as passed, permitted cases in which neither party in an
alienage case was required to be a state or a United States citizen, so it did go too far: "[T]he circuit
courts shall have original cognizance ... of all suits ... where... a foreigner.., is a party."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78; accord, id. § 12, at 79 (removal).
Warren also misreads the draft bill when he avers that at one point it confined alienage and
diversity to instances where the alien or the citizen of another state was defendant. Warren, supra
note 203, at 78 n.67. No such restriction appears in any extant version of the bill-given the reasons
for these jurisdictions, it would have been absurd to limit them to instances where the diverse party
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decisions in federal question cases already was limited to the federal
questions, the Senate restricted it still further to errors appearing "on the
'30 1
face of the record.
The outcry from opponents of the Constitution about the failure of
the Convention to restrict criminal trials and jurors to the "vicinage" or
neighborhood where the crime was committed was voiced in an amendment proposed by Lee and Grayson of Virginia to section 27 of the draft
bill, dealing with jury selection. The amendment would have restricted
the venire of juries in capital cases to the county wherein the crime occurred. It was rejected twice, on July 9 and again on July 13, but after
the House accepted such a provision on September 14 the Senate concurred in the amendment. 302 And in section 31 of the draft bill the subcommittee included a clause permitting federal judges, on their own
knowledge or on the complaint of others, to examine and jail or bail "any
person

. . .

for any offence against the laws of the United States.

'30 3

Maclay and Lee vigorously opposed this inquisitorial provision, which
was supported by Strong and Ellsworth. Maclay records a loss in this
fight, but the clause was eventually expunged. 3°4
Not all of the expansive provisions of the draft bill were limited by
the Senate, and not all of the changes made by the Senate were restrictive. A dramatic exception to the concern for jury trials was the subcommittee's placement of the judicial enforcement of revenue laws on the
high seas within the jury-less admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. This
exception went further even than the laws of England. Not only did the
Senate not object (at least to the point of altering the provision), it added
"seizures on land" or on waters within domestic rather than international jurisdiction, plus "all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred,
under the laws of the United States," to the jurisdiction of the district
30 5
courts (although juries would sit in those suits).
Another minor but revealing failure to restrict the power of the
judges was the inability of some Senators to keep circuit-riding Justices
from voting on appeals of their own decisions. On July 7, Grayson, Maor alien were defendant-and this error probably derives from Warren's inability to decipher correctly the many changes made in this portion of the draft bill.

301. Section 24 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85;
Warren, supra note 203, at 104-05.
302. Warren, supra note 203, at 106; see infra text accompanying note 351.
303. This language is found only in Section 31 of the draft bill; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91-92.
304. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 99-100 (entry for July 3, 1789); Warren, supra note
203, at 107-08.

305. Section 10 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat 73, 76; see
also Warren, supra note 203, at 74-75.
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clay, and others succeeded in adding language to section 4 prohibiting
the district judges from voting in the circuits on their own appeals. Maclay wrote in his diary that it "was agreed to" that "the Effect of this
determination... would prevent, the Circuit Judge, from sit[t]ing in the
Supreme Court on an appeal When he had given original Judgt, ' 30 6 but
such a restriction on the powers of the Supreme Court justices appears
nowhere in the final act, and Warren notes that the two written motions
contained in the record to amend the act in this way are both marked
30 7
failed.
The subcommittee draft restricted to defendants the power of removal of actions involving citizens of the same state concerning title to
land granted by more than one state. The Senate, in what Warren calls
"a very great amendment," allowed removal by either party.30 8 The action does not seem very expansive of federal jurisdiction, since in such a
suit each party claimant is equally entitled to a federal court, and it
would not be extraordinary for the person claiming under an out-of-state
grant to be plaintiff in the action. This head of jurisdiction was universally accepted during the ratification debates.
Perhaps the most startling bit of expansiveness by Senate action lay
in the treatment of federal criminal jurisdiction. The draft bill gave to
the district and circuit courts exclusive "cognizance of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, and defined
by the laws of the same."' 309 During debate the Senate deleted the clause,
"and defined by the laws of the same," which confined federal criminal
jurisdiction to those acts positively outlawed by legislation, and thus left
the courts with a potentially quite expansive common-law criminal jurisdiction. 310 This action becomes less surprising when we recognize that,
as Ritz has pointed out at great length, 311 it was probably meant as a
temporary and stop-gap measure. The crimes committee, consisting of
each Senator not on the judiciary committee, had been empowered to
produce a bill "defining the crimes and offenses" of the United States, but
it was unable to create a comprehensive list of the definitions of federal
crimes, and it eventually reported a bill providing only for criminal punishments. Even this bill did not pass during the first session of the First
Congress, but rather was put over until the second session pending study
of state criminal laws. Of the three crimes created by legislation of the
306.
307.
308.
309.
Stat. 73,
310.
311.

MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 103 (entry for July 7, 1789).
Warren, supra note 203, at 95 & n.101.
Id. at 92.
Sections 10 and 11 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1
76-79.
Warren, supra note 203, at 73, 77.
W. RITz, supra note 3, at 18-19, 111-25.
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first session of the First Congress, 3 12 two were specifically defined but one
(perjury) apparently was left for common-law definition by the federal
courts. Nevertheless, as Ritz puts it, "extensive provision[s]" were made
by the First Congress in 1789 for the "prosecution [of these] crimes and
offenses. '3 13 There would have been a good deal of interchange amongst
the Senators on the judicial and crimes committees, and it is likely (as
Ritz concludes 3 14) that the deletions of the "defined by the laws" language from the judicial bill were made in anticipation of Congress's failure to pass a crimes bill in the first session so that the courts would be
able to protect the nation and the populace until such a bill might pass.
Criminal common law was not only not unthinkable in 1789, in that prepositivist era it was quite a familiar phenomenon. Even though the deletions were not intended as a very expansive maneuver, the implication is
earthshaking. No matter how little common-law jurisdiction Congress
may have expected the federal courts to exercise as a stop-gap measure,
there seemed to be no doubt that the federal courts, and thus the federal
government, could exercise such a power.
Section 34, added to the bill at an unknown but probably quite late
time (probably by the subcommittee upon recommittal of the bill on July
13)315, has been long thought to be a general choice-of-law command for
federal courts to apply state law of the state where the federal court is
located, in diversity cases and other instances in which federal law does
not apply by command of Constitution, statute, or treaty. Ritz argues
cogently that section 34 was probably a direction that the federal courts
refuse to apply a British common law of crimes, but rather to construct
(when defining federal crimes until Congress could pass a crimes act) a
more republican, more American, common law of crimes as one of the
'3 16
"laws of the United States.
One of the many evidences supporting Ritz is that the subcommittee
originally proposed without apparent qualm that the federal judicial dis312. Id. at 114.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 146, 148.
315. Senator Wingate of the judicial committee reported home on July 11 that the "judicial bill

has had three readings in the Senate and is now to be committed in order to make some little
alterations and amendments and then it will be ready to go to the other house." Letter from Paine
Wingate to Timothy Pickering (July 11, 1789), reprintedin 2 C. WINGATE, LIFE AND LETTERS OF
PAINE WINGATE 318 (1930). On July 17, the judicial committee "corrected" the subcommittee's
work, and later that day the Senate debated and passed the bill. MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215,

at 116 (entry for July 17, 1789). Ritz argues convincingly that Section 34 was probably one of those
"little alterations and amendments" added to the bill during this time. W. RITz, supra note 3, at
128-31.
316. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 98-148 etpassim. The quote is from U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2.
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trict of New Hampshire include Maine, then a part of Massachusetts. 31 7
After the President of New Hampshire indignantly protested this apparent mark that New Hampshire was "inferior to any other state in the
Union, ' 3 18 and after George Nicholas of Kentucky (then a part of Virginia) wrote to James Madison that if Kentucky did not receive a district
court of its own under the judicial bill "Kentuckey will renounce the
government within three months from the time she gets the information, ' ' 319 the Senate split Massachusetts and Virginia into two districts
each, although Maine and Kentucky were not made part of the circuit
system. 320 Congress was clearly not thinking in terms of national courts
having to apply the law of each discrete state if it could imagine placing
two states into the same judicial district.
E. Expansiveness in Sections 13 and 14
The subcommittee also drafted expansive language, in two interlocking provisions which the Senate accepted without amendment, that potentially embodied the open-ended, strongly centralizing, omnivorous
jurisdiction that the opponents of the Constitution feared. Many of the
Constitution's supporters (including many in the Senate, who voted for
one or more of the restrictions just detailed) were suspicious of expansive
jurisdiction, but Ellsworth, Strong, Paterson, and many other proponents
of the Constitution desired that the federal judiciary be perceived as powerful in a strong, open-ended sense.
The most expansive and open-ended language emanating from the
subcommittee was contained in section 14, which has come to be known
as the "all-writs" provision. It gave United States judges the power to
issue habeas corpus, "and all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. ' 321 Courts
within the common-law tradition used such writs for administrative purposes, mostly the accomplishment of minor details, and such is the import of the limiting language, "exercise of their respective jurisdictions"
and "agreeable to the principles and usages of law." But the writs also
could be used to deal with matters of great moment, since they were
broad and relatively open-ended.
317. See Section 2 of the draft bill, as amended, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
318. Letter from John Pickering to Paine Wingate (July 1, 1789) (Emmet Collection, Rare
Books and Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden

Foundations).
319.
PAPERS,
320.
321.

Letter from George Nicholas to James Madison (May 8, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON
supra note 9, at 138.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2, 4, 10, 12, 1 Stat. 73, 73-79.
Id. § 14, at 81 (emphasis added).
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There were some apparent limits to this broad power. Language in
the same section restricted federal habeas corpus for jailed persons to
those jailed under federal authority, as we have seen, 322 and section 13
seemed to limit the issuance of writs of prohibition to district judges sitting in admiralty and maritime cases and to limit writs of mandamus "in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law" to "courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
323
States."
"All other" common-law "writs" included more than prohibition
and mandamus, however. One of the most powerful was the peremptory
writ of certiorari, which a superior court could use to draw to it the
record and parties of any case in any inferior court that lacked jurisdiction or was biased or incompetent. 324 Another powerful and intrusive
writ that could have been found by a federal court to be included under
the "all-writs" language was the writ of injunction, which could prevent
a state court from taking a certain case or from exercising its power in
some other way. The phrase "necessary for the exercise of their...
jurisdictions" could easily become expansive in the hands of a federal
judge wishing to protect what he thought was his constitutional power.
Further, no one could predict what might lie hidden in the phrase
"agreeable to the principles and usages of law" in the completely novel
situation of a national judiciary and the strange federal arrangement of
one-government-made-from-many. Section 14 thus could be a tool for
the destruction of all the careful limitations in the other sections, should
a federal court be so minded.
A second possibility for expansion lay deeply hidden in the wording
of section 13, the only section dealing with the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and the concomitant wording of the other sections of the
draft and the Act. The Constitution specifies that the "judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court" and that "the
supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction" in two specified instances
(including "those in which a State shall be a party"); in "all the other
Cases before mentioned [the other types of jurisdiction, such as diversity
and federal question jurisdiction], the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction ... with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make." 32 5 This language can be, and usually is, read as
directly creating the Supreme Court and as directly vesting its original
jurisdiction therein. However, while the appellate jurisdiction of the
322.
323.
324.
325.

See supra text accompanying notes 263-64.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat 73, 80.
See Holt & Perry, supra note 123, at 102-03 & nn.40, 41.
U.S. CONST. art. III., §§ 1, 2.
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Court is also considered to be directly vested by the Constitution, the
"exceptions and regulations" clause has given rise to two conflicting theores of the nature of this kind of direct vesting. One theory is that, by
using its power to "except," Congress can take away any kind of jurisdiction that is not original in the Supreme Court, not only from the
Supreme Court, but from all federal courts. This is the usual reading,
deriving from Chief Justice Marshall's strained construction of the Con326
stitition and the Judiciary Act in Durousseau v. United States.
To my mind a less strained reading of article 3, one which places
great emphasis on the "shalls," on the separation of powers, and on the
suspicion of state courts which as we have seen was the primary impetus
for national court jurisdiction, is that the "exceptions and regulations" of
Congress may eliminate only the appellate aspect of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction, leaving it with original jurisdiction in the instances
excepted. An intermediate position of this reading is that, though Congress can "except" jurisdiction from the federal court system, it must do
so explicitly, by overt negative words. At the heart of this view is that
federal jurisdiction inheres in the federal courts by virtue of the
Constitution.
The Constitution nowhere expressly gives Congress the power to decide whether any portions of the "judicial Power" enumerated in article
III, section 2 might not be exercised by the federal courts. In two places
Congess is given the power to erect lower federal courts, 327 but the power
to create courts does not necessarily carry with it the power to grant or
withhold jurisdiction from them. To the contrary, the Constitution
plainly says that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested" in the federal courts, and that it "shall extend to" the heads of
jurisdiction enumerated in article III, section 2.328 One could easily conclude that the entire "judicial Power" of the United States must reside
either in the Supreme Court, or, if Congress chooses to create lower fed329
eral courts, in all federal courts together.
326. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314-15 (1810).
327. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); id. art.
III,§ 1 ("... such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").
328. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (emphasis added).
329. On August 27, the Convention rejected explicit language that could have been interpreted
to give Congress the power to control and restrict national court jurisdiction, 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 134, at 431; it refused to insert at an unspecified location in article III the
language "[i]n all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in such a
manner as the Legislature shall direct," then unanimously voted to delete the following language
from the end of what became article III, section 2: "The Legislature may assign any part of the
jurisdiction above mentioned ... in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think
proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time." Id. (language from 2 id.
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The reading of the judiciary portion of the Constitution given in the

previous paragraphs seems more consistent with the actual language than
any other interpretation, especially the prevalent reading today that Congress has something just short of plenary power to alter (and even to
delete parts of) the jurisdiction of the national courts. 330 The "plenary
power" reading is theoretically more democratic, since Congress is the

elected branch. But this "plenary power" reading seems strangely inconsistent with the desires and beliefs of the members of a Constitutional

Convention distrustful of the popular democracy then being exhibited in
many of the states; these were men more interested in credit and development than in extending the franchise, empowering the powerless, or ter-

minating slavery. And given this reading of the Constitution, most of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional in the modem sense of thinking of its seemingly mandatory language (all those "shalls") as actually
331
mandatory. Fortunately, most of the Framers were not positivists.
The draft bill and Act can be read with minimal distortion as consistent with the second reading of the judiciary portions of the Constitution
proposed above, although this reading or theory is not widely held to186-87). The meaning of these votes is unclear, but they may indicate a consensus in the Convention
for mandatory jurisdiction.
330. That these points were moot and by no means settled is demonstrated by the need felt by a
particularly astute member of the First Congress to explain at length the theory of congressional
power over the national courts, jurisdiction which today is almost unquestioned in its orthodoxy:
The Judicial powers of the General Government are defined in the Constitution but those
powers will remain a dead letter unless Congress shall establish [ac]ts to carry them into
effect. This they may do either [in wh]ole or in part. They may distribute the exercise [of
th]ose powers among such inferior Courts as they [choo]se to establish. [H]aving established District [& Circ]uit Courts & assigned to each their respective Jurisdictions they
cannot by construction extend their Jurisdiction to omitted Cases. These must remain in
their original State 'til Congress by a Legislative act shall constitute a Court with power to
take [cognizance] of them or extend the powers of the Court[s] already constituted.
Letter from John Brown to Harry Innes (June 18, 1790) (Harry Innes Papers, Library of Congress)
(partially mutilated portions restored). The apparently unproblematic acceptance by Congress of
federal criminal common-law jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 309-16, is another
indication of the inability of eighteenth century contemporaries fully to grasp what was entailed in a
notion of courts of limited jurisdiction.
33 1. Legal positivists see law entirely as a consciously produced human artifact, as morally relative or even neutral, and as completely malleable by those in power. Thus, to most positivists, law is
what the sovereign dictates, and the various ways people act to order their own social and economic
behavior should be called something else such as "custom," whereas questions of right and wrong
must be put into still other supposedly disjoined conceptual boxes called "morality" and "ethics."
Profound certainties underlie positivist thinking, including (a) words have sharp and clear meanings;
(b) a power hierarchy is a normal, inescapable, and good part of human social existence; (c) causes
are always distinct from and prior to effects, and certain effects always flow from certain causes; (d)
legislators have those meanings in mind and intend to exercise that power by requiring those specific
actions or consequences by their dictates, in order to cause desired effects. To a positivist, a "shall"
in law or the Constitution is intended to be mandatory, and to limit the actions of humans in a
precise and predictable way. See generally Millon, supra note 176.
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and may be, in fact, anathema. 333 Section 1 of the draft is consistent with such a theory; it does not purport to create or establish the
Supreme Court, but only to specify the number of its judges and the
frequency and timing of sessions. 334 Importantly, section 13 is also quite
consistent with such a reading, since it purports only to regulate the jurisdiction of other courts, not to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.335 Only one clause of the entire draft bill or Act-the
habeas corpus restriction in section 14-is phrased in absolute negative
terms and can be said absolutely to deny jurisdiction to all federal
day332

courts. 336 All other restrictions are phrased positively or in such a fash-

ion as to allow section 14 to be construed as an exception to them. This
positive phrasing is just as "Exceptions" and "Regulations" should be
phrased, allowing the reader of the bill and Act to imagine it to be possible that all the residual jurisdiction "vested" by the two "shalls" in article III in the Supreme Court is still there.
It follows from this generous construction of the Constitution, and a
correspondingly generous canon of construction of the judicial bill, that
the remainder of the Judiciary Act, especially including sections 9, 11,
12, and 25, consists merely of "Exceptions" and "Regulations" and
should not be read as grants of power as they usually are regarded today.
Any sort of case falling outside the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts as explicitly mentioned in sections 9, 11, and 12, or the Supreme
Court, as explicitly mentioned in the writ-of-error "Regulation" of sec332. It has recently been advanced in Clinton, supra note 3.
333. Note how quickly, effortlessly, and without explanation the gurus of the usual reading of
the Constitution dismiss the best modem exposition of this reading. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P.
MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEM 385-86 (3d ed. 1988)[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (dealing with Clinton, supra note 3).
334. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
335. In two instances, section 13 disavows that "original" jurisdiction automatically means "exclusive" jurisdiction. I think this reading is consistent with the theory stated in the text, though
reasonable persons have taken the opposite view. Also, the last sentence of section 13 purports to
empower the Court to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus; this can be read also as a regulation
of appellate rather than a limitation of original jurisdiction, or these writs can be viewed as procedural and regulatory rather than as types of the exercise of jurisdiction. I imagine the latter view
would have been that of eighteenth-century contemporaries of the Act. I agree with Warren that
"Section 13 and the Constitution are in accord." Warren, supra note 203, at 93 n.98.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 263-64. Two other provisions appear to be denials of
jurisdiction, but the assignee clause, see supra text accompanying note 265, only purported to restrict
district or circuit courts (not the Supreme Court), and the limitations on Supreme Court jurisdiction
under section 24 of the draft (which became the famous section 25 of the Act), see supra text accompanying note 301, could be gotten around by appellate review via a writ of certiorari under section
14. All of the other "restrictions" on jurisdiction that have been referred to in this essay are phrased
positively rather than negatively, and all can equally be gotten around through use of one or more of
the peremptory writs expressly authorized by section 14, particularly writs of certiorari. Casto's
refutation of Clinton, Casto, supra note 3, fails to recognize either the careful use of positive language throughout the Judiciary Act or the potential import of section 14.
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tion 25, but within one of the heads of jurisdiction in article III, section
1, would still be subject to the appellate power of the Supreme Court,
exercisable through any ordinary or extraordinary procedure the Court
considered necessary (such as a writ of certiorari or a writ of injunction
under section 14, as previously discussed), or at least subject to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
A court favoring a generous, nationalizing construction of the Constitution could have construed these two expansive provisions, sections
13 and 14, to have eaten up any or all of the apparent restrictions the
Senate had argued about for months.
It is fruitless to speculate about the degree to which these possible
loopholes were placed there by conscious design by the proponents of a
strong judiciary.337 Class is primarily a group phenomenon, not primarily an individual one, and class analysis posits the contrary of the overly
deterministic notion central to capitalist thought that each individual
somehow is programmed by social and economic circumstances to act
only in a certain way.3 38 The bill and the Act were, as has been amply
demonstrated, the result of the direct collision of two contrary sets of
expectations about the nature of the national government and of the national judiciary. It is not surprising that provisions representing each of
these two sets of expectations found their way into the final product.
Given the strongly nationalizing desires and beliefs of the subcommittee that drafted the bill, it is not surprising that strongly nationalizing
language and provisions exist in the draft. This nationalist language was
not intruded via a conspiracy, however. A successful conspiracy would
have been politically impossible because Lee, Maclay, and the other opponents of a strongly centralizing judiciary were too shrewd and too cognizant of the dangers. As we have seen, they did ferret out several
suspicious (but more specific) provisions. Further, it was impossible for
Ellsworth and his nationalist colleagues to have anticipated all the detailed questions, to have presented solutions for them, and then to have
concealed those devices.
The politics of ambiguity is normal when coalitions are made and
compromises are negotiated. One searches for evocative language into
which different people can read their different hopes and expectations.
People live not in the abstract-not in reflective equilibrium-but rather
in constant activity and turmoil, and despite our abilities all of us have
limited vision-hindsight is always much better. In the heat of the mo337. I am deeply indebted to L.H. LaRue for his help in thinking through the issues in this and
the following three paragraphs of text.
338. For elaboration, see Appendix 2.
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ment, we do not notice everything we might be expected to notice. In
addition, self-deception is a more frequent human phenomenon than is
deception, especially in groups of great people, and Ellsworth and Lee
both worked very hard to achieve a workable solution to the puzzle of
the judiciary, thus becoming prime candidates for self-deception. Ellsworth's arguments during the debates over the equity powers of the
courts show him to have been more "localist" than he knew, whereas
Lee's happiness with the end product demonstrated that he was a greater
nationalist than he believed. 339 Finally, and realistically, the bill and the
Act did contain many provisions that looked like, and were drafted and
adopted to look like, real restrictions. Section 14 itself contained what
looked like real restrictions. The open-ended possibilities in sections 13
and 14 have to be searched for diligently.
When all is said and done, however, my arguments about the generous and open-ended language of the bill, the Act, and the Constitution
remain only abstract structural arguments, only possibilities of interpretation allowed by the open-endedness of language in general and of the
language used. A word, the law, and history are all alike in this regard.
Numerous possibilities result from the fact that life is full of collisionsthat is, the possible constructions of language are caused by politics, they
are always to be filled in by politics, and they are in fact always filled in
by politics. They were in this instance filled in by politics, although that
is a tale told in another place. 34° A collision of expectations produced a
compromise product, with typical Janus-like provisions that looked in
each direction. The lack of clarity of language and intent is not opaque,
but suggestive-not fatal, but life-giving. More need not be said.
F.

The Judiciaryand the Bill of Rights

The judiciary bill's passage through Congress significantly blunted
the momentum of the drive to amend the Constitution. True to his
pledge to his constituents and to his understanding of the strength of the
Constitution's opponents, Madison worked tirelessly during the First
Congress for amendments that would satisfy some of those opponents
without crippling the new government. As a congressional proponent of
the Constitution put it early in the First Congress: "All reasonable &
proper amendments will be obtained, those tending to jar the foundations
339. Maclay judged that Lee had been too supportive of a bill he himself considered "Vile" and
"calculated for Expence," before the final vote. When Lee joined Maclay to vote against it, Maclay
wryly commented: "[H]ad Mr. Lee joined in my Objections against it at an early period, perhaps we
might have now had it, in better form." MACLAY'S DIARY, supra note 215, at 116 (entry for July 17,
1789).
340. See Holt & Perry, supra note 123.
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of united government will be discarded. '34 1 Those foundations would be
jarred, proponents believed, if the jurisdiction and power of the national
court system were to be limited as proposed by the amendments from

Virginia and some of the other states. As Lee put it in a letter to Patrick
Henry: "I think, from what I hear and see, that many of our amendments will not succeed, but my hopes are strong that such as may effectu'342
ally secure civil liberty will not be refused.
Despite sentiment from some proponents of the Constitution that it
would be reasonable to have "an abridgment of the Jurisdiction of the
federal court in a few instances, and some fixed regulations respecting
appeals" as well as "the trial by jury being expressly secured ... in all

cases,

'343

Madison's timidity in walking the tightrope between propo-

nents and opponents of a strong role for the judiciary, combined with his

basic pro-creditor viewpoint, resulted in proposals that would impede the
Constitution's empowerment of the judiciary in only three primary ways:
He proposed 1) to guarantee trial by jury, 2) to prevent the reexamina-

tion of jury-found facts, and 3) an amount-in-controversy limitation on
appeals to the Supreme Court. 344 Since these proposals were not made
341. Letter from Richard Bland Lee to Leven Powell (Mar. 29, 1789) (Leven Powell Papers,
Library of Congress); accord, eg., Letter from Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (Mar. 25, 1789)
(Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 27, 1789), reprintedin 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 186 ("A Bill of rights...
with a few other alterations most called for by the opponents of the Government and least objection.
able to its friends"); Letter from Madison to Jefferson (June 13, 1789) (has introduced amendments
"most likely to pass thro' 2/3 of that Hs. & of the Senate & 3/4 of the States"), reprinted in 12
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 218; Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15,
1789), reprintedin 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 219 ("limited to points which are important in the eyes of many and can be objectionable in those of none. The structure & stamina of the
Govt. are as little touched as possible.").
342. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (May 28, 1789), reprinted in 2 LEE
LETTERS, supra note 219, at 487. Lee's colleague William Grayson wrote to Henry:
Some gentlemen here from motives of policy have it in contemplation to affect amendments
which will affect personal liberty alone, leaving the great points of the Jud[iciar]y & direct
taxation &c. to stand as they are; their object is in my opinion unquestionably to break the
spirit of the party by divisions ....
Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (June 12, 1789) (George Meissner Collection, Washington University, St. Louis).
343. Letter from William R. Davie to James Madison (June 10, 1789), reprinted in 12 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 211.
344. With regard to trial by jury, Madison proposed two provisions: criminal ("The trial of all
crimes... shall be by an impartial jury of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites .. ") and civil ("In suits at common
law between man and man, the trial by jury as one of the best securities to the rights of the people,
ought to remain inviolate."). With respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, he proposed to
add the following: "[B]ut no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy
shall not amount to [blank] dollars: nor shall any fact triable by a jury, according to the course of
common law, be otherwise reexaminable than may consist with the principles of common law." 4
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 293, at 11.
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until June 8, it is clear that the Senate's early compromises on the judicial
bill had eliminated the need to put forward other restrictions on the national judicial power. 345 And when the amendments were considered in
the Senate, the amount-in-controversy limitation was eliminated precisely on the ground that the judicial bill already had taken care of the
3 46
problem.
Except for a guarantee of jury trials and a prohibition on the review

of jury-found facts-both of which reflected concern for debtors, especially in British debt cases-the compromises that Ellsworth, Lee, and
the other senators adopted in April and May and wrote into the Judici-

ary Act prevented any constitutional amendment reducing or restricting
the jurisdiction of the national courts. 347 Because the Act left almost
untouched the great potential that could be read into the vague language
of article III, this was a distinct victory for the proponents of the Constitution, the most important and perhaps the only major victory they
achieved on the national judiciary in the first session of the First

Congress.
G.

House Debate, Passage and Reactions to the JudiciaryAct

A House exhausted by the summer heat and by the difficulty of energizing the new government debated the judicial bill at length in September, but made only two noteworthy (and restrictive) if relatively
The House committee filled the blank in with "one thousand." On August 17, the House defeated attempts both to strike out the entire jurisdictional amount provision and to raise the dollar
amount to three thousand dollars. The committee report also required criminal juries to be composed of freeholders, but this was struck out by the House; and the civil law jury trial was strengthened to read: "In suits at common law the right of jury trial shall be preserved." 4 iad at 29-30 &
nn.25, 26, & 29. The House collated Madison's various proposals into seventeen separate amendments, of which the criminal jury provisions were in the 10th, the civil jury provisions in the 12th,
and the amount-in-controversy and no-review-of-jury-facts provisions were in the 11th. 4 id. at 3539. The Senate eliminated the 10th and 11th amendments, but inserted the no-review-of-jury-facts
provision from the 1lth into the 12th. A twenty-dollar minimum was also added to the 12th. After
other deletions, 12 renumbered amendments remained. 4 id. at 43-45. The House insisted upon an
impartial jury of the "district wherein the crime shall have been committed," and ordered this inserted into what became the 6th Amendment,'to which the Senate concurred. 4 id. at 48.
345. See Warren, supra note 203, at 114-15.
346. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in 12
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 402 ("The Senate have sent back the plan of amendments with
some alterations which strike in my opinion at the most salutary articles ....
A fear of inconvenience to a constitutional bar to appeals below a certain value, and a confidence that such a limitation
is not necessary, have had the same effect on another article."); Letter from Madison to Pendleton
(Sept. 23, 1789), reprintedin 12 id. at 418 ("It will be impossible I find to prevail on the Senate to
concur in the limitation on the value of appeals to the Supreme Court, which they say is unnecessary, and might be embarrassing in questions of national or constitutional importance in their principle, tho' of small pecuniary amount.").
347. Accord, W. RiTz, supra note 3, at 5, 7, 19-21.
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minor alterations. 34 The $2000 amount-in-controversy limitation on appeals from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court was expanded so as to
apply to diversity and alienage cases. 349 This change would eliminate
the possibility of many poor and middling persons being dragged to the
seat of the Court to face appeals in British debt cases and other creditor

litigation, and it perhaps coincidentally restored a term of the original
Senate compromise which had been lost due to Senate subcommittee

drafting. 350 On September 14, what was now section 29 was twice
amended, to include the principle of vicinage (juries drawn from the locality of the crime) in capital cases, and to require that federal juries be
selected "by lot or otherwise" according to state law, to the extent "prac-

ticable by the Courts or Marshals.

'351

These requirements tended to sat-

isfy grievances strongly expressed by opponents of the Constitution. As
in the Senate, however, attempts to achieve more radical demands of

those opponents were failures-such as the attempted elimination of non-

352
admiralty lower federal courts.
An equally exhausted Senate quickly concurred with the essence of
the House bill, and on September 24 President Washington signed the
bill into law. 353 Congressional sentiment held, in the words of Congressman Fisher Ames, that it was "an experimental law, . . . [passed] in the

confidence that a short experience will make manifest the proper alterations. '354 James Madison saw the Act as "defective both in its general
348. Most observers agreed with Congressman Benjamin Goodhue that "no material alterations" had been made in "the Judicial bill ...as it came from the Senate." Letter from Benjamin
Goodhue to [Insurance Officers] (Sept. 13, 1789) (Goodhue Papers, New York Library Society);
accord, ag., Letter from Thomas Hartley to Tench Coxe (Sept. 13, 1789) (Tench Coxe Papers,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania); Letter from Paine Wingate to John Langdon (Sept. 17, 1789);
reprintedin 2 C. WINGATE, supra note 315, at 334; Letter from Rufus King to Caleb Strong (Sept.
20, 1789) (Thompson Papers, Hartford Seminary).
349. Section 22 of the Act reads, in relevant part: "[U]pon a like Process, may final judgments
and decrees in civil Actions and suits in equity in a circuit Court brought there by original process or
removed there from courts of the several states, or removed there by appeal a district court where
the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of Two thousand Dollars exclusive of Costs, be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court .. " Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1
Stat. 73, 84. Compare supra note 259.
350. For the compromise, see supra text accompanying notes 226-31. For the Senate's declension from the compromise with regard to the $2000 minimum on diversity and alienage appeals, see
supra text accompanying note 259.
351. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
352. See supra note 248 and text accompanying notes 246-48. Constitutional opponent William
Grayson saw hope even in these votes. "[Tihe amendment of Virginia respecting this matter [the
judiciary] has more friends in both houses than any other, & I still think it probable that this alteration may be ultimately procured." Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789)
(Patrick Henry Papers, Library of Congress).
353. W. Rrrz, supra note 3, at 17-18.
354. Letter from Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 1 AMES
PAPERS, supra note 220, at 717.
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structure, and many of its particular regulations." But he voted for it
primarily because it would satisfy British creditors. "The most I hope is
that some offensive violations of Southern jurisprudence may be corrected," he said, "and that the system may speedily undergo a reconsideration under the auspices of the Judges who alone will be able perhaps
'355
to set it to rights.
Some opponents of the Constitution, like William Grayson, found
the bill "monstrous," 356 but most were relieved and not unpleased at the
restrictions it placed upon the judicial power. Arthur Lee, brother of
Richard Henry, said "it is difficult to say how... [the Judiciary Act]
coud. have been framed less exceptionable. We must try some experiments & try them with temper. ' 357 Proponents of the Constitution had
grave reservations. Some accurately foresaw terrible battles arising from
"the concurrent Jurisdiction of the Federal with the State Courts which
will unavoidably occasion great embarassment & clashing. '35 8 Some
southerners simply were concerned about practicalities. "To me it appears that the Judiciary system is . . . too unqualified," wrote George
Walton of Georgia. "Should the british debts be entirely and at once
sued for from Virginia inclusive south, the consequences would be ruinous. ' 359 But most proponents were upset over the lack of judicial power
in the Act. "Our judicial system is not free from difficulties," said the
new Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, "and I think the judges
will often find themselves embarassed. ' ' 36° Edward Carrington predicted, "The Judiciary System is so defective that it will doubtless un3 61
dergo much alteration in the next session of Congress."

355. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), reprinted in 12
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 9, at 402.
356. Letter from William Grayson to Patrick Henry (Sept. 29, 1789) (Patrick Henry Papers,
Library of Congress).

357. Letter from Arthur Lee to Tench Coxe (Aug. 4, 1789) (Tench Coxe Papers, Historical
Society of Pennsylvania).
358. Letter from John Brown to Harry Innes (Sept. 28, 1789) (Harry Innes Papers, Library of
Congress). Opponents of the Constitution similarly predicted with accuracy battles arising from the
power of the Supreme Court to reverse a state court under Section 25 of the Act. "[T]he part or
clause in the Judicial Bill which gives writs of Error to the Court of the United States upon Judgment given in the State Courts will be a Source of Contention." Letter from James Sullivan to
Elbridge Gerry (Oct. 11, 1789) (Gerry II Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society).
359. Letter from George Walton to John Adams (Jan. 28, 1790) (Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society).
360. Letter from John Jay to Edward Rutledge (Nov. 16, 1789) (extract of letter quoted for sale
in Rendell's Inc. catalogue).
361. Letter from Edward Carrington to Henry Knox (Oct. 25, 1789) (Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society).
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THE VIRTUES OF HISTORICISM

The reasons for these varied reactions to the Judiciary Act of 1789
are evident from the history of the origins of the Act. First, compromises
between colliding economic organizing principles, between competing
value systems, are rarely satisfying to either party, largely because true
compromise is a delusion in such a situation. Second, and much more
important, the restrictions on the national judicial power in the Act
vastly outweighed its expansiveness. Although Walton accurately understood that any grant of alienage jurisdiction to national trial courts
meant grave difficulties for British debtors-the Constitution is after all a
nationalizing and creditor-oriented document, and the national court
system was there in large part because state courts could not be trusted
to handle creditors' suits against debtors-most of the restrictions in the
Act resulted directly or indirectly from a political need to cater to the
desires of the pro-debtor majority and were enacted to limit the power of
the federal courts. Some restrictions were made expressly on behalf of
the debtor interest.
The weakness of the new government lay in its lack of popular support, and much of that lack stemmed from the power wielded by the
debtor interest as demonstrated first in the responsiveness of state legislatures and courts and later in the near rejection of the Constitution. In
order to get the new government started without widespread unrest, dissent, and perhaps secession, such catering was necessary. As the new
government gained increased strength and respect, many supporters of
the Constitution hoped, debtor-oriented restrictions could be eliminated
and the federal judiciary made the true guardian of a nationalizing and
creditor-conscious Constitution.
When the origins of our federal court system are viewed in their
context of social and economic history, many questions, such as those
posed at the outset of this essay, find answers. In particular, it becomes
clear that the system was constructed neither in the abstract nor within a
conviction that law was separated from politics, but rather the contrary.
The framers of the system worked within a living and unquestioned understanding that law was politics, that they were solving immediate and
362
great political problems the best way they could.
362. Congressman Abiel Foster, one of the few members of the New Hampshire delegation to
Congress who supported the Judiciary Act, challenged its opponents "to suggest a plan for administering Justice, in those instances in which the general Government is invested with it by the Constitution, which will be less objectionable than the general principals contained in the present one."
Letter from Abiel Foster to Oliver Peabody (Sept. 23, 1789) (Chamberlain Collection, reprinted by
courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library).
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They understood legal rules, and particularly the Constitution, in
this same way. For them, the Constitution provided only the broadest of
frameworks, a set of suggestions and guidelines, not a blueprint. Where
the Constitution was absolute and specific, as with the existence of "one"
supreme court, they followed suit. But where, as in most of article III,
the Constitution was broad and vague, they filled in with the best system
they could devise given their principles and the political possibilities and
needs of the time.
Nothing in article III, for example, authorizes the exclusion of litigants from federal court through a jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
limitation; the text, which uniformly uses the word "shall" in describing
the jurisdiction and power of federal courts and lists no exclusions whatsoever, bolsters the contrary argument. Moreover, an amendment to the
Constitution containing such a limit was expressly proposed during the
First Congress, some indication that an amendment was needed before
any jurisdictional amount could be enacted; and it was rejected, some
indication of a denial of congressional authority so to limit federal
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, several jurisdictional amounts were included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, as we have seen, without the first argument of their
unconstitutionality being made. Members of the First Congress did this
not because they were following some sort of map hidden in the words of
the Constitution mandating jurisdictional amounts ("original intent"),
not because they were fleshing out structural requirements that they as
incredibly brilliant theorizers could divine from the Constitution's sparse
words, but because the practical politics of the moment dictated such a
course. Many people were upset at the possible costs of litigation in federal courts for the poor and those in middling circumstances. Some
wanted at least some debt cases to be excluded. Those people had political power and demonstrated it often. Since a majority of the populace
did not favor the new government and there were internal and external
threats to its very existence, the Constitution's supporters thought it was
necessary to set jurisdictional amounts in order to maintain and increase
the wavering support the shaky new government possessed. They had
promised to do so in the ratification debates, and this promise was met in
the First Congress. They did not trouble themselves over either the lack
of explicit authorization in the Constitution or the implications in its language that jurisdictional amounts were improper.
Basically the supporters of the Constitution did not believe that the
words of the Constitution were so definite, so inflexible, so dictatorial as
the positivist views of today would hold. They understood life to be lived
from within its practice, not from theoretical dictates and strictures;
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they believed that the meaning of words derives from practice, not theory; and they understood that the new government would be established
and maintained through the practicalities of politics, not because of the
hollow ramifications of structures or theory. As Jefferson Powell has
shown, the very concept of "original intent" was often unpersuasive to
them.

363

The trouble with recent ingenious theories about the "meaning" of
article III is that, despite their ingenuity, they are not very critical: They
replicate much of the trouble that plagues the existing theories. They are
ahistorical and positivist because they manipulate the historical evidence
quite selectively from a present-minded theory of what the Framers
ought to have done, and they operate from a much too restricted,
mandatory, and hierarchical concept of the meaning of words. Robert
Clinton focuses on the "shalls" in article III, and spins out a wonderful
structural theory from them, 364 but his theory was nothing more than
one of many political possibilities of the meaning of the Constitution to
the Framers--one never accepted, because politics pushed people down a
different path. Akhil Amar focuses on the "alls" in section 2 of article
III and spins out an equally wonderful structural theory, 365 but it too
was not one that most people had in their minds then-nor was it one
that was ever followed, for the same reason. Both theorists take the Constitution's words too literally; neither attempts to see what really happened from the standpoint of the people who took actions at that time.
Both assume that politics-words, life, history, class-is divorced from
law.
For all their replication of many of the difficulties brought on by
capitalism and the adoption of a capitalistic ethos and worldview, the
efforts of Clinton and Amar are at least better than the usual view of the
origins of the federal courts because they can imagine a past and a future
that are different. Not only is the mainstream position unable to recognize (and to criticize) its own positivism, not only does the mainstream
position ignore the crucial importance of economic and political interests
within a view that law and politics are separate, the deterministic mainstream position cannot imagine that matters could have been any differ366
ent than they were, or that they can be any different than they are.
For example, the mainstream's chief criterion for judgment of the histor363. Powell, supra note 3.
364. Clinton, supra note 3.
365. Amar, supra note 3.
366. See, eg., HART & WESCHLER, supra note 333, at 1-34, 366-68, 379-87, passim.
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ical meaning of the Constitution is what the First Congress actually
3 67

did.

This essay has attempted to demonstrate the opposing virtues of historicism. Its "theme is as old as Thucydides. It is chronology. '3 68 The
adoption of this theme flows from the understanding that history is theory, that "historical episodes themselves establish[ ] their own peculiar
constraints and rules for interaction. ' 369 Further, this essay has undertaken to establish chronology within a full socioeconomic conception of
human history.3 70 It has integrated the conflicts and the incompletenesses of life into the history of the federal judiciary. And it demonstrates the contingency of history. By its example it shows that matters
can be better than they are.

367. Id. at 386-87.
368. S. COHN, DEATH AND PROPERTY IN SIENA, 1205-1800: STRATEGIES FOR THE AFTERLIFE
10 (1988). Accord, e.g., S. GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE
OF HIFTORY 15 (1989) ("[T]he primary criterion of order in the domain of contingency is, and must
be, chronology."); LaRue, ConstitutionalLaw and ConstitutionalHistory, 36 BUFFALO L. REv. 373,
373 (1987) ("[T]he most important fact about any case is its date.").
369. S. COHN, supra note 368, at 11.
370. It thus avoids a "toothless, relativistic approach." Id. at 11.
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APPENDIX 1: A PARTIAL NOTE ON SOURCES

A.

Primary Sources

Some of the evidence cited in this essay was discovered in the Public
Record Office, the national archives of the British government, located in
London. The records I consulted there are arranged (1) according to the
pertinent ministry in the cabinet, (2) in numbered classes, and (3) in
numbered volumes or file folders. Sometimes a series number is intruded
between class and fie or volume. In Treasury class 79 (T/79), the large
ifie folders contain smaller ifie folders, each holding the claim made by a
British merchant to either the British-American Claims Commission of
1794 or the British Claims Commission of 1802 (or both) and usually
identified by the name of the claimant. The ministry records I consulted
were those of the Foreign Office (FO), the Audit Office (AO), and the
Treasury (T). Hereinafter, such records will be cited in the form PRO/
FO/4/16, indicating a reference to folder or volume 16 of class 4 of the
Foreign Office records. PRO/FO/95/1/512 indicates a reference to
folder or volume 512 of series 1 of class 95 of the Foreign Office records;
PRO/T/79/27, "John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird" refers to the claim filed
by the firm of John Hay & Co. & Jas. Baird in folder 27 of class 79 of the
Treasury records.
An excellent and nearly complete edition of the writings of those
individuals who opposed the Constitution in 1787-88 has been compiled
by Herbert J. Storing. 37 1 Rather than cite to the original publication of
these writings, I have used Storing's edition.
In 1834 Congress ordered that all the important American public
papers and documents be published for the period 1789-1834 which
theretofore had been made known to the public via pamphlets and in
other separate publications. The result was an extremely valuable thirtyseven volume collection called American State Papers, compiled into several series or classifications such as "Foreign Affairs," "Indian Affairs,"
and the perhaps inevitable "Miscellaneous," each of which series had its
own set of volume numbers.
B.

Secondary Treatments of the JudiciaryAct of 1789

There are only three notable treatments of the Judiciary Act of
1789. The first was Charles Warren's massive, loving, and insightful
1923 article in HarvardLaw Review, entitled New Light on the History of
the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789.372 It contains several inaccuracies371. THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
372. Warren, supra note 203.

(H. storng,

ed., 1981) (7 vols.).
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Wilfred Ritz acerbically points out several of them in the next work to be
discussed, and others are discussed in my own essay-but most were due
to haste or the stubborness and blindness resulting from the interpretive
framework within which Warren worked (in his case, not so surprisingly,
a relatively uncritical pro-creditor framework). Warren nevertheless did
a massive amount of primary research, most of which has not been approached for its thoroughness until the present study, much less duplicated (and Warren did it without any prior bibliographic aid, searching
endlessly through newspapers, correspondence, and even the attic and
basement of the Capitol to discover and collect most of his material on
his own); and much of his work, especially its depiction of a struggle
between those desiring a strong national government and those desiring a
much weaker version, stands up to the test of time. All historians make
errors (indeed, as the editors of Ritz' volume, including myself, have
carefully pointed out, Ritz himself errs in several minor ways), and Warren's do not overthrow the utility of his work.
The second is Wilfred J. Ritz's new study, Rewriting the History of
the JudiciaryAct of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, and
Using New Evidence.373 As co-editor of this volume, I have had access to
its page-proofs and cite them herein. A relentless and usually sure questioner of apparent myths, interpretive frameworks, and supposed facts,
Ritz exhibits a tenacity that rivals Ellsworth's and a superb instinct for
ferreting out both the heart of a historical problem and the attitudes and
beliefs of those who then had the problem. Ritz refuses to look at matters through present-day eyes, insisting on "rewriting the history of the
judiciary act" from assumptions and beliefs that were contemporaneous
to its genesis. He postulates, quite simply, that there was very little belief
in legal positivism in 1789, and as a result most people then understood
"law" and the role of judges much differently than they do now (as the
assumptions of legal positivism are today so widespread as to be usually
unquestioned). From this position, he develops a whole new way of understanding the context and meaning of the Act, especially of Section 34;
and his work has had a great impact upon my own, as perhaps has been
seen.
The third is that of Julius Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings [of
the Supreme Court] to 1801.374 Prolix and dense to the point of obscurity, this massive work arrives at no large conclusions outside of an uncritical positivist, pro-creditor interpretive framework. I have not found
Goebel's suprisingly error-prone volume, and the only apparently thor373. W. RITz, supra note 3.
374. J. GOEBEL, supra note 3.
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ough work, of much use, and I agree with the criticism of it leveled by
Ritz throughout his book.
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APPENDiX 2: AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASS
Class is not a mathematical matter of counting noses or of comparing static categories of wealth or occupation or status, although those
characteristics of human social existence are relevant and important to
class. Moreover, class is not a deterministic way of predicting precise
individual behavior by extrapolating from characteristics of wealth, status, or occupation that they may have. Rather, class is a way of understanding and expressing the tendencies and interactions of human life
and human history as it has been and is lived in social groups, dynamic,
ever-changing, full of conflict, full of possibility, full of both pain and
hope. Class is primarily a social or group phenomenon, a matter of individuals acting within groups rather than individuals acting as individuals. Any individual might exhibit simultaneously characteristics of two
different classes, move during her lifetime from one class to another, express conflicting class views at different times during a period of intensive
class warfare (such as existed during the Revolutionary and early national periods of United States history), or exhibit characteristics differing from those of others in her same socioeconomic position because of
individual or idiosyncratic experiences or self-reflections. Class deals
primarily with social tendencies and forces, not primarily with individual
characteristics.
Class is a way of looking at and dealing with the political and social
world arising from socioeconomic exploitation. Class revolves around
fundamental clashes between competing ways of life, it deals with conflicting lifestyles and mores emanating from, and in turn reinforcing, conflicting modes of organizing the means of production. 375
In the capitalist mode of production, it is the politically "free" wage
laborer whose exploitation is at the core of the economic organization of
production. An entire economic system is externally characterized by
democratic political forms and egalitarian ideology at the geographic
core; colonialism at the geographic margins; an interconnected and always-expanding system of essentially lawless or "private" markets; the
production of commodities and the increasing commodification of everyday life; the taking of profits as a higher social goal than the maintenance
of human community or health or safety; an overweening emphasis on
trade and commerce such that worth is not based on the substantive or
use value of items but on an abstracted and artificial exchange value; and
an ethos of selfish, individualistic, competitive, essentially antisocial
375. See generally de Ste. Croix, Class in Marx's Conception of History, Ancient and Modern, 146
NEw LEFt REVIEW 94 (1984); Holt, The New American Labor Law History, 30 LABOR HIsr. 275,
282-83 n.13 (1989).
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striving and interpersonal warfare. All of these characteristics revolve
around, emanate from, and are dependent upon the extraction of surplus
labor (the value workers produce minus the cost of their reproduction)
by the bosses or owners of the means of production, from supposedly
consenting but actually ignorant or deceived "free" wage workers
through the partial myth of their freedom.
The precapitalist mode of production is variously also called the
"feudal" or "Asiatic" or (when viewed from the bottom up and somewhat misleadingly) the "household" mode of production. 376 In this
mode, the political system is openly characterized by hierarchy, including hierarchically organized groups or social classes; status and human
sentiment within an accepted notion of hierarchy as natural are the most
important values; wealth derives from direct control of land and of unfree workers who are in some way juridically less than fully human, who
are on the bottom rungs of the social hierarchy and juridically tied to the
land, their occupation, or an overlord; exchange is basically barter-centered, and substantive or use values constitute worth; what the capitalist
world thinks of as the noble calling of banking, the pre-capitalist world
calls the sin or crime of usury, and merchants in the latter world have
very low and marginalized status; and investment goes into land or
slaves/serfs/peons or prestige rather than savings or "capital." All of
this revolves around, emanates from, and is dependent upon the extraction of surplus value from unfree labor: from the serfs, peasants, or slaves
at the bottom of the ladder, by their owners or masters who are close to
its top and legally entitled to this surplus through their ownership not of
tools and plants, but of land and of the workers themselves. Force,
rather than ideology, constitutes the system's ultimate glue.
Both systems are exploitative. Both have wealthy members and
poor members. Both have exchange. The great struggle over exploitation is between the exploiters and the exploited in each system, and this
struggle is what is specifically meant by the term "class struggle." But
there is also warfare between class systems when one class system replaces another, and warfare within the valueless and atomistic realms of
capitalism, that is, warfare among segments of the ruling class (what
Hobbes presciently called the war of all against all). Warfare is the social
norm, in a classed society.
376. See Merrill, Cash is Good to Eat: Self-Sufficiency and Exchange in the Rural Economy of
the United States, 4 RADICAL HiST. REV. 42 (1977); Henretta, Families and Farms: Mentalite in
Pre-IndustrialAmerica, 35 WM. & MARY Q. (3d Ser.) 3 (1978); Thompson, The Moral Economy of
the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50 PAST & PRESENT 76 (1971); Dawley, E.P. Thompson and the Peculiaritiesof the Americans, 19 RADICAL HIsT. REV. 33 (1978).
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During Elizabethan times and the civil wars of the 17th century,
capitalism began to become the dominant class system in England,
although the power of capital was not fully consolidated there until the
19th century.3 77 The socioeconomic ethos of capital spread through
much of the urban portions of the realm of England, whereas it was
much less central in rural areas and the colonial hinterlands. As the
American colonies grew, the ethos of capital became more infused there
among the wealthy and powerful people of the urban seaboard communities. As Ernst, among others, has argued, 378 the American Revolution
developed out of the conflict between the capitalists at home and the
capitalists in the colonies. "But even in the towns [u]nrestrained competition ...was an alien notion .... Traditional ties of social responsibility.., could be maintained only when economic life was pervaded by a
37 9
sense of what was equitable, not simply what was profitable."
An alternative to capitalism was simultaneously developing in the
colonies. The way of life southern planters were coming to cherish was
centered on slavery rather than on "free" labor. While its system produced commodities for exchange, and it was a commercial society in this
important sense, southern slave society was not primarily focused on
profit but lived by and shared the precapitalist values of most of the other
members of an American society that was predominantly rural, agricul380
tural, and barter-oriented.
Most American debtors in the 1780s were rural agriculturalists and
fell on the side of the exploited, whether they were from the north or the
south or whether they suffered under a precapitalist nonslave, slave, or
capitalist system. But their fit to class was not perfect, since debtors and
creditors do not form distinct classes; they are not uniformly related to
ownership of the means of production in opposite fashion. Rural
smallholders and peasants were joined by debtors of other stripes. Most
377. See, e.g., C. HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION 1603-1714 (1966); G. RUDE, THE
CROWD IN HISTORY: A STUDY OF POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND 1730-

1848 (rev. ed. 1981); E. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1789-1848 (1962); E. THOMPSON,
(1966); M. DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOP-

THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS

MENT OF CAPITALISM (rev. ed. 1963).

378. J. ERNST, supra note 44.
379.

G. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS,

AND

THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 32 (1979).
380. See, eg., E. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE, supra note 40; E.
GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF THE

SLAVE SOUTH, supra note 40; M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981). The slaveocracy was already sufficiently strong
in the 1780s to protect itself from the full domination of northern capital in the making of the

See S.
185-213 (1967).

Constitution.

LYND, CLASS CONFLICT: SLAVERY AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
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planters were also in debt, and many allied themselves with their

smallholder neighbors because of their debt situation, because they
shared much of the basic precapitalist morality of the smallholders, and
because they feared the capitalist ways that produced the morality of

their creditor/capitalist opponents and threatened their emerging slave
system at its core. Many budding entrepreneurs and small merchants,
who like the planters and Robert Morris were both debtor and creditor

as they were enmeshed in the capitalist system of debt, also joined the
debt protest because they were recently come to entrepreneurialism or
they were relatively poor, in order to eliminate competition and to obtain
the benefit of partial insolvency or bankruptcy without its pain and ignominy. 38 1 And some planters joined with their socioeconomic antagonists
of the entrepreneurial, commercial north in the pro-creditor/pro-Consti-

tution camp, out of a fear of social revolution or because they thought a
strong central government necessary to guarantee against slave
insurrection.
Nevertheless the fissure between debtors and creditors in the 1780s
was a matter of class. The split between debtor and creditor approxi-

mated class struggle in terms of the primary antagonists (except for the
planters), and the debtors thought they were being exploited. The struggle was described, understood, and fought in class terms (especially by
the creditors). The conflicting moralities were those of different class
structures, different ways of life. The issue was the replacement of a precapitalist way of life with a capitalist one, a struggle that has lasted to our
382
own time.
381. Evans, Indebtedness During Confederation, supra note 29, at 370-71, notes the legislative
petitions of Richmond and Petersburg merchants in 1784, 1786, and 1787 opposing both Virginia
citizenship for British creditors and the adoption of repayment schemes.
382. For additional insight on the two conflicting ways of life, see, e.g., D. SZATMARY, supra
note 79, at 1-18 (describes and compares "the two worlds" of commerce and pre-commerce in rural
New England during the Revolution and the Confederation); J. PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1810-1860 (1983) (describes the losing struggle of rural Massachusetts farmers to retain precapitalist ways in the first half

of the 19th century); B. FIELDS,

SLAVERY AND FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARYLAND

DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1985) (shows the clashes between the culture of slavery and
the culture of capital in a "border" state); S. HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GEORGIA UPCOUNTRY, 1850-1890 (1983)
(demonstrates the persistence of precapitalist ways in rural late 19th century Georgia); THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION: ESSAYS IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF RU-

RAL AMERICA (S. Hahn & J. Prude eds. 1985) (essays about the forced destruction of precapitalist
ways in 19th century America); J. HALL et al., LIKE A FAMILY: THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN
CoTroN MILL WORLD (1987) (demonstrates the clash between precapitalist and capitalist ways as
cotton mills came to the South in the early 20th century); J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY

tence of precapitalist ways in Appalachia into the mid 20th-century).

(1980) (showing the persis-
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APPENDIx 3: Two IMPORTANT 1789 LETrERS

Excerpt from a letter from David Sewall to Caleb Strong (Mar. 28, 1789)
(Caleb Strong Manuscripts, Forbes Library, Northampton, Massachusetts.) Reprinted by permission.
A certain uniformity of decisions throughout the United States,
whether in the federal or State Courts, is an object that may be Worthy
of consideration; and as a means of obtaining this desideratum, Suppose
they should be so constituted as to have a certain necessary connection
with each other-For this purpose suppose that Suits properly Cognizeable at Common Law should be Originated, in such of the Supreme
Judicials of the respective States, Where Judges hold their offices during
good behaviour; and have competent provision made for their supportThis might operate as a powerfull incentive to make the Judges of the
S.C. in the respective States have a permanency in the office, and make
them more respectable-And offences arising from Transgressions of Penal Statutes of Congress, might be cognizable in the S.J. of the State
Courts, Which by the Supposition are to be Competently Supported by
the Individual States and will always be attended with Grand and Petit
Jurors of the best quality the State affords-from such a provision the
expense of the Inferior Judiciary of the united States would certainly be
supplied, without any Expence to the Treasury of the United StatesThat Writs of Error should lie from these several courts to the S.J. of the
U.S. in all causes of a federal kind to a certain amount, within a limited
time-let one Trial by Jury be final in that respect, unless from the usual
causes, for which by law a new Trial ought to be granted. For what
Reason in Nature can be assigned why a man's property should be under
the Considera. of a Jury oftener than his life?-and is not the repeated
Trial of Facts by Jury a N. Englandism which in some future period,
may Operate in a pernicious manner, When it shall happen that Evidence
of any kind may be procured.
A maritime or Admiralty Court whose proceedings are according to
the Course of the Civil Law, must be erected from some quarter-and
suppose the Territory of the united States divided into a number of districts in the division of which no regard is had to the boundarys of particular States, in these several districts suppose Admiralty Judges resident,
and in whose Courts all Seizures of property for breach of the acts of
Trade and Revenue where the process is in Rem may be determinedand from these Admiralty Courts let an appeal lie in causes to a certain
limited Value to the S.J. of the U.S.-and as their divisions may be considerably large Territories let the Admiralty Courts be ambulatory in
their respective districts. As the Laws of Trade and Commerce are to be
uniform and made by Congress, there can be no need of any State Admi-
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ralty, or maritime Courts; let the admiralty courts Jurisdiction be so fully
plainly and clearly defined, as to give full speedy and effectual remedy in
all matters within their Jurisdiction. And When a Felony or Piracy cornmited on the high Seas is to be determined some mode should be devised
for providing a Jury-unless the admiralty Judge is joined to the
Supreme Judicial of the State as the case has been under the old
Confederation.
From this Admiralty Court an appeal in causes to a certain amount
should lay to the S.J. of the U.S.-And as to the S.J. of the United States
a Central Situation and Stationary will be at such a distance from the
extremes (6 or 700 miles) as to make it exceedingly expensive and
burthensome. Suppose therefore the Territory divided into three grand
Districts, in which a major part of the Justices of the S.J. shall hold a
Court once a year-at Stated Times-and perhaps Twice a year in the
Center, in case the admiralty divisions are Nine three of them may make
one of the districts where the S.J. shall hold a Session once at least a
year-Perhaps the Sheriffs of the respective states may execute process of
every kind in their respective Bailiwicks for the present-as to writs of
prohibition & mandamus to the admiralty Courts the State Courts ought
not to Interfere, if it can possibly be avoided lest there be a clashing of
Jurisdictions-But how these are to be procured from the Supreme J. of
the U.S. when they are held as seldom and at such remote distances, is
difficult to guard & provide Sufficiently for.
Excerpt from a letter from Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge (Apr. 24,
1789) (Ralph Izard Papers, roll 229, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina). Reprinted by
permission.
I have informed General Pinckney [in a previous letter, now lost]
how far a Committee of the Senate had agreed on a plan for establishing
the judicial power of the United States, when my letter was written.
They have since come to the following resolutions:
-That the Circuit Courts have appellate jurisdiction from the district Courts in all cases, except Criminal, where the matter in dispute
exceeds Three Hundred Dollars; & original jurisdiction in Cases at Common Law & in Equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds Three Hundred Dollars & a State, or the United States be a party; or where it
exceeds Five Hundred Dollars, and a Foreigner, or Citizen of another
State be a party, saving the option of an immediate resort to the supreme
Court in cases where by the Constitution that Court has original
jurisdiction.
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-That Actions commenced in a State Court where title of Land is
concerned, & the matter in dispute exceeds Five Hundred Dollars, & the
parties claim under grants of different States may on motion of the party
claiming under the grant of another State than that in which the suit is
commenced, be removed to a Circuit Court, & proceed as other Actions
at Law originating there.
-That the Circuit Courts have cognizance of all Crimes not cognizable by the district Courts.
-That Appeals may be had from the Circuit Courts to the supreme
Court in all Causes, except criminal, where the matter in dispute exceeds
Two Thousand Dollars; but shall not subject Facts to a revision.
-That from an ultimate determination of any Cause in the highest
Court of Law, or Equity of a State, where is drawn in question the validity of a Statute of, or an authority exercised under a State, on the ground
of their being repugnant to the Constitution, Laws, or Treaties of the
United States, & the determination is in favour of their validity; or where
is drawn in question the validity of a Law, or Treaty of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, on the ground of their exceeding the
powers vested in the United States, & the determination shall be against
their validity, a writ of Error may be had to the supreme Court for the
Trial of such questions of validity only, so that there be not a reversal for
any other Error, or Defect.
The arrival of the President, & the preparations for the ceremonial
of his public reception have interrupted proceedings of the Committee.

